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Summary 
Community policing (polisi jamii) was officially introduced in Tanzania in 2006 as part 
of an ongoing police reform programme. In addition to attempting to improve 
communication between police and the public, the police have promoted ulinzi 
shirikishi (participatory security), whereby citizens are encouraged to form 
neighbourhood policing institutions to prevent and detect crime. This thesis presents 
the findings of research conducted in the city of Mwanza that explored the extent to 
which community policing has improved residents’ perceptions of local security and 
constitutes a form of policing which is responsive, accountable and sustainable. Whilst 
ulinzi shirikishi is widely credited with having improved local safety, it has proved 
difficult to sustain collective action through community policing and the costs and 
benefits of participation have been unequally distributed across ‘communities’. These 
outcomes should be understood in terms of the context of how local development is 
organised and understood in Tanzania. Firstly, existing local governance institutions 
lack transparency and meaningful accountability mechanisms and are highly 
dependent upon personal preferences and capacity. Secondly, local development is 
politicised and liable to become subject to inter-party competition. Thirdly, historical 
understandings of ‘participation’ in Tanzania tend to emphasise obligation and 
material contributions rather than popular influence over initiatives, however this is 
increasingly being contested in today’s multiparty context. The apparent shortcomings 
of community policing are not necessarily inconsistent with police objectives for the 
reform, which often prioritise cost-effective crime prevention rather than the 
reorientation and ‘democratisation’ of policing envisaged by advocates of community 
policing. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Community policing (hereafter CP) was officially introduced in Tanzania in 2006. 
Expressed in Kiswahili as polisi jamii or ulinzi shirikishi, CP as understood in Tanzania 
refers to both improving relationships and communication between the police and 
citizens, and encouraging ‘communities’ to take responsibility for neighbourhood 
security. Police encourage citizens to cooperate with them by reporting crimes and 
providing intelligence, and also to perform local policing duties by organising night 
patrols to prevent crime, apprehending suspected offenders and resolving local 
disputes. The strategy is thus intended to improve police capacity to prevent crime by 
more effectively gathering and using local knowledge, and to be a means of 
supplementing the extremely limited resources and manpower of the Tanzania Police 
Force (TPF).  
 
According to the Inspector General of Police (IGP), who has demonstrated a strong 
personal commitment to CP, the diverse benefits that can be expected as a result of the 
policy include:  
 
…preventing and reducing crime as well as fear of crime; 
reducing disorder and anti-social behaviors; increasing feelings 
of safety; improving police-community relationships as well as 
improving police-community accountability. Other benefits are 
reducing corruption in the police service, enhancing respect of 
human rights and increasing the community’s capacity to deal 
with local problems and changes (sic) police officers’ attitudes 
and behavior towards policing…The Police Force will be 
oriented towards meeting the needs of civilians and institution 
(sic) of democratic society… 
                  (Mwema 2008: 9) 
 
The rhetoric of CP that has been adopted and its association with improved police 
service and democratisation reflect contemporary international consensus around CP 
as an essential element of police reform. However, attempts to mobilise citizens to 
participate in local security provision, and other forms of ‘self-help’, have a long 
history in Tanzania. CP in Tanzania has been largely internally driven and devised, in 
contrast to neighbouring countries where donors and NGOs have played a larger role. 
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CP in Tanzania also evokes Tanzanian ‘traditions’, and particularly that of sungusungu 
village defence groups, which were formed in response to cattle raiding in the 1980s 
and subsequently promoted around the country.  
 
This thesis explores the implementation of CP in the city of Mwanza, in northwest 
Tanzania, and contributes to a growing literature on CP and other forms of non-state 
or ‘hybrid’ security provision in sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter Africa). Research which 
explores how such forms of policing actually operate, and who they benefit, is 
important at a time when it is increasingly accepted that the state police do not, and 
possibly should not, exercise a monopoly on security provision. The research is also 
pertinent to wider debates about the relative roles of states and organised citizens in 
providing public goods and services.   
 
The main objective of the research was to consider the extent to which CP entailed an 
improvement in security and policing from the perspective of ‘end-users’ (Luckham & 
Kirk 2012), and in this case residents of three selected sites in the city of Mwanza. This 
entailed disaggregating ‘communities’ in order to consider for whom CP provided 
security and from what (Luckham 2007). The thesis explains these outcomes in terms 
of the particular historical trajectories of CP and other forms of ‘self-help’ in Tanzania, 
the politics of local development and the objectives and capacity of the state police in 
forming partnerships with communities.  
 
This introductory chapter outlines the rationale for undertaking this research. Firstly, 
CP is currently promoted globally as a means of both improving the effectiveness of 
crime prevention, and making police more accountable and responsive to citizens. 
However, until recently there has been little analysis of how CP and other forms of 
policing ‘best practice’ derived in Western contexts have been implemented in Africa. 
Existing literature suggests that they are shaped by localised historical and cultural 
contexts and local and national power relations, and thus often have very different 
outcomes from those envisaged by proponents of CP.  
 
Secondly, there appears to be an emerging consensus that African states, and 
particularly those emerging from conflict, cannot on their own provide adequate 
security to citizens, and that ‘hybrid’ forms of security provision, which incorporate 
‘non-state’ or ‘informal’ actors may offer pragmatic and normative advantages. 
However, the claims made for ‘multi-layered’ (OECD 2007) approaches to security 
governance demand empirical exploration.  
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Thirdly, the research contributes to critical perspectives on the claims made for citizen 
‘participation’ in development. CP as practised in Tanzania has been implemented at 
the local level in ways that are very similar to other forms of participatory 
development. Critical insights from the large literature on participation in its various 
forms, and historical experiences of ‘self-help’ in Tanzania, were crucial to 
understanding the way in which CP has been understood and practised in Tanzania 
and whose interests it has served. 
 
The final sections provide definitions of ‘security’ and ‘policing’ as used in the thesis 
and outline the structure of the thesis.    
 
1.1 Community policing in Africa 
 
Tanzania is one of many African countries to have adopted CP as part of broader 
police reforms. Having been the ‘buzzword’ (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 1) of Anglo-
American policing since the 1980s, CP has been ‘exported’ from the west to aid 
recipient countries by donors, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and private consultancy firms (Brogden 2004).  
 
CP is very difficult to define with any precision. Typical organisational forms 
associated with CP reforms include neighbourhood watch and police-community 
forums, however the term has been used to describe a ‘truly bewildering’ variety of 
programmes (Skolnick & Bayley 1988: 2; see also Ellison 2007: 207-208). The concept 
might broadly be said to refer to ‘a style and strategy of policing that appears to reflect 
local community needs’ (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 2). This implies accountability, 
transparency and responsiveness to a community, although it remains unclear how 
this is to be achieved. The lack of consensus about what CP actually entails has not 
prevented it from becoming ‘the almost unchallenged definition of good and 
democratic policing’ (Marenin 2009a: vii). The World Development Report for 2011, for 
example, includes ‘programs that support bottom-up state-society relations in insecure 
areas’, of which it considers CP to be an example, among its top five principles for 
programme design to bring about institutional change and confidence building in 
countries affected by conflict and violence (World Bank 2011: 18).  
 
More practically, many African governments have welcomed CP as a possible solution 
to rising crime rates which have not been reduced through more traditional, reactive 
forms of policing, and as a means to improve police legitimacy (Brogden & Nijhar 
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2005: 162-164). Espousing CP may sometimes offer potential career advancement for 
individual senior officers, political capital, or access to external resources (Ellison 2007: 
214-215; Hills 2012b). The popularity of the concept is such that police forces in states 
with political regimes as diverse as those of Ghana, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have 
claimed to be implementing CP (Hills 2008: 215-216).     
 
In practice, CP has often entailed adoption of generalised international models, with 
little consideration of local context (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 3).1 As Ellison (2007: 213) 
notes, promotion of CP has been predicated upon the assumption that best practice 
derived elsewhere ‘can simply be transplanted to another jurisdiction without due 
regard for history, politics, culture, economic differentials, the historical relationship of 
police to public, questions of police legitimacy, state repression, appropriateness and 
sustainability.’ Although until relatively recently, there was little assessment of the 
outcomes of implementing CP in African countries other than South Africa (Brogden & 
Nijhar 2005: 3),2 a growing literature on cases including Kenya (Ruteere and 
Pommerolle 2002), Sierra Leone (Baker 2008a), Mozambique (Kyed 2010) and Nigeria 
(Hills 2012b) demonstrates the extent to which CP is ‘mediated by localized cultural 
and historical repertoires’ (Pratten & Sen 2008: 19), as well as political and economic 
interests (Kyed 2009; Hills 2012b). The introduction of institutional forms associated 
with CP, such as neighbourhood watch or police-community forums, has not 
necessarily ‘democratised’ policing, but has frequently reflected authoritarian models 
of policing and existing inequalities, amounting to what Ruteere and Pommerolle 
(2002) term ‘decentralized repression’.3  
 
1.2 Engaging with non-state security providers4  
 
The Tanzanian experience of CP is also pertinent in the context of calls for Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) to take greater account of the wide range of actors engaged in 
providing security in Africa, rather than pursuing a state-centric approach. Although 
CP in Tanzania has been led by police, ‘communities’ are expected to play a more 
active role in policing than is typically envisaged in Anglo-American CP programmes, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 CP is not unique in this regard. Donor-supported police reforms in developing countries are often 
devised with little knowledge of policing practices in the recipient country and are predicated upon the 
implantation of institutions which may have little relevance to historical, political and economic 
conditions (Hinton & Newburn 2009: 1-3).   
2 For South Africa, see for example: Pelser (1999); Gordon (2001); Schärf (2001); Brogden (2002) Shaw 
(2002); Bénit-Gbaffou (2008); Minnaar (2009).  
3 See also Steinberg (2011) for an illuminating analysis of the similarities between Apartheid-era policing 
and the way in which ‘crime prevention’ has been implemented in South Africa.   
4 The term ‘non-state’ is used here to denote security providers other than the state police and military, 
although it is recognised that the divisions between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are frequently blurred, and that 
‘non-state providers’ do not constitute a coherent category.  
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similar to Baker’s (2009a: 373) ‘African model’ of CP (discussed further in the following 
chapter). Rather than the public assisting the police to provide a better service, 
emphasis is placed on ‘local groups doing much of the everyday policing with the 
assistance or at least the consent of the police’ (ibid.).  
 
The police forces of African states typically do not exert a monopoly over security 
provision, being largely absent from vast areas, and often perceived as illegitimate 
instruments of regime domination or as self-interested and predatory. This does not 
imply that African states are barely policed. Policing may be undertaken by a wide 
range of actors, connected to varying degrees to the state (Baker 2008b).5 It is 
recognised that governance can occur in the absence of government (Menkhaus 2007), 
and that policing may be carried out by a range of ‘twilight institutions’, which ‘are not 
the state but they exercise public authority’ (Lund 2006a: 673). Analyses of ‘hybrid’ 
political orders emphasise the extent to which state authority co-exists with multiple 
forms of public authority based on diverse logics (Boege et al. 2009).  
 
Reductions in state funding of public services and trends towards privatisation 
associated with neo-liberalism have created new opportunities and incentives for the 
emergence of diverse policing providers (Abrahamsen & Williams 2007: 138; Pratten & 
Sen 2008: 2). However, many fine-grained studies have demonstrated the extent to 
which local or ‘everyday policing’ (Buur & Jensen 2004) is not only a response to state 
failure to provide security, but reflects ‘its own local and national historical and 
cultural logics’ (Pratten 2008: 5).6 Furthermore, the novelty of plural policing in Africa, 
or of attempts to co-opt alternative actors, should not be overstated. As outlined with 
regard to Tanzania in Chapter 3, the inability of state police forces to operate across 
entire territories has resulted in various attempts to involve organised citizens in 
policing, whether through the structures of indirect rule, ruling party institutions or 
the co-optation of vigilantes. 
 
The diversity of security providers in Africa and the apparent incapacity of African 
states, particularly those emerging from conflict, to provide security for all citizens 
have led to calls to rethink the state-centric focus of SSR and donor-supported police 
reforms.  Academics and policymakers have begun to explore the potential to engage 
with ‘non-state’ or ‘informal’ actors (e.g. Baker & Scheye 2007; OECD 2007; Albrecht & 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 This is not unique to Africa. Whether conceptualised as ‘multilateralisation’ (Bayley & Shearing 2001), 
‘pluralisation’ (Jones & Newburn 1998), or ‘plural networked policing’ (Loader 2000) there is now 
widespread academic consensus around the notion that the state is not the only, or necessarily the 
dominant, provider of policing.  
6 See for example: Lund (2001); Buur & Jensen (2004); Buur (2006); Heald (2006); Pratten (2006); Kyed 
(2007); Pratten & Sen (2007); Jensen (2008); Titeca (2009). 
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Kyed 2010; Bagayoko 2012). There is ‘an emergent policy orthodoxy that policing is a 
multi-layered activity requiring police to co-operate with informal providers’ (Hills 
2012a: 2). The pragmatic and normative reasons advanced for looking beyond the state 
are discussed further in the following chapter. Briefly, non-state institutions are 
typically assumed to be more accessible to citizens, in terms of proximity, language 
used and methods, to have greater popular legitimacy, to be responsive to local 
demands, and to offer a cost-effective means of establishing security. It is also 
recognised that some of the commonly observed problems with non-state policing, 
such as use of corporal punishment, torture and persecution of marginalised groups, 
may not be any more likely to blight non-state delivery than they do the state police, 
and there is no a priori reason to assume that non-state providers are less amenable to 
reform (Baker & Scheye 2007: 517). 
 
It is valuable to move beyond seeing deviations from a ‘western’ model of the state as 
inherently problematic, and to recognise that there are multiple potential routes to 
achieving effective public authority capable of providing goods and services (CFS 
2010). However, it is not clear that recognition of ‘hybridity’ offers a clear alternative to 
Weberian assumptions about the pre-eminent role of the state in providing security. 
Attempts to engage locally authoritative institutions in providing public security raise 
a number of important empirical questions, including the extent to which local order 
might be confused for local legitimacy or acceptability, and how complex relationships 
with external actors and interests affect local accountability (Meagher 2012). These 
appear particularly pressing given the potential for non-state policing to be violent, 
predatory and discriminatory, and the extent to which local security provision may be 
co-opted to serve the ends of powerful external actors.  
 
1.3 ‘Participatory security’ in Tanzania  
 
This case study of CP in Tanzania is also pertinent to broader debates about service 
delivery in developing countries, and in particular the promotion of ‘participation’ in 
local development. As noted above, CP as understood in Tanzania does not only refer 
to reforms to the practices and orientation of the state police, but also places 
responsibility on citizens to organise for their own security. The way in which CP is 
both implemented and discussed is very similar to other forms of participatory or 
‘community-based’ development, which are central to the provision of a range of 
collective goods and services at the local level.  
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Participation, like CP, is an elastic term, which has spawned varied manifestations, yet 
has achieved the status of ‘development orthodoxy’ (Cornwall 2006: 62). By involving 
‘communities’ in the planning and implementation of local development strategies, it 
is hoped that outcomes will be closer to popular demands, more effective and more 
sustainable, and that citizens might be empowered to better engage with democratic 
political processes. More critical perspectives, however, emphasise the importance of 
history, political context and existing inequalities to outcomes as argued above with 
regard to CP. Three particularly important critiques, which relate to the assumptions 
frequently made by development practitioners, and advocates of CP, about 
‘communities’, are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. In summary, 
whilst citizen engagement with service delivery can be highly beneficial and can 
positively reconfigure relationships between citizens and governments, the context in 
which participation takes place is important, in terms of the legal and institutional 
frameworks in place, existing power relations and histories of social mobilisation in the 
country concerned. Thus importing ‘best practice’ models does not guarantee positive 
outcomes (Citizenship DRC 2011).  
 
1.4 Community policing in historical perspective    
 
As noted in the opening section of this chapter, mobilising citizens in the interests of 
local security is not a new strategy in Tanzania. Self-help, or participatory 
development, also has a long history in the country, from colonial era attempts to 
generate cost effective improvements to local infrastructure, through Nyerere’s 
ideology of kujitegemea (self-reliance) to the ubiquity of community-based strategies in 
donor-led development projects today. Throughout the thesis contemporary practices 
are situated within their historical context in order to highlight the influence of 
historical understandings of participation, development and security, and the 
organisation of state-society relations in Tanzania on how CP is practised today, and to 
assess the extent to which CP forms a new and distinct approach. Furthermore, 
experiences of sungusungu ‘vigilantism’ form an important source of reference in how 
CP, and participation in CP, is understood today. Whilst there are observable 
continuities in local governance, the intensification of party political competition at the 
local level in urban Mwanza is challenging established ways of doing things, and CP is 
also shaped by new contests over what citizens can be expected to contribute towards 
local and national development.  
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1.5 Definition of key terms: policing and the governance of security 
 
Following Luckham & Kirk (2012), a dual-sided definition of security is adopted, 
which reflects both demand and supply side aspects of security production. Firstly: 
‘security is a process of political and social ordering, maintained through authoritative 
discourses and practices of power’ (ibid.: 10). However, it is also ‘an entitlement of 
citizens, and more widely of human beings, to protection from violence and other 
forms of existential risk’ (ibid.). This analysis of the impact of CP on local security in 
Mwanza thus explores the perceptions of those who are ostensibly served by local 
policing institutions regarding the extent to which they are protected through CP, but 
also how CP is shaped by existing and changing power relations, which determine 
how order is constructed.  
 
Policing is defined here, following Johnston (1999: 178), as ‘a purposive strategy 
involving the initiation of techniques which are intended to offer guarantees of security 
to subjects.’ Whilst this might include preventing or removing threats to the safety of 
citizens, for example through crime prevention, the dual-sided definition of security 
adopted above suggests that policing is also a highly political endeavour. Policing can 
uphold a universally beneficial ‘general order’, but also seeks to protect ‘specific order’, 
determined by particular dominant interests (Marenin 1982). The relationship between 
state policing and political competition in Tanzania is explored in Chapter 3. This 
definition deliberately does not specify which types of actors engage in policing. 
Throughout this thesis, ‘police’ is used to refer to the Tanzania Police Force (TPF) and 
its officers. However, policing does not refer only to the police and their activities, or to 
the enforcement of state laws.  
 
Policing is understood here as a form of governance, comprising processes whereby 
various actors are involved in the production of security, with varying degrees of 
success. Governance can be defined as ‘the processes through which individuals and 
state officials interact to express their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, 
work out their differences and cooperate to produce public goods and services’ 
(Brinkerhoff & Goldsmith 2005: 200). These processes might be determined by highly 
formalised and codified rules, or remain largely informal, and could occur largely 
within or outside of the institutions of the state.  
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1.6 Summary of the objectives of the thesis  
 
The thesis provides a detailed and historically contextualised account of the 
implementation of CP in the Tanzanian city of Mwanza, which contributes to empirical 
knowledge about citizens’ experiences of security and policing. This is valuable at a 
time when the feasibility and desirability of a state monopoly on security provision in 
Africa is increasingly being questioned, yet the modalities of how governments or 
international actors might engage with ‘non-state’ actors and the implications of doing 
so remain unclear. The thesis thus contributes to broader debates about the respective 
roles of ‘communities’ and states in providing security and other collective goods and 
services, and the conditions under which community-based development might 
produce more equitable, responsive and sustainable outcomes. This case study of CP 
also illustrates the local level manifestations of processes of political liberalisation in 
Tanzania, and shifting understandings of the role of citizens in bringing about local 
development.  
 
1.7 Thesis outline   
 
Chapter 2 provides a more detailed overview of the promotion of CP and other forms 
of citizen participation in local service delivery by governments and international 
donors. Three key critiques of community-based approaches to development are 
discussed, which are pertinent to CP as it has been implemented in Tanzania and 
inform supplementary research questions that shape the analysis presented in 
subsequent chapters. These general critiques are illustrated through a brief account of 
the history of policies promoting self-help in Tanzania, and the contemporary 
resonance of historical understandings of participation. A theoretical framework is 
elaborated which informs the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a history of policing in Tanzania since the start of British 
administration in 1919 and outlines contemporary CP reforms in greater detail. The 
chapter emphasises the extent to which CP is part of a long history of mobilisation of 
citizens for local security, and in particular, ruling party co-optation of sungusungu 
vigilante groups in the 1980s.  
 
In Chapter 4 the research design and methods of data collection used are outlined, 
including the rationale behind conducting the research in Mwanza and the selection of 
three cases within the city. These cases are introduced in more detail in Chapter 5, 
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which provides a history of sungusungu in urban Mwanza and an overview of 
contemporary CP arrangements in the three sites. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses how CP operates in Mwanza in terms of: the impact of CP on 
popular perceptions of local security; the durability of local CP institutions; for whom 
and from what CP institutions provide security; and the extent to which CP is 
responsive to local needs. These outcomes are explained in Chapter 7 by situating CP 
within the historical trajectories of self-help and policing in Tanzania and the ongoing 
transition away from the one-party state. Chapter 7 also investigates how co-
production of security through CP has worked in practice and the effect of partnership 
between police and communities on local collective action.  
 
The main research findings are synthesised in Chapter 8 and possible future research 
directions are explored. 
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Chapter 2: States and Communities in the Provision of Public 
Security 
 
The main objective of the research was to explore the extent to which CP improved 
security and policing from the perspective of members of the ‘communities’ who are 
encouraged to practice CP. The literature reviewed in this chapter informed three sub-
questions: 
  
1. How well do CP institutions initiate and sustain collective action?  
2. How are the costs and benefits of participation in CP distributed within 
communities and between communities and the police?  
3. For whom does CP provide security and from what?  
 
The central contention of CP is that the public should play a more active role in 
ensuring their own security, as the police alone are not able to adequately bear this 
responsibility (Skolnick & Bayley 1988: 3). It is clear that in the short term most African 
states will be unable to provide security equally for all citizens within their territories. 
CP is thus intended to institutionalise ‘co-production’, whereby policing is provided 
‘through regular, long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups 
of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions’ (Joshi & Moore 2004: 
40). This chapter explores the implications of co-producing local security for both 
‘communities’ and the police, before stating the theoretical framework that informs the 
thesis.  
 
The first section outlines the processes underlying the ‘de-statisation’ (Olivier de 
Sardan 2009: 3) of the provision of many collective goods and services in Africa, 
including security and policing, and in particular the emergence of a consensus around 
community ‘participation’ as an essential component of developmental governance. 
Although long considered a privileged element of statehood, security provision has not 
been immune from these trends. It is increasingly accepted that governments are 
unable to exercise a monopoly on security provision within their territories and that 
there are pragmatic and normative reasons for incorporating a range of actors into the 
governance of security. The chapter explores the promotion by governments and 
international actors of community participation in local security provision through 
‘community policing’ and other forms of partnership with ‘non-state’ security 
providers.  
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However, more critical perspectives on participatory development illuminate some 
problematic assumptions that often inform community-based development strategies 
and that are highly pertinent to CP as practised in Tanzania. Firstly, projects predicated 
upon participation frequently underestimate the difficulties in organising 
neighbourhood collective action and may impose institutional models that are not 
conducive to local cooperation. Secondly, ‘communities’ are not homogeneous and are 
characterised by differentials of power and status. This affects who is able to benefit 
from participation and from the service provided. Thirdly, participation can entail 
considerable costs, which may be borne largely by the relatively poor or otherwise 
disadvantaged. These general critiques are illustrated through a brief history of ‘self-
help’ in Tanzania, which has often been compulsory and state-directed, rather than 
reflecting ‘bottom-up’ community empowerment.  
 
The final section reviews existing evidence on the capacity and willingness of African 
police forces to cooperate with communities, and potentially to mitigate the problems 
of relying upon self-help security initiatives, and suggests that CP strategies must 
address existing collective action problems that limit cooperation between police and 
citizens.  
 
2.1 De-statisation of service delivery in Tanzania  
 
When Tanzania gained independence in 1961, dominant perspectives in development 
theory emphasised the importance of a strong state as an agent of national 
development, casting alternative bases for organisation, such as ethnic solidarity or 
community, as potentially retrogressive (Ferguson 2006: 94-95). However, by the late 
1980s the state was being reframed as an obstacle to development, and it was argued 
that either private enterprise or ‘civil society’ were better placed to provide public 
goods and services. Three broad trends in public sector reform, reflecting divergent 
ideological positions, have contributed to the diversification of service providers in 
developing countries. Pluralisation, associated with New Public Management reforms, 
has been advocated as a means of enabling users to exercise ‘choice’, whilst an 
increased recognition of the importance of making service providers accountable to 
users (e.g. World Bank 2003) has led to a focus on decentralisation and institutionalised 
participation (Joshi 2007). The diversity of actors now involved in producing collective 
goods and services is such that it can be argued that ‘there is no longer any public 
service in Africa whose deliverance does not include the greater or lesser involvement 
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of the four following instances: the state administrative services, the development 
administrations (NGOs and international agencies), the “community-type” 
organisations… and private operators’ (Blundo & Le Meur 2009: 15). 
 
In Tanzania, these trends have contributed to a significant alteration in the local 
governance landscape, from what had been ‘one of Africa’s furthest-going forms of 
statism’ (Kiondo 1994: 38). In 1986, economic crisis and internal and external pressures 
obliged then President Mwinyi to implement structural adjustment policies that 
liberalised trade and reduced government expenditure on social services. Whilst many 
services were privatised, new institutions were also formed as people sought to 
improve their quality of life through collective endeavours, including sungusungu 
defence groups, urban hometown development associations and organised groups of 
parents who lobbied for the right to establish private secondary schools (Tripp 1997: 
12-13; see also Kiondo 1994).  
 
Subsequently, governance has been further ‘shifted from center to satellite through a 
combination of decentralization policies and the promotion of civil society’ (Green 
2010a: 16). A donor funded programme of local government reform with an emphasis 
on decentralisation was introduced in 1998, which aims to make service delivery more 
equitable, accountable and responsive to local needs and enshrines citizen 
participation in development planning  (PMORALG 2004; see also Green 2010b). The 
number of NGOs and other civil society organisations operating in Tanzania has 
increased rapidly since the mid-1980s (see Kiondo 1994; Mercer 1999). The proliferation 
of ‘community-based organisations’ (CBOs), for example, has been ‘phenomenal’ (Dill 
2010a: 25), to the extent that in 2010 over half of the mitaa (the smallest administrative 
unit in urban Tanzania) in Dar es Salaam had some form of community body engaged 
in attempts to improve infrastructure or provide other collective goods (ibid.). 
‘Participation’ of service users is an ubiquitous component of development projects in 
the country and forms a central premise of the way in which many collective goods are 
provided in Tanzania, including infrastructure upgrading (Cadstedt 2006), 
management of natural resources including water (Cleaver & Toner 2006; Brockington 
2008; Lange 2008; Dill 2010b), public health interventions (Marsland 2006) and waste 
management (Myers 2005). Since 2006, CP institutions have also been introduced in 
many areas, adding to the range of participatory community institutions intended to 
provide goods and services at the local level.  
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2.2 Participatory development  
 
Involving communities in the planning and implementation of local development 
strategies is not a new idea, having been a key tenet of a range of approaches to local 
development, including colonial promotion of ‘self-help’ in the 1950s (Hickey & 
Mohan 2004: 5-9; see also Cornwall 2006). The long history of participation in local 
development, or ‘nation building’, in Tanzania is discussed below (2.4). More recent 
approaches to participation emerged from a critique of attempts to impose 
standardised and ‘top down’ programmes which did not address local needs and 
realities and privileged ‘professional’ or ‘expert’ knowledge over that of the poor 
(Chambers 1995: 30). These radical contentions have been absorbed by more 
‘mainstream’ development actors, to the extent that by the 1990s participation had 
become ‘development orthodoxy…[seen as] an essential ingredient in getting 
development interventions and policies right’ (Cornwall 2006: 62). Broadly, 
participation is concerned with ‘the exercise of popular agency in relation to 
development’ (Hickey & Mohan 2004: 3). In ideal terms this could be ‘an empowering 
process which enables local people to do their own analysis, to take command, to gain 
in confidence, and to make their own decisions’ (Chambers 1995: 30).  
 
From the recognition that development aid should be more responsive to the needs of 
the poor, local participation has to some extent ‘acquired a life of its own’ (Mansuri & 
Rao 2013: 15). Participation is an ‘infinitely malleable term’ (Cornwall 2006: 63), and a 
wide range of institutional forms have been adopted in order to encourage community 
engagement with service delivery, including CBOs (e.g. Dill 2010a), social funds, 
participatory rural appraisals (Chambers 1997), user committees (e.g. Manor 2004), 
‘public-public partnerships’ in service delivery (e.g. Dill 2010b) and participatory 
planning and budgeting processes (e.g. Heller 2001; Baiocchi 2001; Wampler 2007). 
Participation is promoted both a means of improving development outcomes and as an 
end in itself, which should empower participants to improve their own lives (Nelson & 
Wright 1995). ‘Heroic claims’ (Cleaver 1999: 597) are often made for the potential of 
participatory projects. Firstly, involving the ‘community’ in service delivery is 
expected to make outcomes closer to what local populations want and to improve 
sustainability and cost-effectiveness by capitalising upon community resources (e.g. 
Dongier et al. 2003). At the same time, participation has been cast as a means of 
empowering the disadvantaged as part of processes of democratisation and the 
implementation of ‘good governance’ (Cornwall 2006: 77-78). By giving the poor 
greater opportunities to exercise ‘voice’, localised service delivery is assumed to be 
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more responsive to popular demands and to result in more equitable distribution of 
public resources and reduced opportunities for corruption (see Mansuri and Rao 2013: 
15-16).  
 
2.2.1 Participation in local security provision through community policing   
!
CP approaches emerged largely within Anglo-American criminology and sought to 
address perceived shortcomings of policing in these contexts. However, CP shares 
considerable similarities with participatory development in terms of an ostensible 
desire to move away from ‘top down’ policing strategies which marginalised local 
concerns, as well as in the assumptions made about the positive impact the process of 
participating in CP will have upon individuals and communities. In Tanzania, CP is 
translated as ulinzi shirikishi, or participatory security,7 employing the terminology of 
participation applied to other participatory methods (mbinu shirikishi) and projects. The 
ways in which citizens are expected to participate in policing in Tanzania are 
somewhat different from CP as developed in the Anglo-American contexts in which it 
originated, as discussed below, having similar institutional manifestations to 
participatory development in other sectors such as infrastructure upgrading and local 
sanitation. 
 
Much like ‘participation’, CP has become an extremely elastic term which has been 
applied to a wide variety of activities undertaken by both state police and 
‘communities’, being ‘widely endorsed, though at the same time widely seen to be 
close to meaningless’ (Tilley 2008: 377). Despite the lack of consensus around what the 
concept entails, CP has become the ‘unchallenged definition of democratic policing’ 
(Marenin 2009a: vii) and is often presented as synonymous with good policing in 
reports and evaluations (Ellison 2007: 209). As outlined in the previous chapter, CP has 
proved highly popular amongst both donors supporting police reforms in Africa and 
aid recipient police forces (Hills 2008: 215).  
 
CP as conceived in Anglo-American contexts is typically focused upon improving the 
performance of the state police, for example by increasing their accountability and 
responsiveness to the public and improving crime prevention capacity through 
capitalising upon local knowledge. In many sub-Saharan African countries, however, 
reflecting the extreme resource shortages facing police and their tenuous monopoly on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 According to the TPF website, CP was initially translated as polisi jamii, but has subsequently been re-
translated as ulinzi shirikishi, which is now the preferred translation. See:  
http://www.policeforce.go.tz/index.php/community-policing (accessed 13 January 2013). 
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service provision, an alternative model of police-community partnership has been 
pursued, whereby: ‘The focus…is not on local groups assisting the police to do a better 
job. Instead, the focus is on (or shifts to) local groups doing much of the everyday 
policing with the assistance or at least the consent of the police (Baker 2009a: 373).8  
 
Based on examples drawn from the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 
Tilley (2008: 373), writing in the Handbook of Policing, argues, that ‘Community policing 
stresses policing with and for the community rather than policing of the community. It 
aspires to improve the quality of life in communities.’ However, in many African 
contexts, including Tanzania, whilst CP strategies do attempt to improve the image of 
the police and their relationship with citizens, CP often approximates policing by the 
community.9 Such ‘society-led’, ‘informal’ or ‘self-policing’ models have been praised 
as offering a means of making the rhetoric of CP more relevant to African populations 
(Wisler and Onwudiwe 2009). Others have highlighted the likelihood that partnerships 
established between communities and the police are unlikely to be sustained if 
dominated by the police (Ruteere and Pommerolle 2002; Baker 2009b: 83). The 
sungusungu of Tanzania and Kenya, which in places operate relatively independently 
of state police and the judiciary, enforcing their own local laws, have been described as 
‘arguably the most successful form of community policing in Eastern Africa’ (Heald 
2007: 2). 
 
A related trend is apparent in the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR),10 where 
academics and donors are increasingly reacting against a former state-centric bias to 
support engagement with alternative ‘local’ security providers (e.g. Baker & Scheye 
2007; Albrecht & Kyed 2010; Bagayoko 2012). The OECD, for example, has advocated a 
‘multi-layered’ approach to SSR which ‘would divide international assistance between 
the state as a regulator, but only a minority provider, of security, and ‘non-state justice 
and security service providers, given their position as the primary purveyors of day-to-
day service delivery’ (OECD 2007: 7). The idea that the police and donors should 
attempt to form partnerships with alternative actors is increasingly accepted, even if in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 See, for example: Brogden (2002: 176) on neighbourhood watch in South Africa’s Western Cape; Brogen 
(2005: 89) on the adaptation of CP in Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zambia; Baker (2009a) on 
Liberia and Sudan.  
9 The Kenyan Police Commissioner in 1997 described CP as involving ‘recruiting civilians as reserve 
officers and the construction of police offices and residential houses on a harambee [self-help] basis’ 
(quoted in Ruteere and Pommerolle: 594-595). The Mozambican Ministry of the Interior states that: 
‘Community policing means the direct involvement of citizens in the security system and policing, giving 
them responsibility to take part in making the community a secure ordered and harmonious place’ 
(quoted in Kyed 2009: 357). 
10 For an overview of the emergence of SSR as a development concern see Albrecht and Buur (2009).  
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practice the modalities of how to incorporate other actors may remain somewhat 
unclear (Albrecht & Buur 2009).  
 
As is the case with other forms of participation, CP is promoted as both a means and 
an end in itself (Nelson & Wright 1995). Advocates of ‘bottom up’ forms of CP argue 
that capitalising on local knowledge will improve the effectiveness of policing (Baker 
2008c: 568; Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009: 5). As communities are best placed to identify 
the problems that affect them and how they should be resolved, they should thus be 
involved in planning and implementing locally defined solutions (e.g. Saferworld 2008: 
4). Involving communities is also expected to improve efficiency (Wisler & Onwudiwe 
2009: 5; Bagayoko 2012: 7), and this is particularly appealing in post-conflict contexts 
where the costs of restructuring discredited state police forces may be prohibitive 
(Baker 2010a: 214). Localised policing is also expected to be cheaper for end users than 
other alternatives (Baker 2012: 288).  
 
In addition, community based policing is assumed to have normative advantages, 
being deemed closer to popular desires, operating in accordance with local norms, and 
possessing greater local legitimacy and popularity than state police forces (e.g. Baker 
2008c: 568; Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009: 4; Bagayoko 2012: 7). It has also been argued that 
locally organised policing could improve accountability by virtue of being ‘closer’ to 
those policed, who are thus better able to monitor performance and implement 
sanctions if necessary (Baker 2010a: 216). CP is often associated with democratising 
security provision, through improved accountability relationships between police and 
citizens, and enhancing deliberative democracy due to the increased engagement of 
citizens with governance (Wood and Shearing 2006; see for example Saferworld 2008; 
Kyed 2009: 354). CP has also been assumed to have positive benefits in itself aside from 
any impact on the quality of service delivery, envisaged as a means of enhancing social 
cohesion (e.g. Saferworld 2008; Kyed 2009: 358). Saferworld (2008: 5), for example, in 
their report on establishing CP in Kenya, list amongst the benefits of CP that it: 
‘encourages networking, constructive social relations and greater cohesion within the 
community’.  
 
Due to shortages of resources and personnel, the participation of communities, 
however defined, in policing may be the only way to ensure that all citizens have 
access to some form of security provision. Furthermore, historical experiences of state 
policing in Africa, which has often been oriented towards service of the regime rather 
than the public (Hills 2000), may make a ‘community’ alternative highly appealing to 
citizens. The logic for sharing responsibility for local security through a form of 
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‘institutionalised co-production’ is explained by both the ‘governance’ and ‘logistical’ 
drivers identified by Joshi and Moore (2004: 41). Governance drivers refer to situations 
whereby government lacks adequate capacity to provide services efficiently. The 
Tanzanian police force is significantly under-resourced with a very low police to 
population ratio (see 3.3.4). Shortages of human and other resources form part of the 
rationale for adopting CP, which is envisaged as a low cost policing strategy. Logistical 
drivers refer to the nature of the service in question. With regard to policing, there are 
logistical imperatives for the police to work with local residents whose knowledge of 
the local environment and crime situation is valuable. The police cannot hope to accrue 
such a level of local expertise. They also depend on citizens to report crimes. However, 
critical perspectives on participatory development, as well as the existing evidence on 
implementation of CP in other African countries, suggests that some of the more 
normative claims made about the potential benefits of CP require interrogation.   
 
2.3 Critical perspectives on participatory development 
 
Various forms of citizen participation in and engagement with service delivery have 
been shown to have a positive developmental impact and reconfigure state-society 
relations in a range of ways, including increasing capacity for local collective action, 
making states more responsive and accountable, and improving access to services 
(Gaventa & Barrett 2010). However, there are also ‘risks of citizen engagement’ (ibid.: 
47), and positive outcomes may require enabling conditions related to the form taken 
by participation and the political context in which it takes place. Recognising the wide 
range of practices and institutions that have been described in terms of both 
participation and CP, this section focuses on ‘strong’ understandings of participation, 
which aim to fundamentally alter how a service is delivered through the formation of 
partnerships with organised citizens, rather than weaker versions which might entail 
only one-off consultation (Loizos & Clayton 1997, cited in Brett 2003: 5). Firstly, 
participation requires communities to overcome collective action problems, which may 
be exacerbated by imposed institutional forms that do not take into account local 
realities. Secondly, the way in which participation in CP and other initiatives is 
organised may reflect and entrench existing power relations. Finally, although CP and 
other forms of self-help are envisaged as low cost governance solutions, they may 
impose considerable costs on those who are expected to participate. Central to all 
issues discussed below is the extent to which CP and other participatory strategies 
have relied upon assumptions about ‘communities’, often conflated with geographic 
neighbourhoods, which are rarely fulfilled in reality.  
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2.3.1 Participation and collective action  
 
Participation in the production of public goods or services requires citizens to 
cooperate in pursuit of shared gains. The collective action problems this entails are 
often not sufficiently considered by development practitioners, who ‘excel in 
perpetuating the myth that communities are capable of anything, that all that is 
required is sufficient mobilization and the latent and unlimited capacities of the 
community will be unleashed in the interests of development’ (Cleaver 1999: 604). 
Similarly, literature discussing the plurality of actors involved in policing Africa often 
emphasises the incentives for the initiation of forms of non-state policing, such as the 
absence or illegitimacy of state provision, opportunities for political or financial gain 
and the desire to uphold particular social orders. This is in contrast to analyses of CP in 
Western Europe and North America, which emphasise the difficulty of initiating and 
sustaining community cooperation (e.g. Laycock and Tilley 1995; Herbert 2006). These 
contrasting assumptions are exemplified by Wisler & Onwudiwe’s (2007) distinction 
between CP in ‘Western democracies’ as a ‘top down’ policy whereby police dominate 
strategies and CP is largely ‘a policy in search of a community’ and African contexts 
where CP is ‘we may argue without too much exaggeration…a community in search of 
a state’ (ibid.: 4). In practice, however, there may be a trade-off between the apparent 
benefits of local policing, and the difficulty in sustaining community-based policing 
predicated upon voluntarism (Baker 2009: 80-1).  
 
Development can be framed as a collective action problem that requires the resolution 
of obstacles to cooperation at local and national levels (Booth 2012). A collective action 
problem occurs when in order to attain a goal that is mutually beneficial, multiple 
actors must decide to take a personally costly action (Medina 2007: 23). In the case of 
CP, the collectively beneficial objective concerned is the security of the neighbourhood. 
Security can be understood as a public good, which yields ‘non-subtractive benefits 
that can be enjoyed jointly by many people who are hard to exclude from obtaining 
these benefits’ (Ostrom 2005: 23). Individuals know that they cannot be excluded from 
enjoyment of the collective benefits produced by CP, such as safer streets, regardless of 
whether they contribute to the production of the good. They thus have an incentive to 
‘free-ride’ on the inputs of others whilst avoiding incurring costs themselves (Olson 
1965). In practice, however, groups of individuals do manage to organise cooperation 
through institutions, broadly defined as ‘the prescriptions that humans use to organize 
all forms of repetitive and structured interactions’ (Ostrom 2005: 3). Institutions 
facilitate collective action by altering the incentives facing individuals to encourage 
cooperation and generating shared expectations about how others will behave in 
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collective action situations (North 1990). This requires rules or norms, that are 
mutually understood and predictably enforced, whether by designated authoritative 
agents or by individuals themselves (Ostrom 2005).  
 
Collective action problems can be exacerbated by the imposition of structures derived 
from idealised versions of western institutions, referred to by Evans (2004) as 
‘institutional monocropping’. This can lead to contradictions between new formalised 
rules and existing practices and power relations, rendering new structures ineffectual 
(ibid.: 33). The history of the promotion of sungusungu in Tanzania is illustrative (see 
also 3.2.3). Where participation in sungusungu was compelled in the 1990s and 
introduced according to a standardised government model, groups were not highly 
sustainable and there were low rates of compliance and cooperation amongst members 
(Mwaikusa 1995: 171). Efforts that subverted existing forms of public authority were 
generally unsuccessful (Fleisher 2000b; Heald 2002). In contrast, more successful 
examples of local ‘self-help’ tend to reflect local institutional histories and to invoke 
locally relevant social expectations and obligations (Shivakumar 2005; Cammack et al. 
2009; Dill 2009; Evans 2009; Hall and Lamont 2009; Swidler 2009; Booth 2011: 17-19). 
Drawing on Douglas (1973, 1987) and Giddens (1984), Cleaver (2002) elaborates the 
concept of ‘institutional bricolage’ whereby ‘mechanisms for collective action are 
borrowed or constructed from existing institutions, styles of thinking and sanctioned 
social relationships’ (ibid.: 16). This is done consciously in order to reduce the cognitive 
effort of responding to change but also unconsciously as the adaptation of older 
practices can imbue newer arrangements with the legitimacy of ‘tradition’ (see also 
Cleaver 2000). As summarised by Lund (2006b: 692), ‘The point seems to be that new 
acts of public authority seem to fare well when they can ‘piggy-back’ on familiar 
idioms.’  
 
2.3.2 The myth of community: for whom does CP provide security, and from 
what?11 
 
The claims made for the beneficial impact of participation in ‘community-led’ 
development are often predicated upon the ‘myth of community’ (Gujit & Shah 1998), 
which obscures the existence of hierarchies and social divisions within 
neighbourhoods and the extent to which ‘global development concepts mould and are 
moulded by existing social and political relationships’ (Mosse 1995: 144). The outcomes 
of a local development project, for example the proportion of residents able to obtain 
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11 This question is informed by Luckham (2007). 
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access to clean water, are not determined solely by institutions established for this 
purpose, such as a water users’ association. Rather outcomes are mediated by ‘a 
multiplicity of institutions of varying degrees of formality and transparency’ (Cleaver 
& Toner 2006: 209), which affect who can participate and how the costs and benefits of 
doing so are distributed. Development projects can provide opportunities for the 
renegotiation of status hierarchies as they institutionalise power in new ways (Mosse 
1995: 155), offering the potential for ‘empowerment’ of the historically disadvantaged, 
but also often enabling existing elites to consolidate their positions of power and 
increase personal access to resources.  
 
Existing evidence suggests that participatory development has often been 
implemented in ways which generate new forms of social exclusion, advantaging 
mainly those who possess the time, resources and skills required to meet the 
expectations of external actors about the form participation should take. For example 
the formalisation of participation through CBOs in Dar es Salaam has privileged those 
able to write funding proposals and pay membership fees (Dill 2009). Those who are 
disadvantaged by gendered or other social relations within communities may face 
additional constraints to participation, for example feeling unable to contribute to 
public meetings, meaning that their needs are not articulated (Mosse 1995). Thus in 
practice:  
 
The character of the institutional channels available within 
political systems, and of the resources required to participate at 
ever higher levels (education and time in particular) means that 
much of what is considered ‘participatory’ is more a process 
whereby large numbers of people are represented by a relatively 
small group of participants. 
               (Hickey & Mohan 2004: 19) 
 
Representational participation does not guarantee that the outcomes of participatory 
development will be equitable. In the absence of effective accountability mechanisms, 
those who are able to become recognised as representatives of the community may be 
able to monopolise group or individual gains of any development initiative at the 
expense of collective gains (Platteau & Abraham 2002). Monitoring by a supportive 
state may be required to prevent the ‘capture’ of decision-making processes and 
material gains by local elites (Mansuri & Rao 2013).  
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Rather than reflecting a romanticised collective solidarity the emergence of 
‘community’ initiatives may be closely related to individual or group economic and 
political aspirations (Ayee & Crook 2003). Kiondo (1994: 61), for example found in an 
overview of community-based development groups in Dar es Salaam that most 
appeared to be ‘collective extensions of personal economic survival activities’.  People 
may aspire to make individual gains which are deemed to offer a better return on 
investment and to be less vulnerable than the collective projects envisaged by 
development projects   (Green 2000: 80-83; see also Mercer 2002).  
 
The differential gains that members of communities typically make from participatory 
development projects that take place within contexts of inequality, may mean that 
participation which is deemed successful in meeting programme outcomes might be 
predicated upon coercion and hierarchy (Cleaver & Toner 2006). In a context of local 
conflict the domination, or perceived domination, of an associational structure by one 
particular faction may preclude a venture being seen as a common asset and instead 
generate resentment from other sectors (Olivier de Sardan 2009: 19). Empowering ‘the 
community’ may thus entail disempowering those who are marginalised by dominant 
cultural practices (Cleaver 1999: 605).  
 
Scholarly analysis of CP interventions in Europe and America has frequently found 
that those who are likely to participate in partnerships with the police are those who 
are already sufficiently happy with current policing practices to do so, not the 
disaffected poor or marginalised minorities (Tilley 2008: 394-395). CP valorises local 
knowledge produced through often non-representative processes, meaning that the 
actions and opinions of the minority who wish to, or are able to, participate are used to 
legitimate policing practices that affect an entire geographical population (Brogden & 
Nijhar 2005: 54).  
 
Analysis of state-initiated CP in Africa is little different, suggesting that almost 
universally, CP has assisted police ‘in co-opting local business and political elites, thus 
reinforcing social inequalities’ (Brogden 2004: 635). Baker (2009: 82) found in his 
overview of non-state policing in post-conflict Africa that typically ‘forums are 
dominated by educated, politically active, and locally influential people, often older 
men’. Similarly, Ruteere and Pommerolle (2002) argue that CP reforms in Nairobi came 
to reflect ‘an intersection of traditional patriarchal orders as well as economic 
dominance that detracts from the democratic intentions of the project and in a sense 
entrenches the status quo’ (ibid.: 601). In so doing, CP and other forms of state-endorsed 
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local policing have enabled the formation of alliances between police and co-opted 
local elites in order to control the ‘dangerous classes’ (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 161).  
 
As emphasised by the dual-sided definition of security provided in the previous 
chapter (1.5) security is not a neutral and self-evident term. Having the ability to 
designate what or who is criminal or constitutes a threat to the community is closely 
linked to contestation of local power relations and forms a way through which 
community is itself constructed and maintained (Buur & Jensen 2004; Jensen 2008). 
Richly detailed case studies have demonstrated the extent to which various forms of 
‘community-based’ policing both reflect and constitute localised (and sometimes 
supra-local) competition over power and resources (e.g. Buur 2006; Jensen 2008; Titeca 
2009). Any attempt to empower ‘communities’ to police themselves, must thus take 
into account the fact that ‘security’ and ‘community’ are both themselves subject to 
contestation. The poor human rights records and violent methods of many non-state 
security providers in Africa make the dilemmas discussed above particularly troubling 
for donors and others involved in the promotion of CP as a means of ‘democratising’ 
security provision. As Brogden & Nijhar (2005: 234-235) observe, ‘community policing’ 
is to some extent an oxymoron: ‘it is and will always be, whatever its whimsical 
reference to a notional community, committed to the key practice of suppressing the 
activities and practices of one group on behalf of another, if in more discursive and 
subtle form’ (ibid.: 234). 
 
2.3.3 Participation as a burden on the poor: how are the costs and benefits of 
participation distributed?  
 
In addition to the normative claims made for popular participation in development, 
there are clear pragmatic benefits to involving ‘communities’ in provision of goods and 
services. Participation can be an economically appealing proposition (Rahnema 1992: 
118-119). This was particularly evident in the 1980s and early 1990s as many African 
countries adopted structural adjustment programmes and: 
 
the notion of ‘self-reliance’, and with it of ‘participation’, had 
begun to be rearticulated as neo-liberalism took hold of the 
development mainstream. No longer the passive recipients of 
development assistance, ‘beneficiaries’ were to be active 
participants in implementation, and in meeting the costs of 
development. 
          Cornwall (2006: 71)   
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Participation may thus take an instrumental form, viewed by the ‘top’ as a means of 
enhancing efficiency and saving money, but experienced by those at the ‘bottom’ as an 
imposition of costs (White 1996: 7-8) and potentially as a form of ‘participatory corvée’ 
(Ribot 1995: 1596).  
 
Although often assumed to be a low-cost solution (e.g. Baker 2009a: 385), participation 
can impose considerable costs on ‘communities’, which may compromise the service 
provided. People may prefer not to participate to the degree expected of them when 
any potential benefits are deemed to be outweighed by likely costs, whether in terms of 
time, resources or the potential for disruption of social relations (Eyben and Ladbury 
1995: 197).  Even when citizens are able to overcome collective action problems to 
establish participatory development initiatives, material constraints can still prevent 
these from adequately providing public services (Cleaver 1999: 604). Community self-
help can lead to inequalities between geographic areas (Tripp 2003). Thus in their 
overview of evaluations of the sustainability of participatory projects, Mansuri and Rao 
(2003: 18) conclude that the continuing importance of external inputs in sustaining 
projects means that, ‘the need for a well-functioning state apparatus does not 
disappear with community involvement.’ 
 
Finally, as discussed above, participatory development projects take place within a 
context of existing hierarchies and social divisions which affect how the benefits and 
costs of participation are distributed within communities. Those who are poor or 
otherwise disadvantaged are often liable to bear costs disproportionate to their ability 
to do so (Mayoux 1995: 241; Ribot 1995), as became evident in the Tanzanian case 
presented here.  
 
2.4 Self-help and the state in Tanzania in historical perspective  
 
CP forms part of a long history of mobilisation of popular self-help for development in 
Tanzania. The history of the institutionalisation of participation in Tanzanian 
development, briefly recounted here, is illustrative of the malleability of the notion of 
‘participation’ noted above, and the extent to which it may be subject to multiple and 
sometimes contradictory interpretations. It also illustrates the difficulty in analysing 
‘local’ forms of participation in isolation from the wider structures of power and 
political competition in which they are embedded.  
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Self-help, referring to small development projects that were intended to be initiated 
and carried out by communities themselves, formed part of the official development 
strategy articulated for newly independent Tanganyika12 in the 1960s. Before this, the 
concept had been employed by both mission societies and the colonial administration, 
as a means of cost-effective rural development. The Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU)13 had also promoted self-help during the nationalist struggle in an 
attempt to mobilise the population around a rejection of colonial models of 
development and as a way of providing services where these were lacking (Jennings 
2003: 166). Self-help appealed to the new government as a means of gradually inducing 
developmental change based on consensus, in contrast to the coercive colonial models 
that had fuelled nationalist sentiment, which also required only minimal government 
expenditure (ibid.).  
 
The importance of self-help was reinforced by the emphasis placed by Nyerere on self-
reliance (kujitegemea) in the Arusha Declaration of 1967, which set out the principles of 
Tanzanian socialism, or ujamaa. Self-reliance at the local level reflected the ‘minimalist 
orientation’ of ujamaa (Green 2010a: 24), whereby ‘lower tiers of administration had to 
provide their own resources for conforming to the project of national development’ 
(ibid.).  
 
Bringing about ‘development’ (maendeleo) was central to the claims to legitimacy of the 
new nationalist regime, as elsewhere in Africa, and development was placed at the 
heart of discourses of nationhood (Jennings 2007). Participation in development was 
thus an act of ‘nation-building’ and was framed as an obligation of citizenship: ‘A 
“citizen” was one who shared these developmental aims and objectives, participated 
actively in projects, and accepted the responsibilities of self-reliance and community 
advancement’ (ibid.: 71). The demands of citizenship were particularly heavy for 
young people, who were mobilised by their ‘nationalist elders’ for nation-building 
activities (Burgess 2005: xvii). ‘Traditional’ forms of communal labour and mutual 
assistance were also evoked as a means to legitimate the unpaid labour and low levels 
of government spending on local development that self-help entailed (Lal 2012: 216-
217).  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Tanganyika is the former name for what is now mainland Tanzania. The United Republic of Tanzania 
was formed in 1964 through the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.   
13 TANU was the political party at the forefront of the nationalist movement in Tanganyika and won a 
landslide victory in the 1960 election, leading the country to independence in 1961. In 1977, TANU merged 
with Zanzibar’s Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) (CCM), 
which has remained in power to date. 
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Many local leaders were initially enthusiastic about self-help, and localised 
development projects, such as mending roads and constructing dispensaries, increased 
during the early 1960s. Much of the early participation in self-help entailed local 
collective action outside of official development plans, due to the utility of self-help as 
a means to secure resources for a particular area: once presented with the results of 
popular labour it was difficult for the government to avoid paying the subsequent 
costs, for example a teacher’s salary (Jennings 2003: 168-172).  Increasingly, however, 
local development was made subject to the direction of the party and administration. 
Self-help outside of the state became a concern for government, partly due to the 
limited funds available to maintain services once infrastructure was put in place, but 
also due to the potential for self-help to become a focus of opposition to the 
government, which had been exploited by TANU itself during the late colonial period 
(ibid.: 174).  There was also an imperative to reconcile popular participation and local 
priorities with overarching national development strategies and the expertise vested in 
government, and ‘this tension was resolved in favor of the state’s authority in 
development’ (Schneider 2004: 347).   
 
The party and administration exercised increased control over local development 
efforts through the creation of District and Regional Development Committees, which 
made decisions regarding planning and funding of local initiatives (Jennings 2003: 179-
181). Development policy was rarely based on local forms of organisation or ways of 
doing things (Tripp 1997: 69). Rather: ‘The social order stressed innovation imposed 
from above, and people waited for changes to come; they had little incentive to 
innovate for themselves’ (Coulson 1982: 223).  
 
The top-down nature of development planning was linked to broader processes, 
whereby autonomous forms of organisation outside of the ruling party were 
increasingly no longer tolerated. Tanzania became a de jure one party state in 1965 and 
local government organisations were abolished in 1967. Potential sources of 
independent political activity, such as trade unions, co-operatives and advocacy 
organisations, were brought under the auspices of the party or dissolved (Kiondo 
1993). Although government ideology continued to emphasise the importance of 
popular participation, this was to occur only through party institutions rather than 
locally autonomous organisations (Tripp 1992: 228-229). 
 
Participating in self-help increasingly became an obligation and an expectation, 
reinforced not only by understandings of citizenship as entailing active participation in 
the building of the nation (Jennings 2007), but through legal measures as well. In 1969 
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the Ward Development Committees Act granted the committees power to compel 
participation in self-help, and to impose fines for failure to do so, as well as removing 
decision-making further from the village. Henceforth:  
 
Self-help had become little more than compulsory labour. 
Participation had become a matter of legal requirement, no 
longer one of pride, community spirit and local custom. 
                                    (Jennings 2003:182) 
 
Government officials tended to view themselves as agents of ‘modernity’, in 
juxtaposition to the ‘underdeveloped’, ‘backward’ and ‘traditional’ masses (Schneider 
2007: 28). These paternalistic views informed the often coercive and authoritarian way 
in which development was implemented (Schneider 2004: 357). Local courts enforced 
government orders to work on communal farms and other developmental directives, 
for example imposing fines on parents who refused to let their daughters attend school 
and farmers who did not use fertiliser (Coulson 1982: 221). Interactions between state 
officials and citizens over communal labour could be fraught, and Shivji (1990: 50) 
characterises the experience of self-help as ‘a long nightmare of harassment, beating, 
extortion of bribes etc. from ordinary citizens by the organs and officials of the state.’ 
The villagisation campaign of the 1970s, which entailed the forced resettlement of 
millions of rural citizens into ujamaa villages, exemplifies the highly authoritarian way 
in which development was to be attained in Tanzania (Scott 1998; Schneider 2004).  
 
As Nyerere had himself anticipated (Schneider 2004), it proved difficult to sustain 
participation in and popular enthusiasm for self-help dictated from above (Pratt 1979: 
205; Caplan 1992; Schneider 2007: 25; Landau 2008: 45). The expectations of citizens 
and the state about the respective roles of the population and the government in local 
development differed: 
 
The state’s perception of self-help was one of state-led and 
state-directed efforts by local communities in the 
implementation of schemes designed to fit in with, and 
promote, the objectives of the state. It was a way to effect 
change and modernisation in a context of minimal resources. 
For the peasantry, self-help implied not state-led development, 
but rather state-supported: the role of government was to 
provide the materials, funds and technical advice required to 
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meet the needs and wishes of the individual community.             
(Jennings 2003: 182. See also Caplan 1992: 108-110) 
 
In contrast to the low levels of enthusiasm for participation in formal, party-mandated 
organisations, a rich associational life existed in urban areas, best documented in Dar 
es Salaam. For example, women’s rotating saving groups (upato) and other informal 
associations flourished, in contrast to party led organisations, which sought to impose 
predetermined organisational models and did not reflect women’s own objectives for 
collaborating (Tripp 1992: 231-234).  
 
Since the 1980s, as a result of an economic crisis which severely compromised state 
capacity for service provision, as well as subsequent political liberalisation and 
privatisation of parts of the state apparatus, new ‘community’ organisations, and ‘non-
governnmental organisations’ (NGOs) have proliferated (Kiondo 1993; Tripp 1997; 
Mercer 1999). Development has been ‘globalized’ in Tanzania, and popular 
participation is now promoted through standardised institutional templates (Green 
2003; Dill 2010a). However, internationalised narratives of participation and its 
empowering and democratising effects have co-existed with rather more instrumental 
(White 1996: 7-8) understandings of what participation is for, reflecting the historical 
development of self-help in Tanzania (Marsland 2006). This version of participation 
views citizens as ‘obliged to contribute their labour and resources in a community effort 
to “build the nation” (kujenga taifa)’ (ibid.: 66, emphasis in original). Rather than 
providing input into policy and priorities of development projects, citizens are often 
involved largely as providers of resources, such as labour, information or money. Rabé 
and Kamanzi (2012: 26-27), for example, in a study of 15 sub-ward and village 
governments found that leaders typically considered citizen participation to entail 
making financial contributions to enable the implementation of decisions made by 
local government leaders at district or village level, rather than having input into the 
decision making process. Consequently many residents associated participation with 
compulsory contributions of money or labour towards ends that did not necessarily 
reflect their interests. Similarly, Chaliga (2008: 10-11) found, from a study of village 
and mtaa level governance institutions across 6 districts, that where citizens were 
involved in local development efforts, this tended to be only partial, for example as 
sources of information.  
 
In a context of scarce government resources, the legitimising rhetoric of participation 
may serve the government’s more pressing objective, which is ‘to co-opt the NGO 
sector into social service provision’ (Mercer 1999: 251). Local institutions, such as 
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CBOs, are often envisaged as a means of assisting government, particularly in 
mobilising local resources (Dill 2009: 730). The contribution of labour or resources 
towards local development projects is still often enforced by legal instruments and 
failure to participate can result in fines or imprisonment (Green 2010a: 25, 2010b: 1241). 
 
Additional continuities are apparent in the attitude of government officials towards 
‘beneficiaries’ of development, and the extent to which local initiatives are dependent 
upon support and funding from above, which determines the activities that can be 
carried out. As in the past, government officials often see themselves as responsible for 
telling rural populations how to develop (Green 2010a: 26), and participation ‘has often 
come to mean teaching the community to act in the way that … experts require them 
to’ (Marsland 2006: 68). Communities are expected to recognise their responsibilities, 
rather than contribute to the development of new ideas and ways of doing things 
(ibid.; Green 2010b: 1246). Since political liberalisation, development planning and 
decision making on local priorities at the village and mtaa (sub-ward) level has 
remained largely ‘top down’, despite ongoing local government reforms (Chaliga 2008; 
Green 2010a; Norman and Massoi 2010; Rabé and Kamanzi 2012). Due to resource 
constraints, ideas which are formulated at the village level may be very unlikely to be 
implemented due to the difficulty in securing limited funding from higher tiers of 
government, and thus directives from above still determine local policies (Green 2010a: 
26). Obtaining funding is dependent upon being recognised as a legitimate actor by 
government and donors, which encourages adherence to particular institutional forms, 
and diverts activities towards donor preferences, rather than the matters which 
initially motivated participation (Dill 2009: 731). 
 
Self-help that appears to be too autonomous of government structures may be 
obstructed. The legal framework governing the formation of associations remains fairly 
restrictive, and civil society organisations are castigated for any activity deemed to be 
too ‘political’ (Dill 2010a: 40-41). The pursuit of development itself in Tanzania remains 
‘very political’ (Jennings 2001), and where parallel participatory institutions appear to 
threaten the ability of government actors to gain credit for developmental gains, with 
associated enhanced electoral prospects, they are liable to be obstructed (Marsland 
2006; Lange 2008).  
 
In summary, popular participation in local development in Tanzania has typically been 
mandated by top-down directives and determined by government objectives. 
Participation has often been framed as an obligation for citizens to contribute labour or 
resources, rather than a means for citizens to influence local development strategies. 
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International narratives of participation and models of community-based development 
that are ubiquitous in local development arenas today, co-exist with these older 
understandings that often distort outcomes away from stated objectives of 
empowerment or innovation.  
 
2.5 Communities and the police in community policing 
 
There are clear advantages for the police in engaging the public as co-producers of 
security, including reduced workload and more effective crime prevention leading to 
safer working conditions. However, co-production also implies responsibilities for the 
police, who are obliged ‘to devise appropriate ways of associating the public with law 
enforcement and the maintenance of order’ (Skolnick & Bayley 1988: 3). The critical 
perspectives on the production of public goods through community-based 
development outlined above suggest that the state police retain a crucial role in 
monitoring and supporting local service delivery in order to ensure it is equitable and 
sustainable, and compliant with the law and with protection of human rights. Loader 
& Walker (2006) thus argue for a form of ‘anchored pluralism’, whereby the state 
retains an important role as a regulator of alternative security providers in the interests 
of ‘civilizing security’. In theory, communities and the police might develop 
‘synergistic’ relationships, whereby ‘engaged public agencies and mobilized 
communities enhance each other’s capacity to deliver collective goods’ (Evans 2002b: 
21). However, the existing evidence regarding the capacity and willingness of African 
police forces to engage with and support citizen participation in the interests of more 
effective and accountable policing, reviewed below, does not inspire optimism. 
Furthermore, CP strategies must resolve collective action problems at the local level 
between police officers and the public. Despite the theoretical benefits of cooperation 
between communities and the police, this does not necessarily constitute an easier 
option for police forces, and may in fact require additional capacity (Baker 2010b: 608). 
Indeed, how states and other organised groups might be able to work together to 
provide public goods and services constitutes ‘one of the more intractable problems in 
African governance’ (Tripp 2003: 131).   
 
Ostrom (1990: 1082) identifies necessary conditions for co-production to constitute an 
advantage over governance involving only one agency. Firstly, the inputs provided by 
various collective actors should be complementary rather than substitutable. For 
example, the police might have more equipment and access to specialised professional 
knowledge than community-based institutions, but need the informational advantage 
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offered by partnerships with local residents. State support for, and oversight of, local 
policing institutions might be a means of making voluntarism more sustainable, 
addressing inequalities between and within communities and ensuring that particular 
social groups or individuals are not disadvantaged (Tripp 2003: 136-145). Baker (2009b: 
83), for example, argues that interactions between community-based policing 
organisations and the state police through forums or other structures:    
  
…have the potential to offer people the advantages of local 
anticrime groups but with external state supervision that can 
restrain or eradicate the defects. They offer the possibility of 
empowering local people with a policing group that is 
accessible (in terms of language, procedures, finance) and yet is 
under obligation to conform to state determined standards. In 
other words, it offers (in theory) the opportunity to be freed 
from the worst abuses of autonomous local policing groups, 
such as their use of threats of violence, their unequal treatment, 
and their summary justice. 
 
However, Ostrom (1990: 1082) identifies two additional conditions that appear to be 
somewhat problematic in this case: ‘participants need to be able to build credible 
commitment to one another so that if one side increases input, the other will continue 
at the same or higher levels’; and incentives are important to encourage inputs from 
both officials and citizens. In African contexts, where police forces are typically poorly 
resourced and motivated and there is a long legacy of very negative relationships 
between public and the police, it may be difficult to meet these criteria. Crucially, co-
production of collective goods rests on ‘robust state agencies oriented toward 
delivering collective goods’ (Evans 2002: 21), and it is not clear that African police 
forces have the necessary capacity or will to form partnerships with the public which 
are conducive to more effective and accountable policing.  
 
In practice, co-production has often proved to disproportionately advantage one party, 
and to be closer to forms of instrumental participation discussed above (White 1996: 7-
8). The lack of resources and capacity which makes working with alternative actors 
appealing to some state police forces may mean that police are not able to exercise 
oversight of partners or provide support sufficient to enable communities to provide 
local security, which requires equipment and training. Conversely, police may be 
unwilling to accept local inputs and seek to dominate interactions with the public, 
privileging their own professional expertise over the knowledge of ‘amateurs’ (e.g. 
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Baker 2010b: 607). The extent to which African police forces prioritise collective goods 
production is questionable, as despite political liberalisation and implementation of 
police reforms, they typically remain politicised and regime oriented (Hills 2008: 215-
216). Co-production has sometimes produced policing that reflects the more negative 
features of state provided services, such as abuse of human rights or the persecution of 
marginalised groups (e.g. Ruteere & Pommerolle 2002; Kyed 2008). These issues are 
discussed further with regard to the Tanzanian case in the following chapter.  
 
At the local level, the need to build credible and predictable commitments between 
parties and to generate incentives for cooperation suggests that CP requires 
institutional reforms that might enable police and communities to overcome collective 
action problems (Kahan 2002).14 Obstacles faced in this regard are likely to be highly 
intractable in many African contexts whereby the history of police-public relations is 
characterized by mutual distrust (Andvig & Barasa 2011: 96). The extent to which this 
has been the case in Tanzania is discussed further in the following chapter. In many 
situations, the police and law-abiding community residents have a shared interest in 
improving local security by preventing or investigating crime, which can best be 
obtained through cooperation. The police, for example, stand to benefit from safer 
working conditions, reduced workload and perhaps vocational rewards. In detecting 
local crime, they rely upon information obtained from citizens, and sometimes on more 
active citizen participation such as patrolling and citizen arrests. In practice, however, 
in many situations, it is not in the interests of individual citizens or police officers in 
Tanzania to contribute towards a collective effort to improve security. For example, 
from a citizen perspective, reporting crime entails costs and is potentially risky, as 
officers are widely thought to solicit bribes from those accused in return for 
information about their accuser. Police, who are poorly paid and equipped, face 
considerable personal risk in responding to crime and have little incentive to form 
long-standing and mutually beneficial relationships with ‘communities’ when they are 
subject to frequent and unpredictable transfers between districts and departments. 
Historically police in Tanzania have been deliberately deployed in areas distant from 
their homes in order to prevent them from forming alliances with local communities 
(Plyler 2007: 232). Interactions between police and the public can appear highly 
unpredictable. The success of CP will thus in part depend on the extent to which 
reforms institutionalise new incentives for cooperation and reduce perceived 
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14 Although the state police is a bureaucratic, hierarchical organisation in which officers are ostensibly 
guided by orders from their superiors, in practice officers in many African police forces retain 
considerable discretion in their daily interactions with the public and are subject to limited monitoring, 
and performance is thus rarely rewarded or punished from within the force. It is thus reasonable to 
consider the police and citizens as part of the same collective action situation (Andvig & Barasa 2011: 97).  
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associated risks. The mechanisms that have been introduced to this end in Tanzania, 
such as attempts to improve communication between citizens and police, are outlined 
in the following chapter (3.4).  
 
2.6 Theoretical framework  
 
Building on the literature reviewed in this chapter, this thesis adopts a theoretical 
framework constructed around three propositions: an ‘agnostic and non-normative’ 
(Lund 2006a: 678-679) approach to governance; the recognition that development is a 
collective action problem; and the historically and politically contingent nature of 
‘community’, ‘policing’ and ‘participation’. This section clarifies the tenets of the 
approach taken with reference to the literature explored above, and highlights how 
these theoretical assumptions relate to the research questions adopted.  
 
2.6.1 Open-minded approaches to governance  
 
This thesis proceeds from a recognition of the diversity of actors involved in the 
governance of African states, and the often ‘unorthodox’ nature of many of the 
institutional configurations through which collective goods and services are provided 
(Joshi & Moore 2004; Blundo & Le Meur 2009; CFS 2010). In this context the state may 
not be the only, or indeed the dominant provider of public goods, including security, 
and indeed the desirability or feasibility of a state monopoly may be questionable in 
some circumstances (Baker & Scheye 2007). However, no assumptions are made 
regarding the intrinsic characteristics of either ‘state’ or ‘informal’ or ‘non-state’ actors: 
‘these need first to be understood within a specific context, and then evaluated for 
positive and negative consequences’ (CFS 2010: 11). Rather than essentialising state-
based or other forms of governance it is recognised that the boundaries between the 
two can be blurred, for example through the ‘informal privatisation’ of ostensibly 
‘public’ services (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2001), the assumption of the symbols and 
accoutrements of the state by alternative actors (Lund 2006b) and shared cultures of 
governance that bring into question the utility of categories such as ‘state’ and ‘civil 
society’ (Green 2010a). Therefore this thesis presents a detailed empirical account of CP 
as practised in Mwanza and explores the differences between the practices of ‘public’ 
and ‘community’ policing and the complex relationships between them.  
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2.6.2 Development as a collective action problem15 
 
A dual-sided definition of security was adopted in the introductory chapter, which 
addressed both supply and demand side perspectives: ‘security is a process of social 
and political ordering, maintained through authoritative discourses and practices of 
power’, and ‘security is an entitlement of citizens, and more widely of human beings, 
to protection from violence and other forms of existential risk’ (Luckham & Kirk 2012: 
10).  
 
The second aspect describes a public good. A state of security yields ‘non-subtractive 
benefits that can be enjoyed jointly by many people who are hard to exclude from 
obtaining these benefits’ (Ostrom 2005: 23). Policing is one way through which security 
might be produced. However, organising local policing entails considerable collective 
action problems, whereby many actors must decide to take an action that is costly in 
order to increase the likelihood of outcomes, in this case improved security, that are in 
the interests of all members of their ‘community’ (Medina 2007: 23). In the absence of 
externally imposed sanctions, rational, self-interested individuals might be expected 
not to cooperate, knowing that they cannot be excluded from enjoyment of the 
collective gains even if they do not make a personal contribution (Olson 1965).  
 
In practice, however, individuals frequently do cooperate when they anticipate that 
others will do the same. Institutions, defined as  ‘the prescriptions that humans use to 
organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions’ (Ostrom 2005: 3) facilitate 
collective action by altering the incentive structures facing individuals (North 1990). 
This thesis explores the extent to which CP reforms have institutionalised collective 
action in the interests of neighbourhood security, which implies the development of 
mutually understood and predictably enforced rules or norms which incentivise 
cooperative action and generate shared expectations about the likely behaviour of 
others in a given situation (Ostrom 2005). These conditions are conducive to the 
development of norms of trust and reciprocity, which are central to explaining why 
individuals participate in costly collective action (Ostrom 1998). In the case of CP, this 
might mean, for example monitoring and sanctioning non-participation in patrols, 
which enables individuals to be reasonably confident that their inputs are reciprocated 
by other residents, and disincentivises free-riding on the inputs of others. The 
responsibilities of individuals and penalties for non-compliance might be stipulated by 
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15 This phrase is taken from the synthesis report of the African Power and Politics Programme (Booth 
2012), which informs the perspective outlined in the following section.  
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formal rules adopted to organise CP, or ‘practical norms’ that prescribe and legitimise 
certain behaviour (Olivier de Sardan 2008).  
 
As discussed in the following section, however, it is recognised that institutional 
designs introduced through CP operate in a specific context, and are ‘mediated 
through localized cultural and historical repertoires’ (Pratten & Sen 2008: 19). Single 
purpose institutions designed to produce public goods exist amongst a ‘multiplicity of 
institutions of varying degrees of formality and transparency’ (Cleaver & Toner 2006: 
209), which affect how a community is defined, the terms of access to new 
institutionalised spaces and how rules are formed (ibid.: Mosse 2005). Imposing 
uniform institutional templates as a solution to local problems may therefore not have 
the desired effects (Evans 2004).  
 
2.6.3 The politically and historically contingent nature of ‘community’, 
‘policing’ and ‘participation’  
 
How security is defined, and by implication determining what or who is a threat to 
security, is a highly political practice, and by claiming to protect and secure 
communities, actors are themselves participating in the construction and maintenance 
of the ‘community’ (Buur & Jensen 2004). In addition to addressing the impact of CP 
on security in terms of crime prevention and residents’ perceptions of risk, the thesis 
therefore also explores the more ‘specific order’ (Marenin 1982) CP upholds, and 
whose interests it serves.  
 
The ‘myth of community’ (Gujit & Shah 1998) is rejected in favour of recognition of the 
diverse political, socio-economic, gendered and generational interests that constitute 
geographical communities. The thesis explores how existing power relationships 
within ‘communities’ have determined the distribution of the costs and benefits of 
participation in CP and how the purposes of ‘participation’ and ‘policing’ are 
understood. Participation is not assumed to be an altruistic contribution to collective 
objectives, but may instead reflect personal economic or political strategies, or be the 
result of coercion (e.g. Mercer 2002; Ayee & Crook 2003; Cleaver & Toner 2006). 
Obstacles to participation are also taken into account, and their impact on how 
community interests are represented through participatory processes (Hickey & 
Mohan 2004: 19).  
 
The differential impacts and experiences of CP within communities are explored by 
situating local policing within the broader context of local governance in Tanzania, 
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exploring the historical construction of ‘policing’ and ‘participation’ and adopting an 
‘end-user approach’, which privileges ‘the perspectives and experience of those at the 
receiving end of security arrangements’ (Luckham & Kirk 2012: 5). 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, perspectives on the participation of organised citizens in the provision 
of collective goods and services through CP and other forms of participatory 
development were explored. Whilst the potential benefits of co-producing security 
were recognised, three important critical perspectives on community-based 
development were elaborated, which informed three supplementary research 
questions:  
 
1. How well do CP institutions initiate and sustain collective action?  
2. How are the costs and benefits of participation in CP distributed within 
communities and between communities and the police?  
3. For whom does CP provide security and from what?  
 
The pertinence of interrogating meanings of ‘participation’ and its objectives and the 
complex relationships between localised developmental initiatives and state action 
were explored in the Tanzanian context through a brief account of the trajectory of self 
help in Tanzania, which will be revisited in subsequent chapters, which emphasised 
enduring patterns in the governance of local development. 
 
Section 2.5 considered the role of the police as a co-producer of public security, and 
suggested that there are likely to be considerable obstacles to establishing synergistic 
partnerships between state police forces and communities, however defined, due to 
lack of will and capacity on the part of the police and the questionable commitment of 
many African police forces to providing collective goods. Furthermore, citizens and 
police face collective action problems, which must be addressed if CP is to lead to 
productive cooperation between police and communities that enhances public security 
and improves local policing. The following chapter provides more detail regarding the 
character of state policing in Tanzania and past experiences of attempts to mobilise 
citizens to provide local security.   
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The final section drew on the literature reviewed in this chapter to outline the 
theoretical framework that informed the thesis. The methodological framework 
constructed to address these concerns is outlined in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3: Community Policing in Tanzania in Historical 
Perspective 
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the history of policing in Tanzania, from the 
colonial period to the present. There are notable continuities in police practice and in 
how the public experience state policing, which have been little altered by firstly the 
end of British colonial administration in 1961 or, more recently, the liberalisation of the 
political system and the end of the one party state. The police have typically been 
oriented towards serving the regime in power rather than providing a public service. 
Corruption, police brutality and lack of police discipline have resulted in largely 
negative public perceptions of police and their ability, and willingness, to prevent 
crime. Sections of the urban population have experienced state policing largely in 
terms of attempts to control their movements and livelihood strategies, and in 
expulsion from urban areas. Finally, acute shortages of personnel and resources have 
affected the Tanzania Police Force since the colonial period, meaning that the state 
police have remained largely absent from sizeable parts of the country. The 
contemporary police reform programme is designed to address these challenges, but at 
the same time exhibits one additional continuity with successive Tanzanian 
administrations. In recognition of the limited geographical coverage of the state police 
force, governments have regularly authorised alternative policing providers, through, 
for example, the empowerment of Native Authorities and Special Constables, the co-
optation of sungusungu vigilantes and today the promotion of ulinzi shirikishi. Such 
strategies have been conveniently consistent with a range of apparently diverse 
ideological positions over time, from colonial era philosophies of indirect rule, to 
Nyerere’s African socialism and self-reliance, and finally the contemporary globalised 
rhetoric of CP, which is used to justify giving ‘communities’ responsibility for local 
security today. 
 
This chapter firstly provides an overview of colonial policing in Tanzania and 
subsequent continuities since the country gained independence in 1961. These legacies 
have important implications for the operation of the TPF today and its relationship 
with the public. The emergence and subsequent co-optation of sungusungu vigilante 
groups in the 1980s is treated in some detail as sungusungu has been evoked by 
reformers as an indigenous ‘tradition’ of CP and a model for contemporary ulinzi 
shirikishi in urban areas. This account and the specific history of sungusungu in urban 
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Mwanza, discussed in Chapter 5 (5.4) demonstrate the extent to which sungusungu, 
rather than being a ‘traditional’ response to insecurity, has also been a means of ruling 
party mobilisation and coercion, which has become problematic in a multi-party 
context. The final section addresses police performance since political liberalisation in 
the early 1990s and outlines the policies adopted under the banner of CP.  
 
3.1 Colonial Policing in Tanganyika16 
3.1.1 Policing Before 1945  
 
Policing in British colonial territories in Africa was determined by the broader 
imperatives of sustaining the colonial endeavour. The police were thus ‘political in 
character; the prevention and detection of crime came a poor second’ (Baker 2008b: 55). 
The police presence was fairly small and largely confined to areas of European 
settlement or those of particular economic interest to the coloniser (Killingray 1986: 
414). For much of the colonial period, police efforts were focused on preventing 
‘crimes’ that posed a threat to the colonial administration or European owned 
property, whilst supporting the colonial order by collecting taxes, patrolling borders 
and assisting in the conscription of labour and the suppression of illegal strikes (ibid.: 
425-426).  
 
The Tanganyika Police and Prisons Service was established in 1919, following the 
British assumption of control over the territory under a United Nations (UN) mandate. 
However, like other British colonies, Tanganyika remained ‘thinly policed’ (Killingray 
1986: 414). The size of the police force remained at approximately 1,800 officers prior to 
the Second World War, rising to only 6,143 by 1961 when Tanganyika gained 
independence (Burton 2003: 68). Rural areas without significant economic value were 
thus largely left to the Native Authorities established under the system of indirect 
rule.17 Native Authority police performed duties including responding to crime, tax 
collection and enforcing the judgements of Native Courts (Rodney 1973, cited in Shivji 
2001: 7; Killingray 1986: 427).  
 
Whilst the colonial police had a more visible coercive presence in urban areas, it was 
common for parts of towns occupied by African residents to remain ‘virtually 
untouched’ by colonial policing (Killingray 1986: 415). In Dar es Salaam, the colonial 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Tanganyika is the former name for what is now mainland Tanzania. The United Republic of Tanzania 
was formed in 1964 through the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.   
17 On indirect rule in Tanganyika see: Austen (1967); Graham (1976); Iliffe (1979: chapter 10); Willis (1993); 
Spear (2005). As elsewhere, implementing indirect rule frequently entailed the ‘creation of tribes’, rather 
than enshrining pre-existing legitimate forms of local authority (Iliffe 1979: 318-341). 
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capital of Tanganyika, a lack of resources resulted in a low ratio of police officers to the 
urban population throughout the colonial period. The distribution of policing 
resources was significantly skewed in the favour of predominately European and to a 
lesser extent Indian areas. The police were largely absent from sizeable areas of the city 
inhabited mainly by Africans. The degree of authority the police could exercise over 
African urban residents thus remained much lower than that desired by police and the 
colonial administration  (Burton 2003: 65-66, 71-74). 
 
In this context informal modes of policing are likely to have been important. Voluntary 
associations, amongst which ethnic associations linking urban residents with their 
rural ‘homes’ were prominent, were engaged in providing both social welfare and 
some measure of social control (Killingray 1986: 418). However, little is known about 
the history of urban forms of self-policing or vigilantism in Tanzania during the 
colonial period (Brennan 2008: 104).  
 
3.1.2  Policing After 1945  
 
The period following the Second World War saw the emergence of a ‘modern’ police 
force in Tanganyika, with improved organisation and increased manpower  (Burton 
2003: 74). The more interventionist strategies of the ‘second colonial occupation’ (Low 
& Lonsdale 1976) required a more professional and expanded police force (Burton 
2003: 66-67). At the same time there was a sharp increase in detected crime in 
Tanganyika following the war, which highlighted the necessity of having a more 
capable and better-equipped police force (ibid.: 74-75). Improvements also reflected the 
desires of colonial governments to improve their capacity to counter potential threats 
to their authority (Anderson & Killingray 1991: 12). 
 
From the late 1940s, the government attempted to attract more educated individuals to 
the police force, leading to a growing proportion of literate officers able to perform 
practices such as recording statements. From 1949, literacy in either Swahili or English 
was required and salaries were increased (Burton 2003: 68, 74-75). New crime 
prevention strategies, including undercover operations and dog patrols had some 
impact in Dar es Salaam, where the number of police stations was also increased 
(Burton 2003: 74-78).  
 
Greater cooperation between the police and the administration, including town 
headmen and elders, and between police and civilians was encouraged after the war. A 
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system of voluntary Special Constables, similar to systems existing in other British 
colonies (Killingray 1986: 432), had been in place since the 1930s, but was reinvigorated 
in 1951. In 1955 the auxiliary policing body began to accept African volunteers (Burton 
2003: 78-79). The Special Constabulary was a permanent body mobilised as needed. 
Special Constables were praised by senior police for providing assistance with regular 
police patrols, participation in ‘spiv’ raids and action against ‘hooligans’ (see below) 
and supporting many other routine police duties (Annual Reports of the Tanganyika 
Police Force 1951-61).   
 
Despite these efforts, in 1955, Sir Charles Jeffries (1955: 116), Deputy Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, described the Tanganyika Police as being, ‘a force which is 
still in process of adapting itself to modern requirements.’ Half of the rank and file 
remained illiterate. Even in comparatively heavily policed Dar es Salaam, African 
residential areas were neglected and senior police officers acknowledged their inability 
to deal with crime in the city (Burton 2003: 79-83). In the Annual Report for 1959 
(Tanganyika Police Force 1959: 3) it was noted that: ‘The force is responsible for the 
policing of the Territory as a whole, but is, in practice, largely restricted by its size to 
the capital and other urban areas.’ 
 
3.1.3 Police-public relations during the colonial period 
 
The modernisation of colonial police forces following the Second World War may have 
improved the ability of the police to perform their duties effectively to some extent, 
however ‘the nature of those duties remained coercive rather than consensual’ 
(Anderson & Killingray 1991: 12). Colonial police officers were generally stationed in 
areas to which they were not local, having been recruited from ethnic groups deemed 
particularly suitable for martial roles. The strategy of ‘policing strangers by strangers’ 
(Deflem 1994: 58) had a negative impact on police-public relations as police were often 
viewed as aliens, compounded by the housing of police in police lines rather than 
among local communities (Killingray 1986:  424).  
 
Consistent with this, official policy in Tanganyika was to limit the number of police 
recruits serving in their home areas and men from neighbouring British colonies 
formed a substantial component of the Tanganyikan force (Burton 2003: 70-71). There 
was also a bias towards certain ethnic groups within the country, predicated upon 
beliefs about their suitability for police work. In the early years of British 
administration the Sukuma, Nyamwezi and Kuria from the northern half of the 
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country, were heavily over-represented in the force, and remained so until the late 
colonial period (Burton 2003: 69-70). In 1952, just six of Tanganyika’s many ethno-
linguistic groups represented 87% of the police force (Saudin 2002: 3, cited in CHRI 
2006: 3).  The perception of the police in Dar es Salaam thus appears to have been 
similar to that of an ‘occupying force’ (Burton 2003: 83). Furthermore, it is apparent 
that ‘the Tanganyikan force was neither the most disciplined nor the best behaved of 
policing bodies’ (ibid.). Senior police and the public frequently bemoaned corruption, 
neglect of duty and the use of excessive force and the general public were often 
reluctant to assist police in inquires. In the 1950s, in the context of increasing 
nationalist sentiment and greater police intervention in urban residents’ daily lives, 
police-public relations worsened to the extent that there were frequent assaults on 
police officers in Dar es Salaam (Burton 2003: 83-87).  
 
In rural areas of Africa under British colonial administration, the poorly trained and 
equipped Native Authority police ‘had a low reputation almost everywhere’ 
(Anderson & Killingray 1991: 8), frequently operating as an instrument of exploitative 
chiefly power (Killingray 1986: 417-418). Executive and judicial powers were fused in 
the office of the chief, which forms a key component of Mamdani’s (1996) argument for 
indirect rule as ‘decentralised despotism’.18 Although indirect rule was ostensibly 
premised upon discovering the ‘true’ or legitimate rulers of rural African communities, 
this proved rather difficult in practice. The northwest of Tanganyika, where Mwanza is 
located, was considered a ‘model’ in terms of implementation of indirect rule, as a pre-
existing form of chiefly authority had been easily identifiable. However, even here the 
form taken by chiefly authority and who was entitled to exercise it was subject to 
frequent contestation (Austen 1967: 604-605). 
 
3.2 Policing independent Tanzania   
 
Contemporary African police systems have evolved directly 
from those inherited at independence. There have been no 
revolutionary and few unprecedented developments in 
policing since the 1950s, and the distinctive features of national 
organization remain much the same as at independence. 
            (Hills 2000: 27)  
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18 However, see Schneider (2006) for a critique of Mamdani’s thesis in relation to Tanzania. 
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The orientation of colonial police forces towards upholding the ruling regime was 
typically little altered following independence, as African governments realised the 
utility of control of the police in asserting their control over newly independent states 
(Marenin 2009b: 249). TANU had opposed increases to the police budget prior to 1961, 
but after assuming power over independent Tanganyika, the party quickly came to 
appreciate the importance of the police as an agent of state coercion (Burton 2003: 90-
91). Thus, TANU ‘inherited the police force as it was and removed only the racial bias 
in its content’ (Kapinga 1990: 42). Public confidence in the police, and the criminal 
justice system, remained low, due to widespread petty corruption. Coulson (1982: 221), 
for example, observed that in the 1970s the easiest way to defend a case was to pay the 
police officer to lose a case file, to the extent that: ‘it became hardly worth while 
prosecuting for burglary or assault, unless the unfortunate offender was nearly 
destitute.’ 
 
From 1964 onwards the Police Force was closely tied to TANU, which became the only 
legal political party in 1965. Party institutions were also encouraged to carry out 
policing functions. Like its colonial predecessor, the TPF struggles with severe resource 
and personnel shortages and remains virtually absent from large areas of the country, 
precipitating attempts to mobilise citizens for local defence through the People’s 
Militia, Sungusungu and the National Service. Political liberalisation in the 1990s has 
had little impact on the operation of the police and their orientation towards regime 
interests, and has done little to improve negative popular perceptions of the police. 
 
3.2.1 Politicisation of the police in the one party state 
 
In 1964 an army mutiny, which obliged then President Nyerere to call upon British 
assistance for the restoration of order, served to illustrate the importance of ensuring 
the loyalty of the military and the police. The Tanganyika Rifles were disbanded and 
replaced by a new national army, largely recruited from the TANU Youth League 
(TYL). Membership of the party was made compulsory for the military and new 
recruits were subject to vetting by the TYL (Brennan 2006: 235), and obliged to undergo 
cultural and political training (Tungaraza 1998: 291-292). A former prohibition on 
police membership of TANU was reversed, precipitating mass enrolment. By the 
middle of 1964 police and civil servants were being coerced into joining the party 
(Brennan 2006: 235) and Regional Police Commissioners (RPCs) became members of 
the party’s Regional Executive Committees (Bienen 1965: 45).  
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The politicisation of the police was not unique and the administration was similarly 
drawn within the party. In 1962 politically appointed Regional Commissioners who 
also became ex officio Regional Party Secretaries replaced Provincial Commissioners. 
This system was subsequently extended to the district level and commissioners were 
appointed largely on the basis of loyalty and service to TANU (Tordoff 1965: 66-67). 
Thus, ‘party and administration spoke with one voice’ (Heald 2006: 278).  
 
The police were frequently used to suppress potential opposition to the ruling party 
and played a key role in consolidating the one party state through the enforcement of 
legislation limiting political competition. This was facilitated by the retention of 
colonial era legislation including the Deportation Ordinance (1921) and subsequent 
additions such as the Preventative Detention Act (1962) (CHRI 2006; Shivji 2001: 6-7), 
which has been used to detain those whom the police do not have sufficient evidence 
to charge in court or as a means of ‘sheer harassment’ (Shivji 1990: 55).  
 
The independent government continued to use police motorised units, established by 
the colonial government in 1950 in response to fears of popular unrest and nationalist 
opposition, now renamed the Field Force Unit (FFU), to suppress protest, often 
violently. The FFU played an extensive role during the forced re-settlement of villagers 
during the ‘villagisation’ campaigns of the 1970s, and has been used to suppress 
workers’ and student protests and carry out brutal crackdowns on non payment of tax 
(Ingle 1982: 202-203; Shivji 1990).  
 
Political opinion was also policed by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), ‘a 
quasi-secret organization designed to collect information on citizens’ behaviour and 
attitudes’ (Landau: 2008: 52-53). Although rumours may have overstated the 
penetration of the CID’s intelligence network, arrests were frequent enough to 
discourage public dissent against the party (ibid.).  
 
In addition to attempting to unite the police and the party, TANU assumed policing 
functions through the TYL and a network of ‘ten-cell leaders’. The ruling party also 
promoted popular mobilisation for ‘self defence’ under party auspices through the 
People’s Militia and sungusungu.  
 
TANU Youth League (TYL) 
 
The TYL was formed in 1956, and in urban areas was largely composed of otherwise 
unemployed recruits with limited opportunities to accrue economic gains or social 
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status through other means (Brennan 2006: 229). In addition to enforcing discipline at 
party gatherings, the TYL acted as a form of ‘shadow police force’ across Dar es Salaam 
(Brennan 2008: 104), organising night patrols, searching motor vehicles and on 
occasion conducting arrests, leading the colonial administration to pejoratively refer to 
the party youth as ‘vigilantes’ (Burgess n.d., cited in Brennan 2006: 229-230).  
 
After independence, the TYL continued to carry out policing, enforcing boycotts of 
South African goods and arresting people for petty crimes, in addition to harassing the 
limited political opposition. The TYL also became active in intelligence gathering, 
influenced by the increasingly important patron-client relations between youth and 
powerful TANU figures in the early years of the TANU government (Brennan 2006: 
232-234). The TYL supported the activities of the state police by collecting taxes, 
guarding borders and manning roadblocks and Special Constables were recruited from 
the Youth League (Bienen 1965: 45).  
 
Ten-cell leaders 
 
The TANU nyumba-kumi (ten-cell) system, adapted from Maoist China, was introduced 
in Dar es Salaam in 1964 and subsequently extended across the country. A leader was 
to be elected for each cell, comprised of roughly ten houses, to increase mass 
participation in TANU and the extension of the party throughout society (Levine 1972). 
In addition to collecting party dues and mobilising the population in communal 
development efforts, the ten-cell leaders performed a law and order function, 
assuming responsibility for liaison with police and courts, responding to crime, 
collecting taxes, summoning people to work on development projects and registering 
newcomers  (O’Barr 1971, cited in Campbell 2009: 171; Levine 1972). According to by-
laws, ten-cell leaders were required to gather detailed information about other 
residents, and citizens were obliged to provide notification of any guests received and 
births, marriages and deaths in the family (Shivji 1990: 49). In Dar es Salaam they were 
specifically intended to aid the City Council to eradicate ‘hooliganism, idleness, 
lawlessness and delinquency’ (Bienen 1965: 46). The ten-cell leader was thus expected 
to become, ‘the eyes of the nation...[He] must expose dangerous characters like thieves 
and other infiltrators who may poison our nation and put its safety at stake’ (second 
Vice-President, quoted in Levine 1972: 330). The security and intelligence function of 
the ten-cell system was also particularly evident in border areas (Bienen 1970: 358). In 
addition to providing intelligence, ten-cell leaders assumed an important dispute 
resolution role, particularly in areas where the nearest police posts or courts were 
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distant, and it was common for a case to be taken to the cell leader before it could be 
referred to the police (Levine 1972: 330).  
 
However, the ten-cell system did not result in a uniform system of local governance, 
and the form taken by cells, functions performed and effectiveness were highly 
variable across the country (Levine 1972: 330). In practice ten-cell leaders often had 
difficulty in persuading people to participate in obligatory communal labour (Caplan 
1992: 108). Those elected may have been chosen on the basis of attributes other than 
their commitment to the party, having some form of ‘traditional’ or seniority-based 
authority, or a relatively high level of formal education (Miller 1968: 194; Ingle 1982: 
174-175), and were sometimes not even party members (Levine 1972: 331). The ten-cell 
leaders were required to negotiate between the demands of the party and higher tiers 
of government, which emphasised extraction and mobilisation, and the desires of their 
neighbours, amongst whom they were obliged to live, and the latter often prevailed 
(Ingle 1972: 210-212). Returns from taxes collected by ten-cell leaders were typically 
poor and they were relieved of responsibility for tax collection in 1970 (ibid.: 172-173). 
Shivji (1990: 49) thus observes that had the official regulations pertaining to ten-cell 
structures been upheld, ‘the situation could easily be described as bordering on a 
police state’. In practice, ‘thanks to the notorious inefficiency of the state’s bureaucratic 
machinery’ (ibid.), this was rarely the case. Nevertheless, the powers given to ten-cell 
leaders enabled less systematic harassment and humiliation of other residents, 
particularly in rural areas (ibid.).  
 
People’s Militia (Jeshi la Mgambo) 
 
The People’s Militia (Jeshi la Mgambo) was instituted in 1965 in an attempt to end the 
army’s monopoly on military training, thus ensuring that ‘the party was on an equal 
security footing with the state’ (Brennan 2006: 235). Militia were established in villages 
throughout the country and both men and women were trained in the use of weapons 
for local defence. Following four months of training by the army, volunteers formed 
part of a reserve army (Shivji 1990: 14-15), which would play an important role during 
the war with Uganda in 1978-9 (Tungaraza 1998: 302-303). The government was keen 
to stress the voluntarism essential to the People’s Militia, as well as its ‘traditional’ 
nature through use of the name Jeshi la Mgambo, referring to an apparently traditional 
assembly in case of emergency. However the groups operated largely under the 
auspices of the party (Tungaraza 1998: 300-303).  
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Whilst initially envisaged as a reserve army, the militia assumed a range of domestic 
functions including enforcing participation in communal development efforts across 
the country and policing the implementation of villagisation campaigns of the 1970s 
(Lal 2010: 5).  In urban areas by the late 1970s it was common for a police patrol group 
to comprise one police officer, supported by two national service recruits19 and two 
militia members (Shaidi 1989: 256), who were, like the police, frequently ‘heavily 
armed, trigger-happy and reckless with their arms’ (Shivji 1990: 67).  
 
Participation in local self-defence, through either the militia or the TYL, became 
identified as a key responsibility of the nation’s (male) youth. For example, Nyerere 
told assembled young people in 1968 that in order to perpetuate the national 
revolution, ‘you have two important weapons – the plough for better and higher 
production, and the gun for the defence of the nation’ (quoted in Lal 2010: 6).  
 
Mgambo is still in operation today, although membership is much more restricted. 
Volunteers are trained by the army over a four to six month period. The principal 
motivation for joining appears to be the potential to obtain employment with one of 
the many commercial security companies now operating across the country or to be 
retained as a permanent employee by the government, for example as a guard for 
council property.20  
 
3.2.3 Co-optation of Sungusungu 
 
In contrast to the People’s Militia and the TYL, which were formed by the ruling party 
as vehicles for popular mobilisation, the impetus for sungusungu came from organised 
rural citizens themselves. However, despite strong opposition from police and the 
judiciary, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)21 was able to co-opt these local organisations 
to some extent and rather than constituting a threat to the state, sungusungu have 
become closely linked to government, and party, administrative structures and state-
sponsored versions of sungusungu were promoted around the country in the early 
1990s.  
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19 The National Service was established in 1963, partly as a means to forestall discontent among TYL 
members who found themselves unemployed once the nationalist struggle was over (Tungaraza 1998: 
299). The body was intended to participate in social and economic development as well as supporting 
national defence. In 1966 participation was made compulsory for all high school leavers and recruits were 
gradually incorporated into domestic policing duties (Shaidi 1989: 256).  
20 Interviews: PSCs 1,2 & 3; District Militia Advisor, Nyamagana 1.3.11. 
21 CCM was formed in 1977 through the merger of TANU and Zanzibar’s ASP. CCM has remained in 
power in Tanzania since the reintroduction of multi-party competition.  
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Sungusungu amongst the Sukuma and Nyamwezi  
 
During the early 1980s Tanzania experienced a wave of violent crime unprecedented in 
recent history. Severe drought in parts of the country, an international oil crisis and an 
economic downturn contributed to severe shortages, which coincided with the return 
of troops from Tanzania’s war with Uganda and an associated influx of weapons. In 
towns commercial and residential properties were subject to armed raids, and in rural 
areas cattle theft was rampant (Heald 2002: 1). Government attempts to respond to the 
problem of cattle theft through special police units and the imposition of collective 
punishments on areas in which suspected thieves were resident proved largely 
ineffective and police were often suspected of being complicit in raids (Heald 2002: 2). 
In this context, a localised response to high levels of cattle theft spread rapidly across 
the Sukuma and Nyamwezi22 inhabited areas of Tanzania in the form of sungusungu,23 
which appeared to have much greater success in apprehending cattle thieves and 
returning stolen property. Masanja (1992) dates the emergence of sungusungu to early 
1982. Although the exact origin of the practice has been traced to different precise 
locations (see Abrahams 1987: 183), it is generally agreed that sungusungu was first in 
operation amongst Sukuma residents of Kahama District, Shinyanga Region. By 1987 
Abrahams (1987: 183) observed that similar institutions were common across 
Nyamwezi and Sukuma inhabited areas in the Regions of Mwanza, Shinyanga and 
Tabora. Although organised at the village level without coordination from above, these 
were ‘remarkably uniform’ (Heald 2002: 6), reflecting older patterns of local 
organisation amongst the Sukuma and Nyamwezi.  
 
The village leadership of sungusungu comprised the ntemi (chief) and his deputy, the 
mtware.24 These titles are taken from structures of chieftainship abolished by the 
Tanzanian government in 1962. In addition a secretary, a kamanda mkuu (chief 
commander) and a council of elders were selected to assist the leaders. Those 
nominated to assume leadership roles were subject to popular confirmation through a 
public vote and then underwent inauguration or enthronement (kutemya) by an ntemi 
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22 The Sukuma and Nyamwezi are closely related ethno-linguistic groups historically resident in an area 
approximating contemporary Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora Regions. The Sukuma and Nyamwezi 
numbered between four and five million in the late 1980s, comprising a fifth of the Tanzanian population. 
(Abrahams 1989: 356).  
23 The name sungusungu is commonly said to be derived from the name given to a type of black biting ant 
(e.g. Heald 2002: 4). However, it has also been claimed that the name is derived from the Kisukuma word 
for poison, busungu, referring to the poison tipped arrows used by the sungusungu (Hangaya 1989: 1; 
Masanja 1992: 204; Bukurura 1996: 265 fn. 3). Although the name sungusungu is now used across Tanzania, 
it was historically more common for the term basalama, or people of peace, to be used amongst the Sukuma 
and Nyamwezi (Heald 2002: 4). 
24 Alternative spellings include ntwale or mtwale. Mtware is used here following the spelling adopted when 
the post was revived in one of the case sites (C).  
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invited from a village in which sungusungu was already established. As part of this 
process village residents were required to compile a list of those suspected to be 
thieves, and those identified were tried and punished as described below (see 
Bukurura 1994a: 4-8). It was deemed important that the leadership of sungusungu, and 
particularly the ntemi, should be knowledgeable regarding divination and the use of 
medicine (ibid.: 4). Divination was important to sungusungu methods, both in locating 
wrongdoers and determining appropriate measures to be taken following their 
apprehension (ibid.: 3) and was sometimes employed in arbitration of local disputes 
(Abrahams 1987: 188). Medicine was needed to enhance the skills of sungusungu and to 
offer protection from the superior weapons of thieves (Hangaya 1989: 62; see also 
Jangu 2012: 186-327 on Mwanza Region).  
 
Although the sungusungu committees were typically comprised of older male village 
residents (Bukurura 1994a: 21), all villagers were obliged to be present at the 
inauguration of sungusungu and to participate in associated rituals and song. Villagers 
were also required to participate by secretly providing names of neighbours they 
suspected of theft, and all able-bodied men could be called upon to participate in the 
recovery of stolen cattle, armed with bows and, often poisoned, arrows (Masanja 
1992).25 Residents contributed a small amount of money to a sungusungu fund, which 
was used to provide food and supplies for those sent to apprehend thieves, and was 
subsequently replenished through fines paid by offenders (Bukurura 1994a: 12).   
 
Sungusungu groups appear initially to have been locally very popular and to have been 
perceived to have had a significant impact on rates of violent crime, having both a 
deterrent effect and some success in apprehending thieves and recovering large 
numbers of cattle (Abrahams 1987: 187). Sungusungu also played a role in dispute 
resolution within villages, sometimes trying cases in which the police had decided 
against prosecution or a court conviction had not been achieved due to shortage of 
evidence (Abrahams 1987: 188). Charges were not laid before the accused, rather the 
entire village population was expected to cooperate in ostracising the individual and 
their family until they were ready to confess their misdeeds to the sungusungu 
committee. The repentant offender was then asked to name a fine they deemed to be 
sufficient to atone for their wrongdoing, increasing their offer incrementally until the 
sungusungu demonstrated through clapping their hands that it was acceptable (ibid.: 
189).   
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25 The sungusungu were largely used only ‘traditional’ weapons, despite facing cattle rustlers with guns 
(Abrahams & Bukurura 1992: 94).  
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Those accused who would not confess to an offence were subject to torture and 
punishment, which sometimes resulted in death (Abrahams & Bukurura 1992: 94). In 
the words of one former secretary of a sungusungu organisation operating in urban 
Mwanza:  
 
They did their investigation with a stick….You would be beaten 
first, then you had to surrender. That’s it.26   
                                                       
Respondents in Mwanza claimed that when a suspect was particularly recalcitrant, the 
‘Field Force Unit’ of sungusungu,27 named after the feared police unit of the same name, 
would be deployed. These members disguised themselves with sisal fibres and 
feathers in order to conceal their identity to avoid reprisals. The fear generated by 
sungusungu’s methods became clear during interviews conducted in Mwanza, 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (5.4). 
 
The formation of sungusungu may to some extent have constituted ‘a vote of no 
confidence in the state’s ability to provide security’ (Abrahams 1987: 186). However, it 
is clear that conditions of insecurity are not a sufficient condition for the emergence of 
collective initiatives for self-protection. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
establishing forms of ‘community’ based policing poses considerable collective action 
problems. Abrahams (1987) thus situates sungusungu’s formation within a history of 
Sukuma and Nyamwezi collective action outside of state structures with which the 
organisation of sungusungu demonstrated considerable parallels, such as threshing 
teams and the basumba batale,28 which have ‘provided a continuing model and a source 
of practical experience for villagers who wish to organize their own affairs’ (Abrahams 
1987: 193-194).  
 
In addition, vigilantism not only constitutes a reaction to state inability to provide 
security. Rather, localised policing also reflects cultural imperatives to protect or 
punish which may diverge from the dictates of state law (Pratten 2008: 3-4). In the case 
of sungusungu, localised gendered and generational cleavages were reflected in the 
organisation of sungusungu and its activities (Abrahams & Bukurura 1992: 99). Some 
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26 Interview WEO-C 16.8.11. The methods of data collection used are explained in the following chapter, 
and a more detailed account of the history of sungusungu in urban Mwanza, based on interviews, follows 
in Chapter 5.  
27 These members were also known collectively as the nguku (baboons).  
28 Literally translated as ‘great youths’ (Abrahams 1989: 360), the basumba batale were the leaders of male 
youth organisations (elika), which were drawn on by chiefs when collective labour or warriors were 
required. For these services the basumba batale negotiated a portion of the chief’s tribute. The elika also 
served as a means of maintaining social order by enforcing behavioural codes for members (Liebenow 
1956: 450).  
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early reflections on sungusungu presented a somewhat idealised picture of a ‘people’s 
organisation’ (Masanja 1992) or a peasant based movement of ‘popular resistance’ 
against an alien and oppressive state (Campbell 1989). However, it is clear that 
sungusungu did not always represent the village as a whole, but rather defined and 
punished ‘criminal’ activities in accordance with the morality of the most powerful 
within the community (Buur & Jensen 2008: 146), in this case senior male residents. 
 
Whilst the initial objective of sungusungu appears to have been the recovery of stolen 
cattle, they were also known as bashosha bakima, or those who recover women, referring 
to the retrieval of women who had left their husbands or had eloped, thereby 
depriving their parents of bridewealth payments (Bukurura 1994a: 21-23). Some 
women appealed to the state for protection from sungusungu by lodging court cases 
alleging their forcible return to their spouses (Bisimba 2002: 87). Sungusungu also tried 
and punished suspected witches, usually older single women (Bukurura 1994b; Mesaki 
2009). One former secretary of sungusungu explained that it was essential for the ntemi 
to be a man. He attributed this partly to what he termed the prevailing patriarchal 
system, but also as, ‘they knew that witches are women and if they had a female ntemi 
she would defend other women’.29  
 
Some women were able to play a role in sungusungu, although it appears this was 
largely confined to the arrest and punishment of female suspects. Abrahams (1987: 184) 
observed that in some villages unmarried women took part in sungusungu and had 
their own makamanda (commanders). This was the case in all three case sites, as 
discussed further in Chapter 5 (5.4). Unusually, in Pansiansi Ward in Mwanza city, a 
woman attained the post of ntemi.  
 
Sungusungu also reproduced typical male generational roles, which emphasised the 
importance of the wisdom of elders and their powers of divination, and the labour of 
the young (Bukurura 1994a: 25). Sungusungu may have been to some extent a means of 
dealing with inter-generational tensions through instituting organised community 
service for younger men (Abrahams 1989: 361-362).  
 
State responses to sungusungu  
 
The initial response of police and the judiciary to sungusungu was extremely negative. 
Not only were the local organisations assuming powers that were legally reserved for 
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29 Interview WEO-C 16.8.11. 
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state agents, they frequently violated state law in terms of their methods of 
interrogation and punishment. Furthermore, it has been suggested that by assuming 
law and order functions sungusungu reduced the opportunities for other actors to 
solicit corrupt payments from victims and perpetrators of crime (Heald 2002: 7). There 
were occasional violent confrontations between police and sungusungu, which 
sometimes resulted in fatalities (Bukurura 1993). Many participants in sungusungu 
were prosecuted and spent time incarcerated (Abrahams & Bukurura 1994: 95). 
Popular mistrust in the police and their hostile reaction to local law enforcement meant 
that sungusungu largely ‘regarded the police as their enemies’ (Bukurura 1993: 131). 
Sungusungu reportedly sometimes arrested and punished policemen and magistrates 
who were suspected of colluding with thieves or engaging in corrupt activities (ibid.: 
133). The judiciary were also largely opposed to sungusungu and in 1987 the High 
Court ruled sungusungu to be unconstitutional and illegal (Widner 2001: 377).  
 
In contrast, the ruling party, and thus the administration, was quick to recognise the 
possible value of sungusungu. As early as 1982 President Nyerere praised sungusungu, 
describing them as a revolutionary movement deserving of support and stated that 
they should be equipped with weapons whilst urging the release of all those who had 
been arrested (Masanja 1992: 204). In 1982 he granted an amnesty to some of those 
convicted (Bukurura 1996: footnote 10), and subsequently continued to pardon 
sungusungu convicted in specific cases as well as issuing a general amnesty in 1989 
(Mwaikusa 1995: 172-173). Sungusungu was consistent with the ideology of Tanzanian 
socialism and its emphasis on self-reliance (Abrahams 1987: 189-190), and with the 
TANU party guidelines adopted in 1971, which state that ‘the basis of development of 
defence and security in Tanzania is in the Tanzanian themselves and in particular 
every patriotic Tanzanian. The country has no ability to employ a big force to manage 
defence and security affairs’ (TANU 1971). 
 
In 1983 the government went so far as to order the deployment of sungusungu from 
rural areas in the towns of Mwanza, Shinyanga and Tabora (Campbell 1989: 46), in 
order to eradicate ‘racketeers, loiterers and prostitutes’ (quoted in Shaidi 1989: 258). In 
some cases the viability of sungusungu came to depend upon the support of the local 
administration to forestall threats of prosecution (Heald 2002: 9).  
 
Contestation over sungusungu between different parts of the state apparatus is 
illustrated by a dispute that occurred in Rukwa Region in the mid-1980s, reported to 
Brockington (2001: 9-10). Suspected thieves convicted by sungusungu complained to the 
Regional and District Lawyers, police and the judiciary about the confiscation of their 
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cattle by sungusungu, who had been working in collaboration with local CCM 
branches. The FFU was dispatched to return cattle that had been seized and to arrest 
sungusungu leaders. In response, cattle owners formed a committee to enlist the 
support of retired President Nyerere, who remained chairman of CCM. Nyerere 
himself arbitrated between the party and sungusungu, and the organs of the state 
criminal justice system. He found in favour of sungusungu and ordered another FFU 
unit to ensure that cattle were again seized from suspected thieves.   
 
In 1989, the People’s Militia Act was amended to incorporate sungusungu, marking a 
formal recognition of their role in preventing crime, although the legal framework has 
remained relatively unclear. The Act bestows powers equivalent to those exercised by 
a police constable on any ‘organised group operating with the authority and under the 
aegis of government…for the protection of the sovereignty of the United Republic or 
for the protection of the people or the property of the United Republic by whatever 
name known whether Wasalama, Sungusungu, or any other…’ (People’s Militia Laws 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 1989). Although the Act also gives the Home 
Secretary the authority to make regulations governing sungusungu activities, this has 
not been done.  
 
Sungusungu was not only ideologically appealing to CCM. The utility of an additional 
local security provider was highly apparent at a time when the ratio of police and 
judicial officers to population were estimated as 1: 10,000 and 1: 17,000 respectively 
(Daily News 30th May 1989 and Nyalali 1990: 16, cited in Bukurura 1996: 263). Lange et 
al. (2000: 6) argue that the government’s acceptance of sungusungu marked ‘a new era’ 
in government attitudes towards civil society more broadly: ‘…the government had 
come to realize that with the conditions of structural adjustment, the non-
governmental sector would have to play a vital role in the delivery of services and a 
variety of organizations soon entered the space left open by the withdrawal of the 
state.’ Thus, embracing sungusungu ‘happily chimed with both necessity and ideology’ 
(Heald 2002: 9).  
 
State-sponsored sungusungu  
 
Following the amendment of the People’s Militia Act in 1989 to incorporate 
sungusungu, the government began to promote the formation of local security 
organisations modelled on sungusungu around the country. These efforts formed part 
of a broader government anti-crime drive, spearheaded by then minister for home 
affairs, Augustine Mrema, which targeted a wide range of offences including public 
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corruption, foreign currency violations and tax avoidance as well as violent crime 
(Kakoti 1998: 58-59). Whilst the strategy appears to have had a considerable impact on 
crime rates, the new sungusungu did not always enjoy local popularity. Rather, 
‘organized by local administrations, demanding compulsory service from members of 
the community – most especially in the form of assistance with night patrols – it 
became another instrument of state coercion’ (Heald 2006: 273).   
 
In urban areas, participation in neighbourhood patrols was made mandatory for all 
able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 60 (Kakoti 1998: 6). Although no 
statutory provision was made, a series of public announcements by Mrema made it 
clear that participation was not optional (Kakoti 1998: 59-60). Those evading patrol 
duties or refusing to pay a fine imposed by sungusungu were prosecuted and 
sometimes jailed (Kinemo 1993, cited in Kakoti 1998: 61). At the same time, residents 
were encouraged to contribute cash, materials or labour to build local police posts 
(Kakoti 1998: 57-58), and rewards were offered to incentivise citizens to share 
information with the police (Mallya 1994: 75). 
 
Ten-cell leaders were central to the operation of the sungusungu system in urban areas. 
They provided information about residents eligible to participate, organised timetables 
for patrolling and were responsible for reporting shirkers to the police (Kakoti 1998: 
61). Minister Mrema also attempted to introduce the compilation of lists of suspected 
local criminals, similar to that employed during sungusungu inaugurations outlined 
above. Residents of an area were encouraged to confidentially record the names of 
those they thought to be involved in crime, and those whose names were frequently 
mentioned were invited to police stations in order for their fingerprints to be recorded 
for use in future police investigations (Mallya 1994: 75).  
 
Where sungusungu was already in existence, they became increasingly tied to the party 
and administration. Hangaya (1989: 37-38) reports that secretaries of sungusungu were 
asked to take the place of absent village secretaries and the rank and file sungusungu 
participants were deployed to collect the development levy. There are also reports of 
sungusungu being utilised to enforce participation in communal work initiatives and 
nation-building projects (Shivji 1990: 17), police public meetings (Heald 2002: 9-10) and 
pursue tax defaulters (Abrahams 1987: 91). Sungusungu representatives were included 
in District Security Committees, chaired by the District Commissioner (Grawert 2009: 
397). In this context, sungusungu did not always remain a popular movement, and 
citizens sometimes experienced harassment and corruption similar to that associated 
with other branches of the state security apparatus (Shivji 1990: 99-101).  
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During 1991-92, at the peak of sungusungu operations around the country, a 60% 
reduction in crime rates was reported, and notably reported armed robbery declined 
by 72% (Safer Cities 2000: 4; see also Mwaikusa 1995: 166-167 on Dar es Salaam). 
However, the compulsory nature of participation made sungusungu highly unpopular 
in urban areas and night patrols proved unsustainable (Mwaikusa 1995: 171). 
Complaints were also reported in the largely government controlled media of 
harassment of civilians by sungusungu and false arrests. The risks involved in 
patrolling were also contentious (Kakoti 1998: 63). In some cases the principle that all 
should participate regardless of social position was eroded, as the relatively wealthy 
were able to avoid the inconvenience of patrolling by paying others to take their place 
(ibid.: 64). Ultimately, most of the groups established as a result of government orders 
were short-lived, due to difficulty in sustaining compliance or internal conflict between 
members (Mwaikusa 1995: 171). 
 
The extent to which participation in sungusungu became compulsory and coercive was 
consistent with government promotion of ‘self help’ initiatives more broadly, which 
were typically implemented in a ‘top down’ manner, with citizens given little 
opportunity to shape development objectives (see 2.4), leading Mwaikusa (1995: 170) to 
describe the Minister for Home Affairs’ insistence on mandatory participation as 
‘typically Tanzanian’. A parallel thus emerges between state–sponsored forms of 
sungusungu and the failure of other coercive state led development directives under 
Ujamaa (Heald 2002: 25). Abrahams & Bukurura (1994: 97), for example, note the 
contrast between the rapid spread of sungusungu among the Sukuma and Nyamwezi 
and limited popular support for and participation in the party-led People’s Militia.  
 
The decline of state-sponsored sungusungu  
 
Mrema was removed from the post of Minister of Home Affairs in 1994. Without his 
energetic leadership the practice of patrolling in urban areas, which had never been 
codified in law, declined rapidly and by 1996 sungusungu was no longer functioning in 
Dar es Salaam (Kakoti 1998: 65; Heald 2002: 8). Following the adoption of a multiparty 
system in 1992, the strong association of sungusungu with CCM became problematic in 
some areas and gave citizens an opportunity to refuse to participate in what could be 
seen as a ruling party scheme (Safer Cities 2000: iv). The brutality exercised by 
sungusungu also made them unpopular in many areas.30 Criticism of sungusungu 
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30 Interview Professor Chris Peter Maina 23.3.11.   
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increased in areas where newly permitted opposition parties were gaining popularity 
(Grawert 2009: 320-321). The extent to which sungusungu was perceived to be 
associated with the ruling party in urban areas is illustrated by the difficulties faced in 
subsequent attempts to revive sungusungu in Dar es Salaam under a UN HABITAT 
sponsored scheme, discussed below. In areas with substantial support for opposition 
parties, coordinators were obliged to formulate alternative names for local security 
schemes as many refused to be associated with sungusungu (Safer Cities 2000: v). The 
decline of sungusungu in urban Mwanza is discussed further in the Chapter 5.   
 
Sungusungu since 1995 
 
Sungusungu continued to operate in many areas, particularly in the Lake Zone and 
areas with high levels of Sukuma and Nyamwezi migration. Whilst permitted to 
decline elsewhere, sungusungu was promoted by the government amongst the Kuria 
resident in the north of the country near the Kenyan border, as a response to high rates 
of violent cattle raiding (Fleisher 2000a; Heald 2002, 2006). Here sungusungu became 
closely linked to existing locally authoritative institutions and has been credited with 
bringing about a considerable improvement in local security and providing a popular 
and legitimate form of policing (Heald 2006). 
 
Sungusungu organisations have typically remained closely linked to local 
administrative structures, in some cases incorporated into village security committees 
and made subject to guidelines aimed at preventing their prosecution (Heald 2002: 8-
9). Nkonya (2008: 132), for example, notes that sungusungu in Bariadi District, 
Shinyanga Region, were obliged to seek approval from the village government before 
ostracism could be implemented. Linkages to wider administrative structures have led 
sungusungu to assume rule enforcement roles across a range of sectors beyond criminal 
justice, including the management of natural resources such as water (Nkonya 2008), 
land (URT 2006a) and fisheries (Medard et al. 2002; Wilson 2002).  
 
Some of the elements of sungusungu that were least palatable to the state criminal 
justice agencies have declined in importance over time. Divination and magic are no 
longer central to their strategies (Jangu 2012: 220-222), and witchcraft is typically no 
longer a key concern (Heald 2002: 8).  
 
An additional change relates to the increasing commercialisation of sungusungu 
activities in some areas, which has become necessary as sungusungu workload has 
increased and activities have become more regular, to the extent that some sungusungu 
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groups ‘turned their operations into a business’, making money by imposing heavy 
fines or charging fees to their clients (Mwaikusa 1995: 175).  
 
Although sungusungu no longer exercise the same systematic use of torture, there are 
reports of violent treatment of those accused of crime (e.g. Department of State 2011, 
2012; LHRC 2007: 23). However, as will be discussed further below, sungusungu are not 
necessarily more likely to be guilty in this regard than the state police.  
 
Politicians have continued to promote formation of sungusungu institutions to deal 
with high levels of crime in both urban and rural areas (e.g. Lawi 2003; David & 
Wantaigwa 2010) and have urged mobilisation of sungusungu in response to particular 
threats, including the killing of people with albinism in Mwanza Region (Muyomba 
2009).31 Sungusungu have also been incorporated into NGO programmes including 
raising awareness about gender-based violence (Highland et al. 2007) and community-
based forest restoration (IUCN 2002). 
 
The largest intervention seeking to mobilise citizens through a revival of sungusungu 
was led by the UN HABITAT supported Safer Cities Programme introduced in Dar es 
Salaam in 1997 (Safer Cities 2000). Aiming to design an intervention that was ‘in 
accordance with local traditions and the political context’ (Assiago n.d.: 6), Safer Cities 
sought to introduce ‘community policing’ based on sungusungu or ten-cell traditions 
within each mtaa. The new sungusungu conducted night patrols as earlier variants had, 
but in some cases also included an income-generating element designed to prevent 
vulnerable young people from engaging in crime, whereby unemployed young men 
were employed as guards through community contributions and encouraged to pursue 
other business opportunities (see Mtani 2007). The extent to which these groups were 
sustained before more recent police-led efforts to establish ulinzi shirikishi is difficult to 
establish and probably highly variable between sub-wards. As noted above, the refusal 
of opposition party supporters to adopt the name ‘sungusungu’ for their 
neighbourhood watch activities suggests the problems of attempting to present 
sungusungu as a ‘tradition’ around which consensus might be found. Particularly in 
urban areas, state-sponsored sungusungu was closely associated with the ruling party 
and participation was sustained through coercion.  
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31 People with albinism are vulnerable to attack due to beliefs that their body parts can bring good fortune 
(see for example Bryceson et al. 2010). 
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3.2.4 Urban undesirables from the colonial period to the present 
 
Throughout the colonial and post-independence periods, policing of urban areas of 
Tanzania has reflected the preoccupation of successive administrations with the 
‘problem’ of the urban unemployed. This merits discussion here due to the extent to 
which similar concerns over the occupation of urban space by ‘idle youth’ shape CP 
practices in contemporary Mwanza, and generate alliances between police and those 
(typically senior) residents who occupy leadership positions in local government 
institutions. 
 
Dar es Salaam experienced rapid population growth from the late 1930s onwards, for 
which neither the urban infrastructure nor economy were well equipped. By the late 
1940s, a growing number of ‘intermittently employed Africans, many of them young’ 
(Burton 2005: 113) were thought to bear significant responsibility for the increasing 
rates of crime. In Dar es Salaam as elsewhere, crime in urban areas was also linked to 
‘detribalisation’ in the colonial imagination, whereby recent migrants were liable to be 
led astray in the absence of village mechanisms of social control (Lewis 2000; 78; 
Burton 2005: 19-21; Fourchard 2011: 525-528). The relative freedom and opportunity 
enjoyed by young people in an urban environment caused anxiety to the colonial 
administration and senior African urban residents (Burton 2001). 
 
In the early 1940s the municipal police began extensive ‘repatriation’ campaigns, 
targeting wahuni (hooligans),32 or all ‘unemployed, underemployed, and nefariously 
employed Africans’ (Burton 2005: 4). By the 1950s such operations were regularly 
initiated by police in Dar es Salaam in cooperation with African local government 
officials (Burton 2005: ch. 12). The removal and repatriation of ‘spivs’ and other 
‘undesirables’ from Mwanza town is noted in the annual reports of Provincial 
Commissioners from the mid-1950s, and in 1959, for example, 343 people were 
expelled to rural areas (Tanganyika Police Force 1959).  
 
Colonial laws intended to deal with such undesirables have been retained (see Burton 
2005: 276) and periodic expulsions of modern day wahuni continued into the post-
colonial period. Young unmarried women in urban areas have also been a source of 
considerable official anxiety, often accused of engaging in prostitution (Brennan 2006: 
404). Since the late 1960s the government has periodically ‘repatriated’ unemployed 
urban residents to rural areas. As in the past, however, those expelled from cities have 
usually returned rapidly (Shaidi 1984: 84; Tripp 1997: 140-144; Tungaraza 1998: 307). 
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32 For an extended discussion of the term wahuni see Burton (2005: 4-6).  
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Although since the 1980s mass removal of sectors of the urban population has ceased 
and the government has developed greater tolerance for informal economic activities, 
the un- and under-employed, and particularly young people, remain subject to 
harassment by police and urban administrations (Burton 2005: 276).  
 
The most recent International Labour Organization survey in Tanzania (2006) found 
youth unemployment to be at 24.4% in urban areas of mainland Tanzania (cited in 
International Labour Office 2010: 2). Former Prime Minister Edward Lowassa has 
described the problem of unemployment amongst young people in Tanzania as a ‘time 
bomb’ (Tanzania Daily News 2012a). In urban areas around Tanzania groups of 
unemployed young men are very visible in public spaces as they gather at their vijiwe.33 
The assumption that it is these young men who will be tempted by criminal activities is 
common, including for example within Dar es Salaam’s UN HABITAT sponsored 
‘Safer Cities’ initiative which promoted the formation of sungusungu groups in the city 
from 2000. These groups were intended to perform preventative patrols, but also 
constituted an attempt to provide unemployed young people with some income to 
forestall criminality (Mtani 2007: 76).  
 
Young people living on the streets are particularly vulnerable to victimisation by police 
who associate their life circumstances with criminality, including occasional forced 
removal from urban areas (Anderson & Stavrou 2000: 48; Kamala et al. 2001; Lugalla & 
Kibassa 2003; interview Kuleana Centre for Children’s Rights 3.11.10; Buske 2011). 
Petty traders and young men who ‘loiter’ in public spaces are also frequently harassed 
by police and municipal Auxiliary Police (e.g. Tripp 1997: 150; Klipin 2003, cited in Van 
der Spuy & Röntsch 2008: 65; Burton 2005: 279; Carabain 2008; Lumanyika 2010 on 
Mwanza).  
 
3.3 Policing democratisation and democratising policing 
 
In 1992 the Tanzanian constitution was altered to permit multiple political parties and 
a general election was held in 1995. CCM retained the presidency and a parliamentary 
majority on the mainland as it has done in subsequent elections in 2000, 2005 and 2010. 
Since the reinstatement of multiparty competition it has been made illegal for police 
officers to join a political party. However, there have been few other changes in the 
legal and regulatory structure of the police force, rather ‘the legal regime and the 
underlying conceptual basis, principles and practices of the police have remained 
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33 Vijiwe literally means ‘small stones’ but can be translated as ‘jobless corner’ (e.g. Mtani 2007: 76; Reuster-
Jahn & Kießling 2006: 7). See Reuster-Jahn & Kießling (2006: 7) for further discussion of the term.  
!!
?H!
virtually intact’ (Shivji 2001: 8-9). Popular opinion has remained largely negative, 
informed by frequent reports of police brutality, experiences of corruption and the 
partisan policing of protest and elections. As has been the case since the colonial 
period, the ability of the police to respond to crime is limited by the very low police to 
population ratio and the lack of available financial resources to improve infrastructure 
or the morale and wellbeing of officers. The extent to which the police were ‘left 
behind’ by political liberalisation34 and the obvious appeal of an apparently low cost 
means of augmenting police capacity, in combination with a surge in violent crime, led 
to the adoption of CP in 2006.  
 
In the absence of reliable and comparable statistics, it is difficult to place crime levels in 
Tanzania in comparative perspective, however the results of the fourth round of the 
Afrobarometer survey, conducted in 2008, suggest that fear of crime in Tanzania is 
close to the average for sub-Saharan Africa, but considerably lower than in 
neighbouring Kenya. 37% of Tanzanians reported having felt fear of crime in their own 
home over the past year (Afrobarometer 2009), compared to 39.8% of all respondents in 
the countries included in the survey,35 and 60%, of Kenyans (cited in Andvig & Barasa 
2011: 27). 27.2% of Tanzanians claimed they had been burgled during the past year. 
This was a somewhat lower proportion than in Kenya (33%) and Uganda (46%) 
(Afrobarometer 2008a, 2008b). However, in 2012, 43% of those surveyed in Tanzania 
claimed that they or a member of their family had been physically attacked during 
2010, representing an astonishing increase from 6% in 2008 (Afrobarometer 2012a). 
This was also a much higher proportion than gave this response in neighbouring 
Kenya (12%), Malawi (9%) and Uganda (12%) (Afrobarometer 2012b, 2012c, 2012d). 
The percentage of Tanzanians who had been burgled during the past year also 
increased to 35% (Afrobarometer 2012a). 
 
3.3.1 Partisan policing in a multi-party system 
 
The police have the potential to significantly affect political life: 
 
…by determining who can participate in politics by their 
discretion over arrest and detention. They may be given explicit 
authority to check and/or restrain political activities, and they 
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34 Interview ACP K 25.3.11. 
35 These were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zambia. 
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certainly regulate public conduct in the form of meetings, 
parades, and demonstrations. 
        
              (Hills 1996: 273) 
 
In Tanzania, despite the introduction of a multiparty system, the police have largely 
continued to act as an instrument for the preservation of government interests. This 
forms part of the rationale for ongoing reforms.36 However, key aspects of the legal 
framework governing the police that are conducive to politicised policing are yet to be 
altered.  
 
Although as noted above, it is now illegal for police officers to join a political party, the 
IGP is a presidential appointee who has no fixed term (CHRI 2006: 22). The president 
also appoints Regional and District Commissioners who chair security committees 
within their jurisdiction and have the power to order arrest and detention.  
 
Existing legislation gives police considerable discretion to interfere with political 
activity. The rules relating to public gatherings are extremely complicated and 
opposition parties are frequently accused of minor infringements (Hoffman & 
Robinson 2006: 132). Opposition party members commonly complain of the selective 
enforcement of campaign regulations in both national and local elections (Ewald 2011: 
237-242). Opposition presidential candidates have frequently been arrested in the 
periods preceding elections, although only one case against a candidate has ever been 
brought to trial (Hoffman & Robinson 2006: 134). During the campaigns prior to the 
2010 general election and subsequent by-elections, several parliamentary candidates 
standing for the Chama Cha Demokrasi na Maendeleo (CHADEMA)37 were arrested 
and subsequently released (Kaijage 2011). Election monitors have reported police 
partisanship favouring the ruling party during every general election since the return 
to multiparty competition in 1995 (EU 2010: 23, 28; Makulilo 2011: 251). Criticism of the 
role played by police during elections has been particularly strong in Zanzibar, which 
has historically been an opposition stronghold. Police were strongly implicated in 
election related violence in 2000 (FIDH & LHRC 2001; CHRI 2006: note 61) and clashed 
again with civilians in 2005 (UNPO 2005).  
 
Since the 2010 election accusations of police partiality have been levelled by 
CHADEMA’s leadership due to the way in which opposition party demonstrations 
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36 Interviews: ACP K 25.3.11; SACP LK 18.10.11. 
37 CHADEMA became the largest opposition party on the mainland following the 2010 general elections. 
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and gatherings have been policed (Machira 2011; Mkinga 2012). Planned 
demonstrations have frequently been prohibited at short notice and police response to 
subsequent protests has resulted in fatalities in Morogoro (Citizen correspondents 
2012), Iringa (Sanga 2012) and Arusha, where three people died during a CHADEMA 
protest after permission for a rally had been granted and then revoked (LHRC 2012: 
18). Police were also accused by two newly elected Mwanza Region members of 
parliament (MPs) of having colluded in an attack in which the MPs were seriously 
injured and of failing to offer protection from the attackers (Domasa 2012). The Legal 
and Human Rights Centre (LHRC)38 (2012: 26) annual report for 2011 thus argues that:  
 
The situation on the ground shows that the police force in 
Tanzania is not free from political control. It is the view of the 
LHRC that the Tanzania Police Force must have a greater 
autonomy from political control for it to be accountable and 
responsible to the people it serves. However, this cannot be 
achieved if the force keeps on receiving orders from political 
quarters. The police force does not seem to be independent 
because it lacks not only the facilities but also the resources. 
This makes it vulnerable and dependent to (sic) external forces. 
 
3.3.2 Police corruption 
 
The police are consistently ranked Tanzania’s most corrupt public institution in 
national surveys (e.g. LHRC 2012: 204; 206-207; TI-Kenya 2012). 92% of respondents to 
the Afrobarometer survey conducted in 2012 claimed that some or all police officers 
were corrupt (Afrobarometer 2012a). The traffic police are typically viewed as 
particularly problematic (URT 2009a).  
 
Common complaints affect both those reporting crime and those apprehended. 
Payment may be demanded before a reported case is dealt with and it is widely 
suspected that apprehended suspects are able to secure their release from custody by 
paying officers (e.g. URT 2003: 88-89). The ability to extract rent from policing 
generates incentives that determine which ‘crimes’ the police focus their efforts upon. 
Fleisher (2000a: 221), for example, reports that in Tarime District in Mara Region, ‘the 
real bread and butter of police work consists of arresting people involved in bar fights, 
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38 The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) is an independent body based in Dar es Salaam that 
conducts research, advocacy and civic education around human rights and produces an annual human 
rights report.   
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or caught cultivating bangi (‘bhang’), or distilling gongo [illicit locally brewed spirit]… 
minor infractions commonly referred to by local people as ‘mistakes’ – and extorting 
bribes from them to let them go.’ In addition, citizens may be arrested on false 
pretences in the hope that they will pay police for their release (CHRI 2006: 16). Police 
are also widely suspected of colluding with thieves (e.g. Fleisher 2000b).  
 
Lack of confidence in the police is compounded by perceptions of corruption within 
the judiciary, which also ranks highly in surveys of citizens’ experiences of corruption 
(e.g. URT 2009b: 29; TI-Kenya 2012). 
 
All of the complaints noted above were also widely repeated in the three case sites, as 
discussed in Chapter 6. Whilst it is possible that some perceptions of corruption are a 
result of misunderstandings of evidence requirements and bail laws, popular 
expectations of police malpractice are important in shaping the strategies pursued by 
victims of crime and their willingness to cooperate with police as required by new CP 
strategies.  
 
3.3.3 Police brutality and extra-judicial killings  
 
The poor record of the Tanzanian police in treatment of suspects is well documented in 
human rights reports and the UN recently named the TPF the tenth worst offender 
globally with regard to police killings of civilians (LHRC 2013: 20). The LHRC reports 
that 246 citizens were killed by the security forces between 2003 and 2012 (ibid.). This 
included 25 deaths in 2011, the year in which the majority of this research was 
conducted (ibid.: 21). In addition to the fatalities caused by police response to party 
political protests noted above, conflict over natural resource extraction has led to 
casualties. In 2011, for example, five people were shot and killed at African Barrick 
Gold’s (ABG) North Mara mine reportedly after police who had been colluding with 
thieves turned on their co-conspirators when senior officers arrived (LHRC 2012: 20-
21). The police were subsequently accused of attempting to cover up the incident by 
stealing the bodies of those killed from the mortuary (ibid.: 27).   
 
Police are often quick to resort to use of weapons and it is rare for alleged perpetrators 
of armed robberies to be apprehended or to appear in court as police are likely to shoot 
suspects on sight (CHRI 2006: 17). It is revealing that following the establishment of the 
Ministry of Safety and Security in 2006, discussed below, one of the new minister’s first 
steps was to introduce a ‘shoot to kill’ policy for police, which resulted in five deaths in 
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its first week of operation (BBC 2006), reflecting the Prime Minister’s 2003 promise that 
in order to combat ‘gangsters’, ‘wherever possible, excessive force will be used’ (Lawi 
2003). Human rights organisations and the media have also documented many cases of 
police brutality towards those arrested and the use of torture to extract confessions 
(CHRI 2006: 15).  
 
Perceived impunity for police killings led the LHRC to refer Tanzania to the UN 
Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial killings in October 2012, following reported 
attempts by the Minister for Home Affairs to support a police cover up of events 
leading to the death of a journalist during a CHADEMA protest in September 2012 
(Athumani 2012).  
 
3.3.4 Shortages of funding and personnel  
 
The police to population ratio in Tanzania is extremely low, being one officer per 1156 
citizens at the beginning of 2013, compared to the UN recommended 1:450 (Kaijage 
2013).39 Although, the current figure of 38,847 officers (ibid.) represents a considerable 
increase from 29,057 officers in 2008 (TPF 2008a), it remains difficult to attract potential 
recruits as rates of pay are low and the hours worked make it difficult for police to 
supplement their income through other activities, as is the norm for other public 
servants (ibid.: 36). The 2009 police annual report (TPF 2009: 26) acknowledges the 
challenge posed by an: ‘Unmotivated workforce resulting in poor morale since TPF 
personnel are unable to meet professional and family commitments due to poor 
remuneration and poor conditions of service.’ Furthermore, those who live in police 
barracks face appalling conditions, many living in ‘dilapidated or almost condemned 
houses’ (TPF 2008a: 37). It was only in 2010 that a scheme for compensation of police 
officers injured or killed in the course of duty was introduced (TPF 2010a: 12).  
 
Limited mobility due to a lack of funds to buy vehicles or fuel for vehicles makes it 
difficult for police to respond to incidents in a timely fashion and restricts the 
geographical coverage of the police force. According to a 2004 survey of experience of 
victimisation in Tanzania, for example, one third of rural respondents had never seen a 
uniformed police officer in their local area (Stavrou & O’Riordan 2005: vii). It is not 
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39 North American and Western European countries typically have more than three officers per thousand 
citizens (Baker 2006: 56). According to estimates based on information provided by national police forces 
to Bruce Baker for the year 2007, the Tanzanian ratio (1 officer for every 1370 citizens) was considerably 
lower than the West African countries of Liberia (1: 857), Nigeria (1: 722) and Sierra Leone (1: 612). 
However, Tanzania compared relatively favourably with the neighbouring countries of Rwanda (1: 1380) 
and Uganda (1: 1880).   
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only in areas far from regional capitals in which the police might be seen as largely 
absent, however, as sprawling cities with often inaccessible and poorly lit informal 
settlements also pose considerable problems for the police (The Citizen 2010).  
 
The wealthy are increasingly choosing to meet their security requirements by hiring 
one of the many commercial firms that have emerged since the liberalisation of the 
security industry in the 1980s. In 2010 it was estimated that over 495 private security 
companies were operating in the country (Shadrack 2011: 6) and during that year alone 
176 new companies were registered with the police, mainly in Dar es Salaam and 
Mwanza (TPF 2010a: 45). In 2012, the Secretary General of the Tanzania Security 
Industry Association claimed that there were over two million people employed by 
commercial security providers (Wa Simbeye 2012). The private security sector lacks a 
comprehensive legal framework (ibid.), however conditions for registration specify 
that the director of the company must demonstrate experience in the security sector, 
typically as a police officer or soldier. This makes establishing a security firm a 
lucrative retirement option for former police and army officers. Three former IGPs, for 
example, are now managing large commercial security providers (Shadrack 2011: 36). 
For the vast majority, employing a security guard is not financially feasible, and so 
instead CP is envisaged as a means to compensate for police absence from poor 
residential areas.  
 
3.4 Community policing (polisi jamii/ulinzi shirikishi) 
 
The only solution to prevent crimes is for everyone to engage in 
the initiative of community policing because security is not 
solely the role for the police.40 
 
Community policing was officially introduced in Tanzania in 2006 following the 
appointment of a new Inspector General of Police, Said Mwema, who had previously 
headed INTERPOL’s eastern Africa regional bureau. CP forms one part of an 
ambitious ten year police reform programme, the aims of which include: reform of the 
legal and regulatory framework governing the police; improvement to infrastructure 
including police accommodation; increased capacity to use ICT within the force; better 
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40 S. Kova, Police Commander Dar es Salaam special policing zone, quoted in Kazoka 
(2011a).  
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human resource management and ‘involving the community in policing’ (ushirikishaji 
jamii katika ulinzi na usalama) (TPF 2010b).  
 
The reforms were initiated in the context of increasing rates of violent crime, 
particularly in urban areas, over the preceding decade of economic and political 
liberalisation (Myers 2005: 63; TPF 2010b: 11-12). In January 2006 it had been decided to 
remove the police from the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Home Affairs and to 
establish a Ministry for Safety and Security (Wazira wa Usalama wa Raia), responsible 
solely for the police. By 2008, however, the police were returned to the Ministry for 
Home Affairs and the police annual report for this year claimed that ‘The crime waves 
involving bank robberies, armed robberies, car jacking which was (sic) rampant in (sic) 
few years ago has (sic) been relatively curbed’ (TPF 2008a: 40).  
 
Tanzania is unusual in the region for the extent to which the reform, including its CP 
elements, has been internally driven (contra Brogden 2004; Saferworld 2008 on CP in 
Kenya; Hinton & Newburn 2009a). The reform is largely ‘home grown’,41 being the 
product of an extensive consultative process within the country, involving police 
officers, the prison service and other organisations such as religious groups, regarding 
opinions on the current performance of the police and challenges they faced (S. Haji, in 
Scher 2009b). Although the design process did entail consideration of experience in 
other countries, the resulting reform template is deemed to be ‘very indigenously 
Tanzanian’ (ibid.).  
 
There is no legislation specific to CP, however legal justification for the role of local 
government in establishing local security initiatives is derived from the Local 
Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982, which established local authorities. The 
act mandates local government authorities to ‘maintain and facilitate the maintenance 
of peace, order and good government’ and to take all actions necessary ‘for the 
suppression of crime, the maintenance of peace and good order and the protection of 
public and private property lawfully acquired’ (cited in TPF 2007a: 22-23). At the local 
level, community crime prevention activities may be covered by by-laws.  
 
CP has three interrelated official objectives: ‘increased capacity of the community to 
deal with local crimes; improved police-community relationships; and increased 
capacity in preventing and solving crime as the planned outcomes of the interventions’ 
(TPF 2009: 66). Recognising the limited capacity of the poorly resourced police to deal 
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41 Interview SACP LK 18.10.11. 
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with crime and the importance of access to local knowledge, through CP the police 
have sought to ‘sensitise’ the public as to their responsibilities with regard to local 
crime prevention and to move towards ‘sharing responsibility for policing between the 
police and the public’ (TPF 2010b: 2).   
 
The policies adopted to implement CP in Tanzania are outlined in the following 
section, with a focus on the promotion of voluntary local policing institutions referred 
to as ulinzi shirikishi.  
 
3.4.1 Improving the public image of the police and gathering intelligence   
 
Recognising the lack of public confidence in the police, attempts have been made to 
improve the public image of the police and to enhance communication between police 
officers and citizens in order to improve intelligence gathering for crime prevention 
and detection.  
 
Educational programmes devoted to explaining polisi jamii and the work of the police 
more broadly have been produced for radio and television and further outreach has 
been conducted at public events such as football tournaments organised by police in 
urban areas. In an attempt to make it easier for the public to report crimes, the mobile 
telephone numbers of senior police, including the IGP and all Regional Police 
Commissioners (RPCs), have been released to the public. It is hoped that by enabling 
the public to contact senior officers directly it will be possible to overcome popular 
fears that local police do not keep statements confidential, leaving witnesses vulnerable 
to reprisals. Incidents can also be reported anonymously by SMS using an emergency 
number or regional cell phone numbers.  The phone numbers of senior regional and 
district police officers are now prominently displayed at all local police stations to 
enable citizens to make a complaint in case of corruption or poor service.  
 
Under the Usalama Wetu Kwanza (Our Safety First) initiative, police have made visits to 
primary schools to educate pupils regarding possible threats to their safety and the 
work of the police, in the hope of making children more responsible for their own 
safety and reducing their fear of the police (Bugaywa 2010). In addition the programme 
also appears to be aimed at improving pupil behaviour, for example reducing 
absenteeism, and increasing the likelihood that they will be law abiding in the future 
(TPF 2010a).42 
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Attempts have been made to strengthen the relationships between police officers and 
the communities in which they work by allocating a police officer to each ward. By 
2010 all 3676 wards in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar had been assigned a polisi kata 
(ward police officer), although it is envisaged that each ward will have two officers in 
the future (TPF 2010a: 39). This system is expected to increase the responsiveness of the 
force as officers will be able to respond to problems in a more timely fashion as well as 
giving citizens more say in policing practice. In addition the polisi kata is assumed to be 
less likely to solicit bribes from those among whom they must work every day 
(Mwapachu 2007). It is also hoped that ward officers will be able to use greater 
discretion and diplomacy in dealing with the public (URT n.d.: 48-49). 
 
3.4.2 Co-producing security 
 
CP as understood in Tanzania places considerable emphasis on the sharing of 
responsibilities between the public and the police. In light of budgetary constraints, 
sharing the responsibility for crime prevention with citizens through CP presented 
itself as an almost unavoidable strategy (L. Kusima in Scher 2009a). As outlined on 
website of the Ministry of Home Affairs: 
 
To deliver the service the public deserves, TPF needs to enlist 
the cooperation and participation of the communities it serves 
and other stakeholders. This is critical especially in a situation 
where TPF is experiencing shortages in terms of human 
resources and infrastructure.43  
 
A former Commissioner of Police Operations has described CP as a means of 
mitigating the shortage of police officers by ‘tapping on available resources i.e. the 
citizens’ (Tibasana 2002). To this end, police have called for material support from 
businesses and communities, as well as instituting local policing initiatives which 
enable the police to shed some of the ‘unnecessary load’ they had been bearing.44 
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43 http://www.moha.go.tz/index.php/police-force/community-policing (Accessed 11 February 2013). 
44 Interview ACP K 25.3.11. 
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Co-producing security with the private sector 
 
Police annual reports frequently evoke the importance of ‘partnership’ between the 
police and the private sector. This typically refers largely to donations received by the 
police from businesses, which are often cited as evidence of CP’s success (see 3.4.3).  
 
Particularly strong relationships have been formed between the police and large 
mining companies including ABG and Geita Gold Mining, both of which have signed a 
memorandum of understanding with police outlining their commitment to supporting 
CP. The ABG North Mara mine, for example, which was the scene of shootings of 
civilians by police and mine security guards discussed above, has enthusiastically 
embraced CP by reorganising, training and employing local sungusungu to guard the 
perimeter of the mine, establishing close relationships between their head of security 
and village leadership and constructing police posts near the mine.45 Using ‘traditional’ 
security groups enables a considerable reduction in the mine’s security costs. ABG 
have also funded the production of educational materials on CP for villagers living 
near the mine and provided human rights training to police officers stationed there.46 
 
It is not only private companies that are called upon to support the poorly resourced 
police. The Ministry of Home Affairs has, for example, praised the construction of 
police stations by volunteers and called for more police stations to be built through 
local self help (The Guardian 2011). Other ways in which citizens might assist the 
police are illustrated by this account of CP given by Dr S. Haji, an academic involved in 
the design of the police reform programme: 
 
I am the mtaa [sub-ward] chairman…. Now the police come to 
me if they don’t have any petrol. I direct them to somebody 
who will be able to help them or to find them a four-wheel 
drive to borrow for the weekend. This boosts the morale of the 
police. Or if the police have other problems they come and tell 
me, for example if they can’t pay school fees that month.47 
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45 Interview member of ABG security management team 13.1.11; see also Tanzania Daily News 2012b on 
ABG in Kahama. 
46 Interviews: ACP K 11.10.11; member of ABG security management team 13.1.11. 
47 Interview Semboja Haji 7.10.11. 
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Co-producing security with the ‘community’: ulinzi shirikishi 
 
CP is seen partly as an attempt to ‘decentralise police powers and authority down to 
the people’.48 This is largely manifested through the promotion of local security groups 
(vikundi vya ulinzi) organised by local government authorities. The emphasis placed on 
such local policing initiatives has led Van der Spuy and Röntsch (2008: 65) to suggest 
that in Tanzania ‘the concept [of CP] seems to have been misunderstood, the popular 
understanding being yet another alternative community police force’.  
 
Police have held seminars for elected and appointed leaders of mitaa, villages and 
wards49 in order to explain the concept of ulinzi shirikishi and how to go about 
establishing a local security group.50 They are instructed to organise public meetings at 
which a security committee (kamati ya ulinzi) is to be selected and a strategy for 
organising night patrols should be decided. It is anticipated that vijana (young men) 
within each mtaa or village should take responsibility for patrolling, whilst other 
residents undertake to provide goods or money to ensure the guards have the 
necessary equipment (such as batons, whistles, mobile telephones) for patrolling and 
may receive some posho (subsistence allowance) (TPF 2008b).   
 
The security groups are incorporated into the existing hierarchical organisation of the 
mtaa (or village in rural areas), whereby the young security guards are overseen by the 
security committee, which like the other committees comprising the governance of the 
mtaa, such as those for health and sanitation, is subordinate to the mtaa chairperson. 
The chairperson in turn reports to the Ward Executive Officer (WEO) (TPF 2008b).  
 
According to guidance on establishing ulinzi shirikishi provided by the TPF, the duties 
of local security groups include: preventing crime and offering timely assistance to the 
community when required; educating the community about strategies of preventing 
crime and bringing about ‘development’ (maendeleo) in the area; providing a first 
response in times of trouble or natural disaster such as fire or floods; the prompt 
delivery of statements to the police regarding any suspicious behaviour; and ensuring 
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48 Interview ACP K 25.3.11. 
49 The structure of the Tanzanian local government system is outlined in the following chapter. The mtaa 
(plural mitaa), or sub-ward, is the lowest level of local government in urban areas.  
50 At the time of the research this element of the reform was being piloted in selected regions due to the 
particular security threats affecting these areas. These were: Dar es Salaam (high crime rates), Mwanza 
(prevalence of killings over witchcraft accusations), Mbeya (prevalence of killings over witchcraft 
accusations) and Kilimanjaro Regions (a border region), as well as areas of Mara Region (conflict near 
mining sites) (interview ACP K 11.10.11). 
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that they rid the area of any person(s) carrying out criminal activity (TPF 2008b: 15). 
Guidelines provide little information about how the young security guards are to go 
about performing these functions and considerable variation is apparent between 
administrative areas. Typically, however, a night patrol to prevent crime forms the 
core activity.   
 
In addition to reducing crime, community collaboration is expected to have positive 
outcomes in itself:  
 
Ulinzi shirikishi helps to increase levels of trust between people 
and to build relationships based on good communication in 
order to recognise and address various problems endangering 
the community, and that erode people’s enthusiasm to work for 
their own economic, community and cultural development.51  
TPF (2008b: 20)  
 
Leaders are requested to report their plans to form a security group to the local police 
station and in December 2010 there were reportedly 2634 registered local security 
groups (Geofray 2011), an increase from 2174 in 2009 (TPF 2009: 4). As ulinzi shirikishi is 
intended to be a strategy that is led by residents, the role of the police is to offer advice, 
expertise and education about security to the groups and the rest of the community 
(TPF 2008b: 9). Thus, annual reports note numbers of people ‘sensitised’ regarding CP, 
of which for example there were apparently 11,487,151 in 2009 (TPF 2009: 4).  
 
Although in official policy it is made clear that CP today is not the same as sungusungu 
(e.g. TPF 2007b) there are considerable similarities in terms of how both local initiatives 
are organised. For example the involvement of all local young men in patrolling on a 
shift basis, the use of whistles for communication, collection of contributions from 
other community members to provide equipment and posho and the division of labour 
envisaged between elders, who assume leadership roles, and the young who provide 
their physical labour, all draw strongly on the sungusungu model. In some cases it has 
been decided to adopt the terminology of sungusungu. It is also recognised by reform 
leaders that the association of CP with sungusungu is potentially useful. Sungusungu 
offered a ‘loophole’, which made it easier to encourage citizen participation as pre-
existing structures could be revived, albeit with additional concern for education 
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51 This is the author’s translation of the original Kiswahili text, which reads: Ulinzi shirikishi unasaidia 
kuinua kiwango cha kuaminiana baina ya mtu na mtu, na kujenga mahusiano yanayolenga kwenye mawasiliano 
sahihi katika kutambua na kutatua kero mbalimbali zinazohatarisha jamii na kuzorotesha juhudi za kujiletea 
maendeleo ya kiuchumi, kijamii na kiutamaduni. 
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regarding human rights.52 Those responsible for managing the police reform describe 
sungusungu as the genesis of contemporary CP, which reflects ‘our tradition’, and the 
political culture of Tanzania.53  These mixed understandings of CP as something that is 
both ‘traditional’ and familiar whilst also having the ‘modern’ accoutrements of 
respect for human rights and the law are also apparent in the three case sites, discussed 
further in Chapter 7.  
 
3.4.3 Police evaluation of CP  
 
Senior police responsible for the police reform programme highlight CP as being a 
particularly successful element of the reform to date, perhaps reflecting the 
comparative resources and time required to achieve reform objectives relating to 
infrastructure or recruitment. Collaboration with the ‘community’ and other actors is 
credited with having contributed to improved capacity to solve crimes and higher 
reporting rates amongst the public as well as popular willingness to contribute labour 
or donations to the police.54 Similar positive assessments are made in police annual 
reports and other publications (e.g. TPF 2008a: 55, 2009: 82). The claims made for the 
impact of CP strategies and the rationale for positive assessments of CP are illustrated 
by this extract from the mid-term strategy paper for the police reform: 
 
Interventions undertaken to improve the relationship between 
the Police Force and the community are also starting to bear 
some fruits. The public is now more willing to work with the 
police in fighting crime than was the case before as evidenced 
by the willingness of the members of the public to report crime 
and provide material support.  
 (TPF 2010b: 5) 
 
These general claims were reiterated with regard to Mwanza region specifically by the 
RPC at the time reforms were introduced, who expressed his gratitude for the concept. 
He described CP as a ‘very big success’, as the crime rate had reduced somewhat, 
police were receiving more information from the public, neighbourhood watches were 
in place and a Mwanza Business Fund Against Crime had been established to make 
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52 Interview ACP K 25.3.11. 
53 Interview SACP LK & ASP IM 18.10.11.  
54 Interviews: ACP K 25.3.11 and 11.10.11; Dr Semboja Haji 7.10.11; Scher 2009a (transcript of interview 
with SACP L. Kusima). 
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contributions to the police, and the fund had already provided most of the motorcycles 
being used by the force.55  
 
However, it is recognised that attempts to bring about the ‘cultural reorientation’ (IGP 
Mwema in TPF 2008a: 3) that sharing responsibility for policing between police and 
public requires have been hindered by a lack of clarity around the concept of CP. As 
was noted in the previous chapter, the concept of CP is itself highly malleable and 
difficult to define. Misunderstanding of the concept of CP has sometimes reduced the 
willingness of police to engage with reforms (TPF 2009: 82; TPF 2010c: 55). In 
particular, older police officers were described as being reluctant to change their 
methods and liable to view CP as an unwelcome abrogation of their powers.56 With 
regard to the public, insufficient understanding of CP could lead to reluctance to 
participate as: ‘the people … think why should we work when these officers are paid 
and we pay taxes’.57  
 
The legal framework for CP rests on general responsibilities vested in local 
government, rather than regulation that clearly establishes the rights or responsibilities 
of members of the public who participate in CP. The resulting variation between 
localities in terms of how CP is practised and the ad hoc nature of partnerships 
between police and local security groups, which affects their sustainability, are 
explored further in Chapter 7.   
 
Unsurprisingly, the evaluations made by senior police are largely made from a police 
perspective and address the extent to which the work of the police has been facilitated 
by CP, for example through donations received or a greater rate of reporting of crime. 
They do not consider the extent to which CP constitutes a service which is more 
responsive to popular desires, or which parts of ‘communities’ might particularly 
benefit from or be negatively affected by CP. A more sober assessment by the 
independent LHRC notes that despite notable achievements through CP and a 
considerable effort being made to improve the image of the police through media 
outreach, ‘community trust in police is still very weak’ (LHRC 2012: 196).  
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56 Interviews: ACP K 25.3.11; SACP LK 18.10.11. 
57 Interview SACP LK 18.10.11. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
The final section of this chapter outlined the official narrative of CP in Tanzania, which 
echoes the optimistic claims made for other forms of participatory development 
discussed in the previous chapter. CP is expected to make policing more responsive to 
popular demands, more effective in preventing and detecting crime and to be a cost 
effective means of improving the service provided by capitalising upon the capacity of 
‘communities’. The mobilisation of citizens for local security provision is not a new 
strategy in Tanzania. Financial constraints and ideological orientation, as well as 
political imperatives, have led successive regimes to authorise policing under various 
auspices to supplement the state police. Of most relevance to the contemporary reform 
programme, government attempts to promote participation in sungusungu in the past 
are presented as part of a historical narrative of CP and there are many similarities 
with organisational forms taken by ulinzi shirikishi. Whilst sungusungu had a significant 
effect on crime rates, the initiatives proved difficult to sustain when promoted by 
government. Sungusungu, like other local development initiatives, both reflected local 
power relations and became a means through which these could be sustained or 
contested. Furthermore, the extent to which sungusungu was associated with national 
and local party political competition contributed to its decline once the one party state 
was legally ended. Although CP in contemporary Mwanza should not be understood 
as a reversion to ‘traditional’ forms of self policing, the notable similarities between 
experiences of state-sponsored sungusungu and ulinzi shirikishi are explored in 
Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 5 provides a more detailed account of the organisation of 
policing in Mwanza city, and introduces the three case sites and their CP practices.   
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Methods of Data Collection  
 
The objective of this research was to explore the extent to which end-users of CP 
arrangements considered CP to have improved their security and the policing of their 
neighbourhoods. The literature review in Chapter 2 identified several additional sub-
questions likely to affect these outcomes: the ability of CP institutions to facilitate 
sustainable collective action; how the costs and benefits of participating in CP were 
distributed across communities; and for which sections of communities CP improved 
security and from what. As CP entails co-producing security with the police, the 
research also addressed how local level policing arrangements were affected by 
partnership with the police.  
 
A qualitative case study approach was adopted, although a small semi-structured 
survey was also carried out.  The city of Mwanza was selected for the study, and 
research was carried out there and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s commercial and de 
facto administrative capital, between October 2010 and December 2011. A total of 11 
months was spent conducting research in Tanzania.  
 
Very little information was available about the nature or extent of CP activities in 
Mwanza, or elsewhere in Tanzania, prior to commencing the research. Other than 
police publications, which outline the official model for local policing activities 
promoted as part of CP and its benefits from a police perspective, and occasional 
newspaper reports referring to specific cases, there has been little other analysis of CP 
outside of Dar es Salaam.58 Typically existing evaluation has emphasised the positive 
impact of CP on crime prevention and rates of reporting crime, but has not explored 
the extent to which CP constitutes a form of policing desired by citizens, or the extent 
to which the impact of CP might vary within and between ‘communities’.   
 
Due to the paucity of data available about the activities CP entailed in practice, popular 
opinion of CP, connections between CP institutions and other forms of local 
governance and any variation in performance around the country, an inductive case 
study approach was adopted, being conducive to the generation of hypotheses and a 
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58 Published accounts of CP in Dar es Salaam have been produced under the auspices of the UN HABITAT 
Safer Cities programme, and relate to their efforts to promote the revival of local policing groups called 
sungusungu since 1997 (e.g. Safer Cities 2000; Mtani 2007). 
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focus on causal mechanisms, as opposed to causal effects (Ragin 2007; Gerring 2007: 
37-39).  
 
The remainder of this chapter outlines the rationale behind conducting this research in 
Mwanza, the selection of cases within Mwanza and the methods of data collection 
used in the case sites. The generalisability, or external validity, of the research findings, 
is discussed in the concluding section.  
 
4.1 Case selection  
 
The local policing activities promoted as part of CP are organised at the mtaa (sub-
ward) level.  The mtaa, or ‘street’, is the lowest level of local government in urban 
areas. Three case study mitaa were selected in the city of Mwanza. Mwanza is 
Tanzanian’s second largest city in terms of population, and is located in the northwest 
of the country on the shores of Lake Victoria. A more detailed introduction to Mwanza 
is provided in the following chapter.  
 
The research was carried out in Tanzania because the CP reforms appeared to present 
an interesting contrast to other documented examples of CP in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a 
regional context, Tanzania was relatively late to introduce CP, and both CP and the 
police reform programme with which it is associated have been unusual in the extent 
to which they have been internally driven and devised. Tanzania also has a long 
tradition of various forms of community-based policing, and particularly state-
sponsored sungusungu vigilantism. Contemporary CP operates on a similar model to 
sungusungu, and is often described in the media and elsewhere as a continuation of the 
principles of sungusungu and other older forms of self-policing such as the People’s 
Militia (see 3.2.1). The Tanzanian reforms thus offered the opportunity to gain insights 
through diachronic comparison.  
 
The city of Mwanza was selected firstly as it is located in one of the five pilot regions in 
which police have promoted the formation of neighbourhood security institutions.59 
Working in Mwanza also appeared to offer an opportunity to trace the histories of 
various forms of CP, including sungusungu.  Sungusungu quickly spread to Mwanza 
Region from Shinyanga, and as early as 1983 politicians called for the deployment of 
sungusungu in Mwanza city (see 3.2.3). In rural areas of Mwanza Region and in some 
parts of the city, sungusungu continued to operate long after it had declined in other 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 The other regions included in the pilot are Kilimanjaro, Mara, Mbeya and Dar es Salaam.  
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parts of the country. Although Mwanza has grown rapidly since the 1980s and has an 
ethnically diverse population, the largest ethnic group represented in Mwanza is the 
Sukuma, amongst whom sungusungu began.  Although it rapidly became clear that CP 
in urban Mwanza did not represent a return to ‘tradition’ in the sense envisaged by 
some proponents of CP in Tanzania (e.g. Safer Cities 2000; Assiago n.d.), people’s 
memories of sungusungu, and particularly their use of violence and connection to the 
one party state, proved illuminating regarding how people felt about participation in 
CP in the present, and the connections between CP and broader processes of social and 
political change in Tanzania.    
 
CP is organised at the mtaa (sub-ward) level. Three of these administrative units were 
selected for in depth study. Cases were selected to demonstrate variation in terms of 
the extent to which CP had been ‘successful’, in terms of having sustained collective 
action. This was determined through scoping interviews with district police and eight 
of the city’s 21 Ward Executive Officers (WEOs). Two of the cases (A and B) were 
considered to be particularly strong examples of CP, but had adopted different 
operational models, and in the third case (C) CP had been attempted but the system 
had repeatedly lapsed. The chairpersons of the selected sites were then interviewed 
and their willingness to participate in the research was established. The three case sites 
and their models of CP are presented in more detail in the following chapter.   
 
This approach meant that only areas in which CP had actually been introduced (or at 
least attempted) were selected for in depth study. By default these are low- and 
middle-income areas, where residents could not afford to take individual measures to 
protect their property, such as hiring commercial security providers. I considered this 
to be acceptable in order to maximise the potential to generate empirical data about 
how CP was actually working, and carried out interviews with chairpersons of areas 
neighbouring the case sites where CP was not occurring in order to better contextualise 
my cases. The assessments of ward level officials sometimes proved somewhat 
optimistic, and the ‘successful’ cases also provided the opportunity to explore lapses in 
CP and the challenges of implementation.  
 
4.2 Data collection  
 
Several methods of data collection were employed, including semi-structured 
interviews, a small survey with closed and open-ended questions, participant 
observation of CP activities within the case sites and analysis of documentary and 
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archival sources. This section firstly explains why official crime statistics did not form a 
major source, before explaining the methods used in greater detail.   
 
4.2.1 Crime statistics 
 
The accuracy and reliability of official crime statistics in Tanzania and elsewhere are 
subject to two major concerns. Recorded crime rates are affected firstly by the 
likelihood that citizens report crimes to the police, and secondly by the data collection 
and processing capacity and procedures of the government organisations concerned 
(Marenin 1997: 463). In the Tanzanian context, as in many other developing countries, 
crime statistics are liable to be particularly unreliable for several reasons. Firstly, the 
geographical coverage of the police is limited and there has, until recently, been 
limited digitisation of crime statistics in regional centres meaning that records are 
vulnerable to being lost or damaged. Secondly, there are a range of reasons why 
citizens may not report crimes to the police, including, for example, the perception that 
nothing will happen as a result of reporting, low levels of trust in police probity, 
anticipated expense of reporting a crime due to the likelihood that one will have to pay 
a bribe, and the police may be perceived as a source of insecurity themselves (see 
Marenin 1997). 
 
There are two more specific reasons why official crime data is not used extensively to 
support the conclusions reached in this thesis. Firstly, CP is organised at the level of 
the mtaa (sub-ward), and police data is not available by mtaa. Furthermore, CP policies, 
which in part aim to increase rates of reported crime, are not easily amenable to 
assessment through recorded crime statistics. For example, the TPF has interpreted 
increased rates of reporting crime as an indication that CP is working well: people are 
more willing to communicate with the police and to assist them in identifying 
perpetrators. It might also be the case that effective local crime prevention efforts mean 
more suspected criminals are apprehended. However, it might equally be the case that 
higher or unaltered rates of recorded crime suggest that local crime prevention is 
ineffective, or that citizens remain unwilling to cooperate with police in solving 
reported crimes.  
 
 
!
4.2.2 Semi-structured interviews  
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Dar es Salaam  
 
The national police headquarters is located in Dar es Salaam. I was fortunate to have 
the opportunity to interview several senior police officers involved in the police reform 
programme, and CP more specifically, from the earliest stages of formulation and 
implementation. In addition, interviews were conducted with staff at Safer Cities Dar 
es Salaam, the Legal and Human Rights Centre and with several academics at the 
University of Dar es Salaam, including Dr Semboja Haji who was closely involved in 
the development of the police reform.  
 
Mwanza  
 
Regional and district level police with responsibility for CP and the Regional Police 
Commissioner were interviewed in Mwanza, in addition to the ward police officers 
responsible for the wards in which the three case sites were located. Interviews with 
police officers were carried out at the police stations where officers worked or in the 
canteen at the police barracks.  
 
Within the case sites, elected and appointed leaders were interviewed, including: 
elected chairpersons, Mtaa Executive Officers (MEOs), other members of the mtaa 
government and security committees formed to organise CP, and a sample of ten-cell 
leaders. Interviews usually took place at mtaa offices or at the residence of the 
interviewee, depending on their preference and availability. The total number of ten-
cell leaders interviewed was 24, of which 11 were resident in A, seven in B and six in C. 
As many ten-cell leaders as possible were interviewed in each case site, however this 
was limited by time constraints, the necessity that we encountered or could arrange to 
meet an individual at their home, and by adverse weather conditions at the end of the 
fieldwork period that rendered parts of some areas inaccessible. Many of the local 
leaders were interviewed on numerous occasions and I also had many less formal 
conversations during observation of patrols or while waiting in offices for 
appointments, which greatly enhanced my understanding of CP. Several chairpersons 
of neighbouring mitaa, where CP was not practised, were also interviewed as to why 
their own efforts to establish CP had been less successful. Former leaders of 
sungusungu were also identified and interviewed within the case sites, some of whom 
were involved in contemporary CP.  
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Although this was not a key focus of the research, several interviews conducted with 
managers of commercial security providers, of various sizes, in Mwanza provided 
valuable context as to the political economy of security provision in the city.  
 
Interviews were recorded when permission was granted by participants and 
background noise was not prohibitively loud.  
 
4.2.3 Survey of mtaa residents  
 
A small semi-structured survey of residents of the three case sites was conducted in 
order to explore the perspectives of members of the ‘communities’ who are expected to 
benefit from, and participate in, CP. The survey was intended to provide quantitative 
data that could be compared between mitaa, for example regarding residents’ 
perceptions of safety. However, it also presented a very useful opportunity to elicit 
more detailed qualitative data through the use of open-ended questions. This proved 
invaluable in constructing a picture of the operation of CP that was often somewhat 
different to that presented by leaders and police. A copy of the survey questionnaire is 
included in Appendix A. In summary, questions addressed: opinions of the impact of 
CP on local security and crime prevention and investigation; experiences and opinions 
of participation in or contribution towards CP; experiences of crime and reporting 
preferences; the degree to which residents felt local policing institutions to be 
responsive to their needs; and opinions of police performance and any changes in the 
police force since the policy of polisi jamii was introduced.  
 
36 respondents, half male and half female, were selected in each case site, as outlined 
below. The decision to select a total of 108 respondents reflected a compromise 
between the potential to generate meaningful and reasonably representative 
quantitative data and the time constraints imposed by the analysis of numerous open-
ended responses.  
 
The sampling strategy employed was informed by the methods used by the 
Afrobarometer (see Afrobarometer 2007). In the absence of a list of all individuals in 
the mtaa, a multistage random area sampling procedure was followed (see Mannheim 
& Rich 1991: 98-101).  It was not possible to obtain detailed maps or aerial photographs 
of the areas. Before commencing the survey, the boundaries of the mtaa on the ground 
were established and a walking route was developed for each site, which came as close 
to passing all houses as was possible. This was sometimes difficult due to the nature of 
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the terrain and irregular arrangement of dwellings. A starting point and walking 
direction were randomly chosen, and subsequently each nth60 house passed on the 
right hand side was selected. Once a dwelling was identified, those present were asked 
to compile a list of all residents aged 18 and over. The gender of respondents selected 
alternated between consecutive houses visited. I randomly allocated each individual a 
number and residents then selected a number that corresponded to an individual 
resident. If the individual concerned was absent from the house or did not have time to 
participate, an appointment was made for a second visit. If the individual was again 
not available upon the second occasion, the same procedure was carried out at the 
neighbouring dwelling. Limited space or the wishes of the participant meant that these 
interviews were sometimes conducted in the presence of other members of the 
household.  
 
The demographic profile of respondents, in terms of age and socio-economic status, is 
shown in Appendix B. The proxies used for socio-economic status were the standard of 
dwelling (e.g. building materials used, connection to electric power), inability to afford 
essential items over the past year (food, healthcare and school fees), possession of 
luxury items (a television, a fridge, and/or a car) and level of formal education. The 
distribution of respondents by occupation is also shown in the appendix, although it 
should be recognised that individuals were often dependent upon the incomes of 
others within their household in addition to their own economic activities, and 
additional sources of income, such as rent paid by tenants were not taken into account. 
 
The sample size was relatively small, as the estimated population of each mitaa was 
over 2,800 people. However, this was considered a worthwhile trade-off, as we were 
able to spend a sufficient amount of time with respondents to elicit highly detailed and 
useful qualitative data. In addition to including open-ended questions, it was also 
possible to record additional comments made in response to closed questions. 
Unanticipated findings emerged that would not have been likely to be reported had a 
more closed questionnaire been used.   
 
4.2.4 Participant observation  
 
During my many visits to the mitaa offices it was possible to observe the daily practices 
of local governance including the handling of cases by the community police. Time 
spent waiting for scheduled interviews to take place, or sheltering from downpours 
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60 This number varied between the case sites in accordance with the total number of dwellings in the area, 
in order to ensure that the entire area was included in the sampling process.   
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thus proved highly useful. In two of the case sites I also attended more formal public 
meetings, at which CP and other issues were discussed. In addition, I participated in 
two night patrols in mtaa A, and one patrol in mtaa B. Before arriving in Mwanza I had 
decided that I would not participate in patrols, being concerned for my own personal 
safety and wishing to avoid the potential ethical dilemmas raised by witnessing illegal 
acts perpetrated by community police, such as beating of suspects. However, having 
learnt more about the activities of the community police, become more familiar with 
the geographical areas concerned and discussed the matter with police and those 
involved in CP, I re-evaluated the likely risks on both counts. The experience of 
patrolling in two of the case sites was extremely valuable, both in terms of the 
opportunities provided to collect data, and to earn the trust of the community police. It 
was not possible to participate in a night patrol in C as patrols were not taking place 
during the earlier stages of the fieldwork. In later stages of the fieldwork altered 
circumstances made me decide against participating in additional patrols due to 
increased risk. Heavy seasonal rain and lengthy power cuts as a result of national 
power rationing were deemed by the community police to make their work much 
more dangerous, as darkness and the noise of the rain facilitated criminal activity. All 
decisions were taken in consultation with an interpreter, Stephen John Shipula, who 
accompanied me during patrols.  
 
Where possible notes were taken during observation, and where this was not possible, 
for example during night patrols, I recorded key words and wrote detailed accounts as 
soon as possible. I also discussed my observations with Stephen, who was able to add 
his recollections and clarify my understanding of any conversations held in Kiswahili 
if necessary.  
 
4.2.5 Analysis of documentary and archival sources  
 
In constructing the outline of CP in Tanzania presented in the previous chapter, I used 
many official documents produced by the TPF, as well as the TPF website, police 
annual reports and media coverage of CP. These sources were also useful in 
interpreting the objectives of CP from a police perspective.  
 
Archival sources available at the London School of Economics, including Tanganyika 
Police Annual Reports, were helpful in adding some more detail on the history of 
policing in Mwanza, to supplement the existing detailed historical accounts of colonial 
policing in Dar es Salaam (Burton 2003, 2005). Time constraints meant that I was 
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unable to spend a longer period exploring material at the Tanzania National Archives 
or the National Central Library (Maktaba Kuu) in Dar es Salaam for any information 
relating to sungusungu in Mwanza in the 1980s and 90s. However, unpublished theses 
and documents available at the library of the University of Dar es Salaam were used to 
construct the history of sungusungu presented in the previous chapter.  
 
4.2.6 Language and communication  
 
The large majority of interviews conducted in Mwanza, and all of those that took place 
within the three case sites, were conducted in Kiswahili. I arrived in Mwanza with 
fairly basic knowledge of the language, but this rapidly improved over the course of 
fieldwork to the extent that I could carry out interviews and read police official 
documents produced in Kiswahili. However, an interpreter, usually Stephen Shipula, 
was present during the large majority of interviews, and we frequently revisited 
interviews that had been recorded in order to clarify meaning or to discuss the most 
appropriate translation of phrases used. 
 
4.2.7 Ethical considerations when working with research participants  
 
In order to obtain informed consent to participate in the research, all those interviewed 
and all participants in the survey were given a detailed explanation of the objectives of 
the project, the researchers’ identities and how the data would be used and presented. 
Participants were encouraged to ask questions at any time. Appropriate official 
documentation, including my research permit obtained from the Commission for 
Science and Technology (COSTECH) and a letter of introduction from the Mwanza 
Regional Commission, was shown when requested. Additional consent was obtained 
before interviews were recorded.   
 
Throughout, I was particularly concerned to avoid giving residents of the case sites the 
impression that they were obliged to participate in the research, either because the 
central government (through COSTECH) or local leaders had approved the research. 
This meant declining well-meant offers from mtaa chairpersons to provide letters 
instructing people to participate in the survey, and resisting being accompanied by a 
member of the mtaa government. I also decided that participants would not be asked to 
sign written consent forms before participating, as I felt this was likely to generate 
anxiety and to suggest that the research was ‘official’, in the sense of being connected 
to government.  
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An additional reason for refusing the assistance of the mtaa government in carrying out 
the survey related to the imperative to preserve respondents’ privacy. The nature of 
the research made me particularly concerned to ensure that those who expressed 
negative opinions about the mtaa government or the police should not be subjected to 
future reprisals.  All survey participants and interviewees have been made 
anonymous, excluding very senior police and academics based in Dar es Salaam. The 
case study sites are referred to as A, B and C in order to protect the identity of elected 
local leaders who could otherwise be identified by their job titles. Although none of the 
leaders interviewed considered this to be a concern, I have decided to preserve their 
anonymity in order to avoid any unforeseen consequences of publishing the data. 
 
Although I had been concerned prior to starting the fieldwork that it would be 
challenging to recruit research participants, and particularly police officers, this was 
only very rarely the case. Both senior and local police were extremely helpful, and 
generally very happy to talk about what is viewed as an important and necessary 
reform.  
 
A final imperative to be extremely clear about my own objectives arose due to the 
assumptions made by many participants about my identity and reasons for conducting 
the research. Wazungu61 visitors were not common in any of the three mitaa and it was 
common for participants to ask me whether I was working for an NGO that might be 
bringing resources to the mtaa to help with CP or, in several cases, whether I was 
recruiting for my own private security firm. Even when I had explained what I was 
doing, answering the question, ‘and how will this help us?’ was not easy. I was able to 
offer some tokenistic forms of compensation for the time local leaders spent assisting 
me with the research, such as soft drinks, photographs and information about models 
of CP in other parts of Mwanza. Some requested to be informed of the findings of the 
study, and whilst I do not presume to assume that this will be of material benefit to 
local leaders or improve local security, I am currently considering how best to ‘give 
back’ my research findings. This raises considerable dilemmas relating to the most 
appropriate way to present the data and how to avoid giving offence or implicating 
individuals when recounting some of the more problematic aspects of CP. In addition, 
when conducting the research I struggled to resist attempts by local leaders, and police 
officers in Mwanza, to use my interest in CP, as a foreigner, to legitimise existing 
models and a means to convince other residents of the importance of participation.  
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61 Wazungu (singular mzungu) literally means ‘Europeans’, however it is typically applied to all white 
people.  
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4.3 Data analysis  
 
All interviews were transcribed either on the day the interview was conducted or as 
soon as possible thereafter. Completed survey questionnaires were allocated a number 
and digitised as soon after the interview as possible. After returning from Tanzania, 
the survey data was coded and entered into SPSS for analysis, in order to test for basic 
correlation between factors including place of residence, gender, socio-economic status 
and party political affiliation and the opinions expressed. The interview transcripts, 
and qualitative data collected during the survey that was not amenable to numerical 
coding, were also coded using Zotero bibliographic software, which allows entries to 
be categorised according to key words and facilitates the recording of key quotations. 
The analysis of the interview data was an iterative process and transcripts were 
revisited many times. 
 
4.4 Conclusion: wider implications of the case study  
 
This chapter outlined the rationale behind adopting a qualitative case study approach, 
and provided detailed accounts of the research methods used and practicalities and 
ethical considerations affecting how these were implemented.  The internal validity of 
the case study was enhanced through the triangulation of sources. However, a case 
study can be understood as ‘the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of 
that study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)’ 
(Gerring 2007: 20). The cases presented in the remainder of this thesis are not 
necessarily representative of CP as practised in the rest of the country, or in Mwanza. 
Furthermore, it is recognised that the data collected was contingent upon the 
positionality of the researcher and the time at which the research was conducted, and 
thus replicability is problematic (Burawoy 1998: 11). However the findings are 
generalised to theory (Yin 2003), and by ‘extending out’ (Burawoy 1998) from the 
empirical data collected within the case sites to broader processes entailed in the 
transition away from authoritarian rule and the intensification of party political 
competition. The research also explored the national level experience of CP through 
media analysis and interviews at the national police headquarters. The explanatory 
factors which emerge as particularly important, including the local government system 
in place, the impact of multiparty competition on local development and historical 
understandings of participation and self help, have been observed to have similar 
effects in diverse regions of the Tanzania.   
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The following chapter introduces the city of Mwanza and its structures of urban 
administration and policing in greater detail. The three case sites are introduced and 
the systems of CP in place are described. A history of sungusungu in urban and peri-
urban Mwanza is also outlined to supplement the more general history provided in 
Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 5: Community Policing in Mwanza  
 
This chapter firstly provides an introduction to the city of Mwanza, its administrative 
structure and the actors involved in policing the city. In order to contextualise 
contemporary CP reforms, and to provide necessary background to understandings of 
ulinzi shirikishi in Mwanza today, a history of sungusungu in urban Mwanza is 
provided, based on interviews conducted in the three case sites. Finally, the three case 
sites, designated A, B and C, are introduced and the systems of CP adopted in each are 
outlined. This introductory outline provides the basis for more critical analysis of local 
policing in the following two chapters.  
 
5.1 Introducing Mwanza  
 
Mwanza is a port city located on the shores of Lake Victoria in the northwest of 
Tanzania.  The city, which is the second largest in the country in terms of population, is 
the administrative and commercial centre of Mwanza Region and forms a transport 
hub for access to the Lake Zone62 and the neighbouring countries of Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda and Uganda. Mwanza attained city status in 2000 following rapid population 
growth, which saw the population more than double between 1988 and 2002 (URT 
2002). According to the 2012 census, the population of the city is 706,453 (URT 2013). 
The regionally dominant Sukuma remain the largest ethnic group in the city, along 
with the Zinza and Kerewe, however the city is ethnically diverse, with a total of 17 
ethnic identities recorded in the city in 2010 (MCC 2010, cited in MCC 2013). As 
ethnicity is not recorded in census data it is difficult to establish a more detailed 
picture of the ethnic composition of urban Mwanza.  
  
Due to the lakeside location, fishing and fish processing are central to Mwanza’s 
economy. The introduction of Nile Perch to Lake Victoria in the 1950s, whilst 
ecologically damaging, enabled the growth of a fish export industry in the city (ALAT 
2004: 160). The development of the mining industry in neighbouring districts has also 
brought economic growth to the city as the region’s principal commercial and 
transport hub.  
 
Whilst Mwanza city centre is increasingly characterised by new multi-storey buildings, 
densely populated unplanned settlements occupy many of the city’s hills (see Figure 
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62 Lake Zone refers to the Tanzanian administrative districts of Mwanza, Kagera, Mara and Shinyanga. 
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1). In 2002 it was estimated by Mwanza City Council that 75% of residents were living 
in unplanned areas (MCC 2002, cited in Cadstedt 2006: 46), which are poorly served 
with regard to sanitation, accessibility and educational and health facilities (MCC 
2007). These difficult conditions are compounded by Mwanza’s hilly landscape, which 
is scattered with large rock features.  
 
!
Figure 1: Photograph of Mwanza city centre, showing multi-storey buildings in the city centre and 
informal settlements on surrounding hills. Taken by the author in January 2011. 
!
5.2 Urban administration 
 
Mwanza city is comprised of two administrative districts, Nyamagana and Ilemela, 
which also constitute single member parliamentary constituencies. Both incumbent 
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MPs were members of an opposition party, CHADEMA, at the time the research was 
carried out. Each district is divided into wards (kata) from which a councillor is elected 
to the Municipal Council.63 The city’s two MPs and 8 female members, nominated by 
political parties in accordance with the proportion of elected seats held, also hold seats 
on the council. A mayor is elected by the councillors from within their number. The 
executive arm of the council is led by the City Director, a presidential appointee. 
 
Each of Mwanza’s 21 wards has an appointed, salaried Ward Executive Officer (WEO). 
The WEO is responsible to the City Director and their responsibilities include 
participation in development planning, oversight of implementation of programmes 
within the ward, enforcement of by-laws and ‘to initiate and promote participatory 
development in the Ward’ (Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 
2006).  
 
Each ward is further subdivided into mitaa (singular mtaa). It is this lowest level of 
local government which is given principal responsibility for initiating and managing 
CP. Although mtaa can be translated as ‘street’, the units are usually larger than a 
single street, particularly since the amalgamation of mitaa in 2009 to form larger units.  
 
Each mtaa has a serikali ya mtaa (street government), which is elected on a party political 
basis every five years in a secret ballot of all permanent residents aged 18 and above. 
The most recent election took place in 2009. The governing committee is comprised of a 
chairperson and six councillors (wajumbe), of whom at least two must be female. 
Candidates must be sponsored by a political party and be literate in Kiswahili or 
English (URT 2009b). Those elected are not paid, and the mtaa government does not 
receive funding for its activities. However, they may benefit from sitting allowances for 
attending meetings. Sub-committees of the mtaa government are formed to address 
specific local development concerns, such as sanitation and school management. 
 
In 2006 the position of Mtaa Executive Officer (MEO) was established. The MEO is 
appointed by the urban authority as a secretary to the mtaa government and to assist 
the mtaa chairperson in the implementation of projects (Local Government Laws 
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2006; URT 2009b). The MEO, unlike other members 
of the mtaa government, is typically not resident in the mtaa and receives a salary. It has 
not yet been possible to post an MEO in all mitaa, meaning that some are responsible 
for multiple areas.64  
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63 In 2012 it was decided to establish a separate municipal council for each of the urban districts. 
64 Interview MEO-A 15.11.11. 
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According to the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act of 1999, 
the responsibilities of the mtaa committee include implementation of council policies, 
advising the council regarding development plans and activities taking place in the 
mtaa and carrying out tasks as directed by the Ward Development Committee (WDC). 
The WDC consists of the chairs and MEOs of all mitaa within the ward and is chaired 
by the ward’s elected councillor. It acts as a forum for the discussion of development 
plans emerging from the mitaa, but also forms a conduit for directives from the 
municipal level (Baker et al. 2002: 23). The mitaa governments are given responsibility 
for general community welfare and promotion of ‘maendeleo’ (development) in their 
jurisdictions (Mwanza Regional Commission 2009). To this end they are expected to 
facilitate participatory planning in accordance with the Opportunities and Obstacles to 
Development approach adopted as part of a donor funded Local Government Reform 
Programme (LGRP) (Fjeldstad et al. 2010).  
 
The mtaa government is empowered to pass by-laws, subject to the consent of an 
assembly of local residents and approval by the District Council  (Local Government 
(District Authorities) Act 1982) and can impose fines to sanction non-compliance. A 
more general law and order function is implied by the expectation that the mtaa 
authority will advise the WDC regarding ‘matters relating to peace and security in the 
Mtaa’, and ‘keep proper record’ of residents (Local Government Laws Amendment Act 
1999).  
 
Participation in the governance of the mitaa largely occurs through public meetings, 
which should be held at least every two months (Local Government Laws Amendment 
Act 1999). Members of mtaa sub-committees are selected on these occasions and other 
local development initiatives, such as the mobilisation of resources to construct a 
school building, are discussed. Residents can also bring complaints or queries, for 
example over delays in promised improvement to local infrastructure.  
 
The mtaa government also plays a significant role in local dispute resolution, 
particularly between landlords and tenants and in cases of marital conflict.65  
 
As will become clear in the following two chapters, in practice the performance of the 
mtaa government appears to be highly dependent upon individual preferences and 
ability. As they are unpaid, committee members must balance their official duties with 
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pursuing their own economic activities and performing domestic obligations. The lack 
of funds available can mean that village or mtaa governments, often the first place to 
which residents appeal for help, are rarely able to offer any material assistance (Pallotti 
2006, cited in Pallotti 2008: 227). Although the MEOs are paid, as explained by the 
MEO of one case site: ‘with government work it’s not like working for a big company 
where somebody might be checking up on you’.66 Thus office hours may not be 
observed. As MEOs do not normally live in the mtaa in which they work the 
chairperson is still required to deal with any issues that occur outside of working 
hours, including organising to improve security at night.67  
 
A final level of quasi-governmental administration is formed by the ten-cell leaders of 
the ruling party, CCM. Although the importance of the ten-cell leader has declined 
since the reintroduction of multipartism in 1992, they have continued to play a role in 
dispute resolution, organising funerals and in the implementation of CP, discussed 
below. 
 
5.3 Crime and policing in Mwanza  
 
It is difficult to compare rates of crime, and fear of crime, in the city of Mwanza with 
those of other urban areas as published annual crime statistics aggregate data at the 
regional level, rather than that of the district. Recorded incidents of selected serious 
crimes in the police district in which the three case sites were located are shown in 
Table 1, however in the absence of comparative data this is not highly instructive. The 
very small number of incidents recorded in 2010 in comparison to other years suggests 
there may be some irregularities in the data recording process.   
 
Table 1: Recorded incidents of selected serious offences in Nyamagana District 2008-2011. 
 Unlawful 
killings (mauaji) 
Rape (kubaka) Armed robbery 
(unyang’a nyi wa 
kutumia silaha) 
Burglary 
(uvunjaji) 
Cattle theft 
(wizi wa 
mifugo) 
2008 45 44 6 52 0 
2009 121 95 16 36 57 
2010 6 7 1 2 7 
2011 (Jan-
Sept only) 
46 46 0 17 21 
Source: Official police statistics collated by Nyamagana District Headquarters. 
 
Furthermore, recorded crime statistics in all contexts, but particularly in developing 
countries with a poor record of police-community relations are not necessarily a good 
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67 Interview chairman-A 11.7.11. 
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indicator of levels of crime experienced by populations, being dependent upon the 
likelihood that citizens will report crimes to the police and the data collection and 
processing practices of governments (Marenin 1997: 463). According to the most recent 
victimization survey carried out in Tanzania, in the cities of Tanga, Mbeya and 
Mwanza and the municipalities of Moshi and Dodoma, less than half of burglaries, 
robberies and sexual and other assaults were reported to the police (UNODC 2009: 4). 
Selected results of this survey are presented in Table 2, and compared with results 
obtained in urban areas of Kenya (UNODC 2010) and Uganda (UNODC 2008). Data 
collected regarding the perceptions of residents of the three case sites regarding safety 
in their neighbourhoods is discussed in the following chapter.  
 
Table 2: Crime victimisation and fear of crime in Mwanza and other urban areas of Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda. 
 Dodoma, Mbeya, Moshi, 
Mwanza and Tanga68  
Kenya69 Uganda70 
Experienced burglary or 
attempted burglary 13.2 1071 17.4 
Experienced robbery 3 3.772 4.3 
Experienced 
assault/threat of assault  2.9 5.173 9.3 
Felt unsafe/very unsafe 
in own home after dark 32.5 29.6 36.5 
Felt unsafe/very unsafe 
walking in 
neighbourhood after 
dark 
44.1 48.6 49.9 
Source: UNODC 2008, 2009, 2010. 
 
The police in urban Mwanza are organised around the politico-administrative districts 
of Nyamagana and Ilemela. However, in practice some areas located in Ilemela District 
are incorporated under the jurisdiction of the Officer Commanding District (OCD) for 
Nyamagana. Thus all of the case sites were served by the central police station for 
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68 This data was obtained in a victimisation survey carried out by UNODC in several urban areas of 
Tanzania including Mwanza (UNODC 2009). Responses refer to the year 2007.  
69 This data was obtained in a victimisation survey carried out by UNODC in rural and urban Kenya in 
2010 (UNODC 2010). Only results for urban areas are included in this table. Responses refer to the year 
2009. 
70 This data was obtained in a victimisation survey carried out by UNODC in rural and urban Uganda in 
2008 (UNODC 2010). Reported results are not disaggregated according to whether they are for rural or 
urban areas, however 79% of respondents were resident in urban areas. Responses refer to the year 2007. 
71 This figure refers to both urban and rural respondents. 
72 This figure refers to both urban and rural respondents. 
73 This figure refers to both urban and rural respondents. 
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Nyamagana, located in the city centre. 320 police officers were employed in the district 
in 2011.74 This gives an estimated police: population ratio of 1: 1336.75 This compares 
favourably with the ratio for Mwanza Region as a whole, which was 1: 1,943 in 2010 
(TPF 2010c: 44), reflecting the concentration of officers in urban areas. However, it is 
still a very low ratio by international standards, and is considerably less than more 
heavily policed Dar es Salaam, where there was one officer for every 358 people in 
2010 (ibid.). In addition to the central police station there are two other sub-stations, 
which are supplemented by small police posts. Mwanza city also houses the Regional 
Police Headquarters and several specialised police branches including the Marine 
Police, Railway Police and units of the FFU.  
 
The police force in urban Mwanza has promoted polisi jamii on the model outlined in 
the previous chapter. Seminars have been held for local government staff to emphasise 
their responsibilities in maintaining local security, police have conducted outreach in 
schools and use of local television and radio stations has been successful to the extent 
that the police now receive requests to provide material for outlets, rather than having 
to ask for space.76 In September 2011, police in Nyamagana were aware of the existence 
of 54 local policing initiatives within the ward, although it was thought that only 38 of 
these were currently active as their activities fluctuated according to perceived need.77  
 
In lakeside areas, CP was implemented through Beach Management Units (BMUs), 
which predate the official policy of CP, having been established following directives 
from the Tanzanian Fisheries Department in order to monitor illegal fishing and 
protect beach environments (see Medard et al. 2000). The BMUs are now encouraged 
by the police to extend their surveillance to other criminal activities such as theft and 
they sometimes conduct patrols.78  
 
There were attempts to extend the UN HABITAT sponsored Safer Cities Programme, 
which had been promoting the revival of sungusungu groups in Dar es Salaam (see 
3.2.3) to Mwanza in 2007. However, it proved very difficult to institutionalise Safer 
Cities within the City Council due to the frequent transfer of personnel and a shortfall 
in funding following a shift in donor priorities.79 Although the council was involved in 
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74 Personal communication Sgt-Nyamagana 23.11.11. 
75 Based on the 2012 census data (URT 2013), which reports a population of 363,452 for Nyamagana 
District. However, as noted above, the borders of the police and administrative districts are not exactly the 
same.    
76 Interview Sgt-Nyamagana 19.11.11. 
77 Personal communication Sgt-Nyamagana 15.9.11. 
78 Interview Sgt-Nyamagana and BMU leader, Sweya, 11.11.10. 
79 Interview Anna Mtani 24.3.11. 
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the organisation of ‘sensitisation’ workshops for mitaa chairs, WEOs and MEOs about 
CP,80 none of the local government officials or local police interviewed had heard of the 
Safer Cities initiative.  
 
In addition to the Tanzania Police Force, several other actors are involved in policing 
public and private spaces in Mwanza. The city council employs an Auxiliary Police 
Force, composed of recruits who have completed militia training and some additional 
police training. They guard council property and may be deployed to enforce by-laws. 
During the research period there were several violent clashes between Auxiliary Police 
and petty traders over attempts to evict the latter from the city centre (Lumanyika 
2010; Naluyaga 2011).  
 
There is a thriving commercial security sector in Mwanza and in 2011 there were over 
80 registered firms in operation, including both large multinational companies, such as 
G4S, and many small concerns run by former police officers or soldiers. Demand for 
commercial security services is reportedly very high.81 
 
Less formalised responses to crime include the apparently spontaneous killings of 
suspected thieves at the scene of their alleged offence. ‘Mob justice’ is common in 
Mwanza Region. In 2009, for example, 405 incidents were reported in the region 
(David 2010). In rural areas killings are often associated with witchcraft accusations. 
According to Nyamagana District Police records, in 2009, of 126 people who were 
unlawfully killed, 88 were killed while allegedly stealing. However, such cases are 
rarely investigated or prosecuted (Plyler 2007: 134). As described by one resident of 
mtaa B recounting the death of a suspected thief outside his house, ‘the police just came 
afterwards to take away the body’.82 Incidents are typically blamed on lack of faith in 
state law enforcement bodies (Plyler 2007: 134).  
 
5.4 Sungusungu in urban Mwanza  
 
This section contains a brief historical account of sungusungu and other neighbourhood 
security initiatives in the area that now forms urban Mwanza. This is based on 
interviews with residents of the three case sites, including those who formerly held 
leadership positions within sungusungu. This is included as a supplement to the 
general account given in the previous chapter as sungusungu in Mwanza diverged 
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80 Interview John Wanga 8.11.10. 
81 Interviews PSC1 19.2.11; PSC2 15.7.11. 
82 Survey-62. 
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somewhat from other urban examples due to the city’s location close to the rural areas 
in which sungusungu originated. The urban experience of sungusungu has also received 
little attention in existing literature.  
 
As noted above, Mwanza has grown rapidly since sungusungu emerged in the late 
1980s, when the urban population was 182,899 (URT 1988, cited in Barke & Sowden 
1992: 11). Two of the case sites were fairly sparsely populated at the time, compared by 
respondents to villages, and have since been further incorporated into the city through 
the construction of tarmac roads and improved public transport links. The remaining 
mtaa (A) is located in one of the oldest informal settlements in the city, and had a larger 
population and was closer to the city’s administrative centre. However, the accounts 
given by residents in all three areas converged around the establishment, organisation 
and operation of sungusungu. Variations in accounts, for example the importance 
placed on dealing with witchcraft, did not appear to correspond to place of residence. 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the government ordered the deployment of sungusungu from 
surrounding areas in Mwanza town in 1983.  Local sungusungu groups were 
subsequently established across the area that now forms Ilemela and Nyamagana 
Districts between 1984 and 1987. Residents had been suffering high rates of armed 
robbery and burglary in the preceding period and the police response was deemed 
inadequate.83  
 
Interviewees recalled inaugurations like those described in Chapter 3. Mwanza had a 
diverse ethnic population and non-Sukuma or Nyamwezi were also required to 
participate, even to the extent of pretending to sing songs in Kisukuma during the 
ceremony.84 An ntemi, mtware and makamanda were selected for areas approximating 
the size of contemporary wards.  
 
Although the kutemya (inauguration) was carried out by sungusungu leaders from 
elsewhere and, as outlined below, the operation of sungusungu retained more of its 
‘traditional’ elements than in other urban areas, sungusungu was typically understood 
as having been ‘agizo ya chama’ (an order from the party) or the government. The 
Regional and District Commissioners were, for example, reported to have attended 
some inaugurations.85 Sungusungu mirrored the administrative structure of CCM, so 
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83 Interviews: makamanda-A 1,2,3 26.1.11; TCL-B 5 24.6.11; TCL-C 4 28.8.11. 
84 Interview WEO-BT 16.8.11. See also Bryceson (2011: 279) on multi-ethnic participation in sungusungu 
elsewhere in the Lake Zone.  
85 Interview chairman-C 28.8.11. 
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that each branch office of CCM had a corresponding sungusungu office, and was 
described by one former sungusungu secretary as having been ‘controlled by CCM’.86  
 
In all three case sites sungusungu had a women’s wing. Whilst the most senior leaders 
were men (although one ward in Mwanza selected a female ntemi), there were female 
makamanda and askari (soldiers). The female sungusungu arrested, searched and, if 
necessary, punished female suspects.  
 
The sungusungu leadership was able to make a small income from participation by 
asking for ‘hela ya mguu’87 from those who required their services and from fines 
imposed on offenders. Night patrols were conducted by all able-bodied young male 
residents who were allocated dates to participate.88 Those who were excluded from 
patrolling due to work commitments, disability or age made small contributions 
towards the purchase of equipment. The sungusungu were armed with bows and 
arrows, which it was claimed were tipped with poison.89   
 
As in rural areas, whistles were used for communication. Sungusungu from 
neighbouring areas cooperated with each other to apprehend suspected thieves and 
their stolen goods and return them to the area in which an offence had been 
committed. All households were required to have a whistle so that news of an incident 
travelled far and fast.90  
 
The principal concern of sungusungu in urban and peri-urban Mwanza was theft of 
cattle and other property. It is difficult to establish the extent to which uchawi 
(witchcraft) was important. Some, including one former kamanda and a former 
secretary of sungusungu, asserted that it was. The chairman and secretary of mtaa C, for 
example, explained that it was vital for the leaders selected to be knowledgeable about 
dawa (medicine) in order to protect themselves from witchcraft, including by ensuring 
that food distributed at meetings was not contaminated.91 However, most saw 
witchcraft as being ‘kijijini’ (in the village), and not a problem affecting town life.  
 
Sungusungu in Mwanza also played a role in enforcing participation in local 
development activities, such as repairing roads. One ten-cell leader recalled a by-law 
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86 Interview WEO-C 24.10.11. 
87 Literally ‘foot money’, this refers to a small allowance to compensate the sungusungu for their time and 
defray the costs of any necessary travel.   
88 One ten-cell leader reported that divorced women had also been obliged to participate in patrolling as 
they had ‘chosen’ to live alone (interview TCL-B 6 3.3.11).  
89 Interview kamanda mkuu-A 15.11.11 
90 Interview chairman-C 28.8.11. 
91 Interview chairman-C & secretary-C 28.8.11. 
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introduced at the time to prohibit people from playing bao (a Swahili game) until the 
afternoon to ensure productivity.92 
 
As discussed further in Chapter 7, sungusungu is strongly associated in popular 
memory with their methods of interrogation and punishment. A suspected offender 
was initially interrogated by sungusungu leaders. If they did not offer a confession, they 
were tried again in public, with the aid of ‘kupiga viboko’ (beatings), until they admitted 
their guilt.  Beatings were severe, sometimes conducted with a fan belt tied to a stick, 
and water and salt were applied to wounds to increase pain. As a former secretary of 
sungusungu now resident in mtaa C explained: ‘You would go into the [sungusungu] 
office with your hands raised in confession, even if you hadn’t done anything’.93  
 
The ‘Field Force Unit’, or nguku (baboons) administered especially harsh punishments. 
This division, named after the feared FFU of the police (see 3.2.1), disguised themselves 
with sisal fibres and feathers. In addition to beating people, the nguku reportedly 
sometimes used pliers and needles to torture suspects.94 
 
Although some expressed unease regarding sungusungu’s methods, and the use of 
violence does seem to have contributed to the decline in popularity of the 
organisations in the mid 1990s, many saw sungusungu as incorruptible and expressed 
faith in their ability to identify the correct offenders every time, particularly in 
comparison to the police. Sungusungu had local knowledge: ‘they were working in the 
community, and the community knew who was a thief.’95 Residents participated in 
compiling lists of suspected criminals for sungusungu.  
 
The brutal methods appear to have had a striking impact on crime rates, and 
respondents frequently described crime as having been eradicated. Sungusungu were 
also very successful in returning stolen property, which was an important element of 
their appeal.96 One ten-cell leader, frustrated over the lack of action taken by police 
regarding a theft she reported from her home recently, claimed that if you were a thief:  
 
They [sungusungu] would beat you until you brought the stuff 
back yourself!...[Now] every time I call the police they just say 
that legal processes are underway, but if sungusungu was still 
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93 Survey-88. 
94 Interview chairman-C 28.8.11. 
95 Interview TCL-B 1 11.11.11. 
96 Interviews: TCL-A 5 25.2.11; secretary-C 28.8.11; kamanda mkuu-A 15.11.11. 
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here they would have got the money back straight away! They 
really helped.97 
        
Accounts of the relationship of sungusungu with the police were often positive. 
However, as discussed further in Chapter 7, the extent to which contemporary ulinzi 
shirikishi work with the police is frequently evoked as a key difference between 
sungusungu and CP. Sungusungu on occasion required police support, for example 
when thieves had automatic weapons, and one former kamanda mkuu recalled that 
police sometimes attended sungusungu assemblies and on occasion referred cases to 
sungusungu.98 However, it appears that conflict could arise over the potential income to 
be generated through policing. Police lost opportunities to extract payments from those 
arrested as sungusungu themselves tried suspects and imposed fines.99 In the absence of 
a regular salary, sungusungu were dependent upon fines for compensation and should 
police seek to take over a serious case, for example involving use of weapons, before 
sungusungu had been able to impose their own fine, ‘vurugu kidogo’ (a bit of trouble) 
could result.100 
 
As elsewhere, the reintroduction of multipartism contributed to a decline in 
sungusungu, which had been closely associated with CCM. A ten-cell leader in B 
explained that:  
 
Initially it [sungusungu] was compulsory…because there were 
no opposition parties. The multiparty system has brought 
greater freedom.101  
 
In addition, mistakes and punishment of those thought to be innocent caused 
sungusungu to become unpopular in some cases. Sungusungu were implicated in 
several deaths in Mwanza and leaders were arrested, making others reluctant to 
assume leadership roles. One former secretary of sungusungu, resident in what is now 
mtaa C, was arrested and incarcerated for one year in 1998 after a man died whilst 
under arrest in the sungusungu office. He claimed that the death was due to natural 
causes, blaming a pre-existing heart condition of which the sungusungu were unaware. 
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100 Interview WEO-C 24.10.11. 
101 Interview TCL-B 3 6.11.11. 
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Following his time in prison his family did not want him to be involved in sungusungu 
any longer.102  
 
Although the formalised hierarchical structures and trial procedures of sungusungu 
were gradually abandoned in all three case sites, residents continued to organise for 
their own security as they had before sungusungu was established. At times of need, 
occasional night patrols were organised by the mtaa government and ten-cell leaders 
until more regular arrangements were made following the introduction of CP.  
 
5.5 CP in the three case sites 
 
Three mitaa were selected within Mwanza, as outlined in Chapter 4. All three of the 
mitaa were formed in October 2009, when existing mitaa were merged to form larger 
administrative units, after which local elections were held.  
 
The official data available regarding population size and ethnic and socio-economic 
composition of populations within mitaa is very limited. Therefore the following 
introduction is largely based on extended observation of the three sites, interviews 
with residents and local authority officials, and available ward level data.  
 
The model adopted in two of the case sites (A and C) remains close to that of 
sungusungu, although in mtaa B it was decided to employ local young men as guards.  
 
5.5.1 Mtaa A  
 
A was the mtaa in which CP was most consistently practised and the community police 
assumed the widest range of functions. CP in A was rated highly by police officers in 
Mwanza and the mtaa has in the past been selected for visits by senior police officers, 
including the IGP,103 and the chairman has on occasion participated in police 
educational broadcasts about CP.  
 
A is a largely low income area located in one of Mwanza’s oldest informal settlements, 
which was established in the 1960s (ICLEI 1996, cited in Cadstedt 2006: 46; Ndyuki 
1999: 2). The mtaa spreads across a steep, rocky hillside approximately 1.5 km from the 
city centre. One paved road cuts through the mtaa, however the majority of the area is 
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not accessible by vehicle, being largely traversed by narrow pathways between houses, 
as shown in Figure 2. The size of an individual plot in the ward averages eight by ten 
metres (Ndyuki 1999: 2).  
 
Infrastructure in the mtaa is very poor and the extent of environmental degradation 
and lack of service delivery led to the ward in which A is located being selected as one 
of the pilot sites for the DANIDA sponsored Sustainable Mwanza Programme in the 
late 1990s (Ndyuki 1999: 3). The mtaa is very densely populated and many houses 
contain multiple family groups. Although two compounds in the area had walls 
constructed around them this was exceptional. Housing is a mixture of semi-
permanent structures made with mud bricks and corrugated iron roofs weighted down 
with rocks and permanent concrete structures with metal roofs (see Figure 3).  
 
The population of the mtaa was recorded as 4,685 in the 2002 census,104 and by 2011 the 
chairman estimated that the mtaa’s approximately 500 houses were occupied by over 
1,200 kaya (households).105  
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!!
"H"!
!
Figure 2: Photograph showing typical housing and terrain in mtaa A. Taken by the author in July 2011. 
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Figure 3: Photograph showing typical dwellings in mtaa A and Mwanza's characteristic rock 
formations. Taken by the author in July 2011. 
 
The mtaa chairperson and all of the elected councillors (wajumbe) of A were affiliated to 
Tanzania’s ruling party, CCM. The elected chair was a local businessman, engaged in 
the fish trade, who occupied a relatively large, attractive house in the mtaa. The mtaa 
government rented an office in the centre of the mtaa that was regularly staffed by the 
chairman or several of the wajumbe.  
 
The mtaa had an MEO, who was also responsible for a neighbouring street. However, 
during the research period she was frequently absent, even during her office hours 
(9am – 3pm). The chairman explained that although initially the mtaa committee had 
given the MEO the official stamps required for any letter of reference issued by the 
mtaa, her frequent absence and the need for services outside of her working hours had 
obliged him to take them back in order to serve the local population.106  
 
A police station, with responsibility for the five surrounding wards, is located in a 
neighbouring mtaa, approximately 5 minutes walk from the mtaa office. However, 
proximity to a police station does not necessarily improve access to police services or 
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reduce response time. Although residents of A could easily walk to the police post, at 
night the police organise patrols over a wide area, meaning that the majority of 
officers, and any available vehicles, may be distant from the police station, whilst the 
few who remain on duty are often not permitted to leave their post.107  
 
CP in mtaa A  
 
The chairman attended a seminar organised by police in 2006 and subsequently 
established a security group within his mtaa. In 2009 his mtaa was incorporated into a 
new larger administrative area (mtaa A), of which he was subsequently elected as 
chairman. He was able to extend CP across the entire new mtaa.  
 
A security committee was selected with the intention of ensuring the representation of 
diverse groups resident in the mtaa. It included representatives of religious 
organisations, school pupils, disabled residents and political parties. The committee 
met every three months, leaving daily oversight of CP to the chairman and elected 
makamanda (commanders).  
 
The 12 makamanda, of whom half were female, included all of the six mtaa councillors. 
All were aged between 40 and 60, with the exception of one 35 year old man. Like the 
majority of the mtaa’s inhabitants, the makamanda earned a living through informal 
sector activities such as petty trading (biashara ndogo ndogo) or poorly paid positions, 
for example as cooks. The onerous time demands of running CP in the mtaa probably 
precluded those with more regular employment from participating to the same extent 
and the economic incentives, discussed below, were less appealing to the relatively 
wealthy.  
 
The makamanda led night patrols twice a week on a shift basis. In addition, residents 
could report incidents or suspicions for investigation. The makamanda could be 
employed to arrest a suspected offender or locate a party to a dispute for a small fee. 
As some makamanda were also members of the mtaa government, they already 
performed dispute resolution in the mtaa.  
 
Through donations, the community police purchased uniforms and rented an office 
next to the mtaa office.  As three of the most active mtaa councillors (all female) who 
were regularly present in the office were also makamanda of CP, it was easy for 
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residents to locate the community police during the daytime and the CP office was also 
occupied during the night.  
 
The important role played by women in leading patrols in A is highly unusual in 
Mwanza. The makamanda explained that it was important to have female participants 
because it was inappropriate for a man to search or arrest a woman, echoing the logic 
for formation of women’s wings of sungusungu. Although the mtaa chairman accepted 
this explanation in part, he was very keen to stress that the involvement of women was 
really a reflection of what he understood as the core principle of polisi jamii, whereby 
everybody within a community should participate, including even children who can 
play a role by reporting a crime.108 
 
Crime prevention  
 
A patrol was organised around the mtaa every night from 11 p.m. in order to 
apprehend any vibaka (petty thieves) roaming the area and to deter thieves from 
entering the mtaa. The makamanda on duty were accompanied by young male 
residents109 who were allocated a monthly patrol date. The timetable for participation 
in patrols was organised around the ten-cell structures of CCM. Each ten-cell leader 
was required to provide the names of all eligible residents one night each month. 
Participants brought with them any available weapons, typically small machetes 
(mapanga) or sticks. The CP office kept a spear, a bow and arrow (which the makamanda 
claimed was tipped with poison), machetes and batons.  
 
Households in which an able-bodied young man was not resident and those unable to 
participate due to work commitments contributed 3000 Tanzanian Shillings (TSH) each 
month in order to purchase necessary equipment, such as torches and batteries.110 
 
Participation was made compulsory through the introduction of a by-law, which 
imposed a fine of 5000 TSH, for failure to report for patrol. Residents who continued to 
obstruct CP were liable to be taken to the local police station and could face a jail term. 
Participation was rigorously monitored and enforced by the makamanda, who devoted 
up to an hour at the beginning of each night’s work to visiting the houses of those who 
had not reported for duty.  
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110 At the end of October 2010 when fieldwork in Mwanza started, 3000 TSH was equivalent to 
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During patrols anybody seen moving around the area was liable to be confronted and 
asked to ‘kaa chini’ (sit or crouch on the ground) in order for their identity and purpose 
to be ascertained. Residents were lectured about the importance of not taking risks by 
moving around the area at night.  
 
The weapons carried by the community police were ostensibly for self-defence but 
were sometimes used during the apprehension of suspects. Some of the makamanda 
explicitly claimed that they beat suspected thieves apprehended at night, however it 
was not possible to ascertain the extent to which this was true. Reports of incidents 
during patrols did suggest that excessive force was sometimes used to restrain and 
subdue those apprehended.  
 
Those apprehended on suspicion of a criminal offence were taken to the nearby police 
station. The community police also reported here each evening before a patrol to 
inform the police of the names of those participating, who would then be entitled to 
free medical care in case of an injury sustained during the patrol. This procedure also 
helped to prevent those patrolling being mistaken for thieves.  
 
In addition to patrolling, the makamanda and the mtaa chairman took proactive steps to 
target those they thought to be at risk of offending. Residents who were suspected of 
engaging in crime could be summoned to the mtaa office to be warned about their 
activities and photographed, for use in future investigations. Surveillance of the houses 
of residents deemed suspicious was also prioritised during night patrols and the 
chairman was very keen to obtain a video camera to be used for covert surveillance.  
 
CP for hire 
 
In late 2010 when the research began, a sign was prominently displayed on the doors 
of the mtaa office in order to inform residents to phone the chairman’s number should 
they require any crime-related assistance. It was noted that ‘huduma hii ni bure’ (this 
service is free). However, the success of CP through night patrols enabled the 
makamanda to expand their activities in order to make some small financial gains.  
 
Requests for security provision from local property owners enabled the community 
police to charge for their services. For example, the owner of a maize milling machine 
located on the border of mtaa A agreed a fee to ensure the patrol passed his property a 
certain number of times each night, and vehicle owners parked their cars and 
motorbikes outside the office overnight for a fee of 500 TSH per day. Community 
!!
"H?!
police were also available for hire for special events such as funerals, which are 
targeted by thieves because the host is likely to have additional property on their 
premises, such as utensils and chairs borrowed from neighbours.111  
 
Upon payment of 3000 TSH, the makamanda could be employed to locate and arrest 
suspected criminal offenders or debtors. Police at the local police station in fact 
referred those who had reported a crime for which there was a known suspect to the 
community police, so that the makamanda could arrest the individual concerned and 
deliver them to the police station. In the case of other disputes, such as quarrels over 
the use of abusive language, the makamanda arbitrated between parties and could 
impose further fines or other punishments. In one case observed, for example, a young 
woman who had refused to apologise for her part in an argument was imprisoned in 
the office overnight. The extent to which local dispute resolution formed a part of ulinzi 
shirikishi in A was somewhat unusual, reflecting the fact that the makamanda were also 
members of the mtaa government.  
 
These additional examples of cases observed in the CP office in A illustrate the range of 
reasons for which mtaa residents, and others, sought the assistance of the community 
police:  
 
• A male resident who had travelled to Dar es Salaam called the community 
police upon hearing reports that his estranged wife was removing furniture 
from his house. The ulinzi shirikishi group apprehended her vehicle and 
confiscated the furniture.  
• An elderly female resident complained that young men living in a house 
situated higher on the hill than hers had been throwing stones onto her plot. 
One kamanda agreed to visit her house on each of the four following days to 
assess the situation before confronting her neighbours.  
• A woman resident in another mtaa requested that the community police assist 
her in identifying and locating a man, known to live in A, who owed her 
money. The kamanda on duty knew the individual concerned and agreed to 
locate him or his family members for a fee of 3000 TSH.  
• A woman complained to the community police that her brother had stolen iron 
sheets from her. He was arrested by several makamanda and, due to the 
complexity of the case, escorted to the police station.  
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The community police in the other two case sites were not involved to the same extent 
in resolving residents’ problems and proactively seeking out suspected wrongdoers.  
 
Despite being able to charge fees for their services, it was claimed by the makamanda 
that it was rare for income to exceed operational costs, such as renting the office and 
purchasing items such as stationery.112 However, as discussed in the following chapter, 
other residents often assumed that leaders were making financial gains from CP.   
 
5.5.2 Mtaa B 
 
Mtaa B is located approximately 5.5 kilometres from the city centre. Most of B is 
planned, with wide dirt roads and large plots. Many of the houses are within walled 
compounds (see Figure 4). However, approximately one third of the area of the mtaa is 
unplanned and has much poorer quality housing that is not accessible by vehicle (see 
Figure 5). This area is locally referred to as the ‘squatter area’ and housing quality and 
infrastructure is similar to that of the majority of mtaa A. The chairman estimated the 
population of the mtaa to be 4000 people.113 
 
B was formed in 2009 through the amalgamation of two pre-existing mitaa. The 
chairman, a retired policeman in his late 50s, was affiliated to CCM. He was a 
prosperous businessman, well-known in the city, with several enterprises, including a 
busy city centre restaurant, a garage and a lorry that he hired out. The mtaa 
government had an office, however this was rarely occupied by either the chairman or 
his councillors. An MEO acted as a secretary at public meetings, however he was also 
employed as a teacher and some complaints were made that this prevented him from 
fulfilling his duties in the mtaa.114  
 
The nearest police station to B is located approximately two kilometres away. 
However, as this station does not have a vehicle it is likely that any police emergency 
response would have to come from Nyamagana District Police Headquarters in the 
city centre.  
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112 Interviews: makamanda-A 6 & 2 25.11.11. 
113 Interview chairman-B 28.1.11. 
114 Observation public meeting 20.2.11. 
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Figure 4: Photograph showing a typical street in the planned section of mtaa B. Taken by the author in 
November 2011. 
 
CP in mtaa B  
 
The chairman was the first to establish ulinzi shirikishi in Mwanza, in 2005. As noted 
above, he was a retired police officer who claimed ‘ulinzi ni kwenye damu’ (security is in 
my blood).115 His mtaa was subsequently merged with another to form B in 2009. 
Despite attempts to do so, it had not proved possible to extend the CP system across 
the new larger mtaa. Thus in 2011 CP was practised in only half of mtaa B. 
Nevertheless, the mtaa was considered by local police to have a particularly successful 
example of CP in operation, and had also been honoured by visits from the Regional 
Commissioner and Regional Police Commissioner.116  
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Figure 5: Photograph showing the unplanned area of mtaa B. Taken by the author in July 2011. 
 
Rather than following a model similar to that of sungusungu, as was the case in A, it 
was decided that each house owner should contribute 1000 TSH each month in order 
to employ some unemployed local young people as night guards, and by-laws were 
introduced to this effect. Owners of businesses, such as guesthouses or small shops, 
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were charged 5000 TSH and those with cars paid 3000 TSH. The guards were promised 
a salary of 40,000 TSH per month.117 
 
The guards recruited were aged between 17 and 29. Whilst the youngest was in 
secondary school, the majority were also working in low paid jobs in the daytime. The 
group included a painter, several dala dala (shared minibus taxi) conductors, factory 
employees and one driver. Most had completed only primary school education. All of 
the guards were male, although they claimed that should they be required to arrest or 
search a woman they would ask the female mtaa secretary or a female ten-cell leader to 
do so.118 
 
A security committee, with both male and female members, was selected at a public 
meeting in order to oversee the guards and organise collection of money to pay them. 
All members were aged 45 and above. In practice, however, there was no oversight of 
the guards’ nocturnal activities beyond a requirement that they complete a register to 
monitor attendance.  
 
Each night the young guards conducted a patrol, armed with various weapons 
including machetes, an iron bar, a spear, batons and a bow and arrow. Any person 
encountered in the mtaa at night was challenged to ascertain that they were residents of 
the area and had an acceptable reason for being abroad at night. The guards were 
expected to escort those suspected of having committed a criminal offence to the mtaa 
chairman, who might subsequently direct them to take the suspect to the police station.  
 
Unlike in mtaa A, it was not common for residents to report crimes to the community 
police. They did not have an office or uniforms, were not available during the daytime 
and their identities and contact details were not necessarily known to other residents. 
Therefore none of those interviewed in B said that they would report crimes to the 
guards. However, the community police did sometimes respond to community 
concerns and might conduct their own surveillance and investigation at night, for 
example by sharing their phone numbers with those who were suspicious of their 
neighbours, so that the guards could be alerted to any unusual activity and track the 
suspect’s nocturnal movements.  
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117 This is a relatively small amount. Renting a room in the area could cost up to 30,000 TSH per month.  
118 Interview guard-B M 20.11.11. 
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5.5.3 Mtaa C 
 
C is located in a ward that was characterised as ‘rural’ by the council in 2007 (MCC 
2007), and is approximately 12 km from the city centre. The area has experienced rapid 
population growth in recent years and now appears more like a satellite town to the 
city of Mwanza, with many shops, restaurants, a market and high frequency minibus-
taxi connections to the city centre. There are still large cultivated plots on the borders 
of the mtaa, however, and many residents engage in agriculture.  
 
What is now mtaa C was settled by several Sukuma families and their livestock in the 
early 20th century and some of the offspring of these early inhabitants were still 
resident in the area in 2011. The area remained very sparsely populated until the mid-
1990s, at which time there was only one expensive bus to Mwanza town each day.119 
However, by 2011, through the gifting of plots to family members and subdivision and 
sale of other land, the population had greatly increased and population density was 
similar to that of the planned areas of mtaa B. Although the area is now multi-ethnic, 
and many earlier Sukuma residents have moved out to more rural areas,120 it was more 
common to hear Kisukuma spoken in C than in the other two case sites and this was 
the only area in which some research participants preferred to speak Kisukuma, rather 
than Kiswahili, during interviews. The chairman estimated the population of the area 
to be 2800.121  
 
The mtaa is unplanned, but in contrast to A there is much more space for building due 
to the relatively recent sub-division of plots, and plots and houses tend to be larger (see 
Figures 6 and 7). Many of the houses were newly built or still under construction. 
Although the newer houses are typically fairly large and constructed from concrete, 
the process of construction can be a very long one and many residents were living in 
unfinished houses while they attempted to save money to finish building. Some of the 
area’s poorer residents were tenants living with virtually no material possessions or 
furniture in large unfinished houses in order to protect the owner’s property during 
construction. The area represents both a cheaper alternative to building in the city 
centre for the relatively poor, and an opportunity for the wealthy to construct the large 
houses they desire where there is still space to do so. There was thus considerable 
variation in quality and size of housing and in the socio-economic status of residents. 
Most of the mtaa is accessible by dirt roads and paths, however these can rapidly 
become impassable when it rains.  
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119 Interview father of chairman-C 22.8.11. 
120 Interview chairman-C 5.7.11. 
121 Interview chairman-C 5.7.11. 
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Figure 6: Photograph showing open cultivated area and housing in the centre of mtaa C. Taken by the 
author in November 2011. 
!
The elected chairman of the ward was a local businessman in his early 40s, running a 
successful family cattle business. Like the chairmen of the other two case sites, he was 
affiliated to CCM. He and the mtaa secretary carried out the bulk of the work of the 
mtaa government, and the chairman was dismissive of the abilities of the other 
councillors, who played no role in organising or overseeing CP in the mtaa. There was 
no mtaa office so residents in need of assistance contacted the chairman by mobile 
phone or visited his home in the evenings. There is a WEO who works at the nearby 
ward office, however upon her attendance at a meeting of ten-cell leaders the chairman 
found it necessary to introduce her to those present and explain that residents could 
approach her if necessary.122  
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Figure 7: Photograph showing housing and partially flooded path in mtaa C. Taken by the author in 
November 2011. 
 
The nearest police station is located approximately 2.5 kilometres away by road. 
However, the station does not have a vehicle, and any emergency response would thus 
come from the Nyamagana Police District Headquarters, 12 km away, or from police 
on patrol.  
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CP in mtaa C 
 
In 2008 mtaa C was the last of the three case sites to adopt CP, although as noted above 
a less formalised system had been in operation prior to this time. In C the terminology 
of sungusungu was reintroduced and an ntemi and mtware were selected, as well as a 
secretary and other makamanda, all of whom were male retirees. Unlike in A, a 
deliberate effort was made to separate the leadership of sungusungu from the mtaa 
government, as the chairman had little faith in the capacity of most of his elected 
councillors to respond to local problems, viewing them as having been selected ‘kwa 
ushabiki’ (according to their popularity), rather than for relevant skills.123  
 
 Crime prevention  
 
All able-bodied men who did not have conflicting work commitments were required to 
participate in night patrols, in accordance with a timetable organised around CCM’s 
ten-cell structure. Women were not included in patrols because it was doubted that 
they had sufficient physical strength and some had complained that participation 
would interfere with childcare.124 In contrast to the other two sites, it was not initially 
considered necessary to formalise a system of collecting contributions from residents to 
support nightly patrols and expenses were collected on an ad hoc basis from relatively 
wealthy residents.  
 
A by-law was introduced to compel participation in CP and the chairman reported that 
in the early stages of implementation six residents had received a short prison sentence 
following referral to the police over infringements.125 However, initial rigorous 
enforcement of the rules seems to have been short lived as the system was in place for 
only four months, after which time the mtware was removed from his post and a 
recently arrived retired soldier was selected to replace him. Despite efforts to revive 
the system, ten-cell leaders were lax in providing names of residents who could be 
called upon to patrol and, although outright refusal was rare, it was common for 
residents to claim injury or other mitigating circumstances to avoid attending to 
patrol.126  
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123 Interview chairman-C 5.7.11. 
124 Interview chairman-C 2.2.11. 
125 Interview chairman-C 2.2.11. 
126 Interview mtware-C 22.8.11.  
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The difficulty in organising regular patrols led leaders to alter the system, and in 
September 2010 ten-cell leaders were asked to collect 2000 TSH from each household in 
order to employ local young people to guard. However, of 54 ten-cell leaders, only 14 
provided any money, and even those that did so had not collected from all households 
under their jurisdiction. When a meeting was held in early August 2011 to try to 
encourage those who had not collected contributions to do so, only 16 of the mtaa’s 54 
ten-cell leaders attended.127  
 
By October 2011, these proposals had been abandoned and the leaders had reverted to 
‘utaratibu wa jadi’ (the traditional system),128 whereby ten-cell leaders were required to 
provide the names of participants in accordance with a timetable. The ‘volunteers’ 
were accompanied by one of the leaders of sungusungu. Although at the time women 
were not involved in patrolling, it had been hoped to employ some female guards, and 
the secretary of sungusungu felt that female involvement in apprehending and 
guarding suspects was important as in 1995 one mtware had been accused of sexually 
assaulting a female detainee.129 
 
Any apprehended person was secured in a small lock up adjoining the sungusungu 
office and then questioned by the ‘wazee’ (old men, referring to the leaders of 
sungusungu).130 In the case of a criminal complaint the detainee was taken to the police 
station. The secretary of sungusungu emphasised that unlike the former sungusungu, 
today’s guards did not routinely dole out corporal punishment. However, he also 
noted that if the person detained appeared to have sustained injuries at the hands of 
those patrolling or by other means, the police were called immediately so that the 
sungusungu leadership should not be seen as culpable for the injuries.131  
 
Although patrols had been revived by late 2011, they were not organised every night. 
It became apparent during the research that many residents of C were either unaware 
that CP was in operation in the mtaa or had very little knowledge about what the 
sungusungu were doing, or were supposed to be doing, and this is discussed further in 
the following chapter.  
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127 Observation of public meeting 5.8.11. 
128 Interview secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11. 
129 Interview secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11. 
130 Interview secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11. 
131 Interview secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11. 
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Investigation and dispute resolution 
 
The sungusungu had a small office on which the telephone numbers of the ntemi and 
mtware were painted. If an incident was reported to the sungusungu they decided 
whether it should immediately be reported to the police. Minor incidents such as 
fighting, disputes over debts or cases of petty theft when the perpetrator had 
apologised were dealt with in the office.132 If sungusungu were required to retrieve a 
party to a dispute or a suspected offender the individual concerned was charged 4000 
TSH. Half of this money was used for office overheads and the remainder shared 
amongst those who had completed the job. The secretary of sungusungu claimed that 
fines were not imposed, as ‘sisi sio mahakama’ (we are not a court).133 As noted above, 
however, knowledge of the activities of sungusungu was limited and for many the mtaa 
chairman was probably their first recourse in case of a dispute.   
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter introduced Mwanza, Tanzania’s second largest city, and outlined the 
structure of urban administration. The lowest level of urban government, the serikali ya 
mtaa (sub-ward government), is intended to be responsible for implementing CP. These 
elected bodies do not receive any regular funding from the central government and are 
composed of volunteers, and possibly one salaried executive officer. The chairpersons 
of Mwanza’s mitaa have been educated by police as to their responsibilities with regard 
to CP, however they retain considerable discretion over how CP is actually 
implemented, and whether any further action is taken at all. The practices described as 
polisi jamii or ulinzi shirikishi thus varied considerably between the three case sites.  
 
In mtaa A the mtaa councillors and others were selected as makamanda (commanders) of 
CP. Residents were obliged to participate in night patrols led by the makamanda in 
accordance with a monthly timetable. In addition to preventative patrols, the 
makamanda resolved disputes, arrested suspected criminals or disputants for a fee, and 
offered security provision for special events such as funerals.  
 
In mtaa B, an elected security committee collected a monthly levy from residents in 
order to employ local young men as night guards. The guards conducted patrols 
around the mtaa but did not play a role in investigating local crime. The system 
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operated in only half of the mtaa, as it had not been possible to extend patrols and 
revenue collection since the size of the mtaa was increased in 2009.   
 
In mtaa C, leaders were elected to organise sungusungu and an office was constructed. 
However, residents consistently failed to report to patrol, and leaders decided to 
collect money to employ some young men to guard the area. This was also 
unsuccessful and a system based on voluntary night patrols was reintroduced. 
However, many residents were not aware that there was any system of CP in place and 
had neither participated in patrols nor contributed funds.  
 
The following chapter explores the performance CP in the three mitaa more critically, 
and in particular the impact of CP on perceptions of local safety, how well collective 
participation in CP was sustained in the three mitaa, the extent to which CP as 
practised constituted a response to popular demands, and the differential impact of CP 
on various sectors of the neighbourhoods introduced above.  
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Chapter 6: Outcomes and Experiences of Participation in Ulinzi 
Shirikishi    
 
In this chapter, the performance of CP institutions is assessed across four dimensions: 
their impact upon popular perceptions of neighbourhood safety and local crime; how 
well collective action was sustained; the distribution of the costs and benefits of 
participating in CP across communities; and finally, the extent to which CP as 
practised in the three case sites constituted the kind of service residents wanted.  
 
In the following section, the impact of CP on popular and police perceptions of public 
safety in the three mitaa is explored through data collected during the survey and 
interviews with elected local leaders and local police. Both residents and police were 
largely positive about the impact of CP where it was operating, and described 
considerable improvements in local safety and reduced crime rates. However, 
sustaining collective action in the interests of local safety proved very difficult. Section 
6.2 describes how collective action problems were overcome in mtaa A due to a strict 
sanctions regime, whereas in B and C, participation was either intermittent or partial 
and rules were not enforced. 
 
Section 6.3 outlines the unequal way in which the costs and benefits of participating in 
CP were distributed within ‘communities’. Whilst leaders were sometimes able to 
secure legitimate, and possibly illegitimate, private benefits through policing, ulinzi 
shirikishi was sometimes experienced by other residents largely as an obligation to 
provide labour or money. These burdens were particularly onerous for the relatively 
poor.  
 
Section 6.4 addresses for whom ulinzi shirikishi provided security, and from whom or 
what residents were protected (Luckham 2007: 690). Collective benefits were generated 
through night patrols, which prevented crime and made neighbourhoods safer. 
However, when the community police charged for services some were unable to afford 
their help, and future opportunities to make neighbourhood policing more 
commercialised may reduce the ‘community’ orientation of ulinzi shirikishi. Young 
people were widely considered a potential threat to others living in the mtaa, 
particularly when they congregated in public spaces. Thus some young people, and 
particularly males, experienced CP as an intensification of gerontocratic authority over 
the mitaa, which restricted their freedom of movement. 
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The final section addresses the extent to which CP provided a service that was 
responsive to local demands. The ‘local’ nature of CP offered several advantages over 
state provision of policing, including proximity to residential areas. However, 
although CP was valued for its impact on local safety, in all three mitaa it also 
generated suspicion and resentment, particularly in mtaa A, where some residents felt 
coerced into participation and excluded from decision making processes.  
 
6.1 How effective was CP at improving neighbourhood security and policing?  
 
The following analysis draws largely on the perceptions of residents, police and local 
leaders of security in their neighbourhoods before the introduction of CP and since, 
and their assessments of the impact of CP. Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain 
recorded crime statistics compiled at the mtaa level because police jurisdictions do not 
correspond to the administrative mitaa. The additional problems with relying upon 
recorded crime statistics in this context and the difficulty of assessing CP from rates of 
reported crime were discussed in Chapter 4 (4.2.1). 
 
6.1.1 Perspectives of mitaa leaders 
 
In all three areas elected local leaders, including mitaa chairmen and councillors and 
security committee members, gave unanimously positive assessments of 
improvements in local security since the introduction of CP, claiming that overall 
crime rates and the severity of crime were significantly reduced.134 Leaders compared 
their areas to neighbouring mitaa to illustrate the superior security in their 
jurisdictions. The chairman of A, for example, explained that a motorbike taxi driver 
asked to deliver a passenger to the ward would agree to drive as far as his mtaa office, 
knowing this area to be safe, but would refuse to venture into neighbouring areas.135 In 
B, the MEO claimed that people chose to move to the mtaa due to its reputation for 
superior security.136 
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134 Interviews: makamanda-A 11.11.10; chairman-A 1.12.10; chairman-B 2.12.10; chairman-C 2.2.11; ntemi-C 
10.7.11; mtware-C 8.11.11; secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11. 
135 Interview chairman-A 22.2.11. 
136 Observation of public meeting in B 20.2.11. 
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6.1.2 Perspectives of local police  
 
The polisi kata (ward police officers)137 responsible for all three mitaa were unanimously 
positive regarding the impact of CP institutions on crime in their respective areas and 
emphasised that their own jobs had become easier since these were established. Their 
comments supported the observation of the head of the CP office within the national 
police headquarters that police officers were usually grateful for CP as previously they 
had been carrying an ‘unnecessary load’, whereas now civilians were shouldering 
some of this burden.138 The polisi kata responsible for mtaa B, for example, claimed that 
at present the area was ‘salama sana, salama kabisa’ (very safe, completely safe), whereas 
prior to the establishment of CP institutions it was ‘tofauti kabisa… shida kubwa’ 
(completely different… a big problem) as it had been the police alone who were 
responsible for tackling crime.139 Similarly in A, one of the two polisi kata claimed that 
today ‘kuna amani sana kabisa’ (it is completely peaceful), in contrast to the period prior 
to polisi jamii when people had not recognised their own responsibility for crime 
prevention.140 
 
6.1.3 Perspectives of mitaa residents  
 
The 108 residents surveyed in the three mitaa were asked about their perceptions of the 
safety of their person and property before CP was introduced in the area and since in 
four hypothetical situations: when walking alone in the mtaa in the daytime and at 
night, when alone in their homes at night, and when valuable possessions were left in 
an unoccupied house. As some of the residents had moved to the mtaa since CP had 
been established, or were not aware of the existence of CP, they were not asked to 
provide a perspective on safety before CP was introduced. Percentages referred to here 
regarding perceptions of safety before establishment of CP thus refer only to the 
proportion of those respondents who had been resident in the mtaa for a sufficiently 
long period of time to answer this question. Unless otherwise specified, survey data for 
mtaa B presented in this section refers only to responses collected in the part of the mtaa 
in which CP was active, in order to provide a better representation of popular opinion 
of CP where it was functioning.141  
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137 The position of polisi kata was introduced as part of the community policing reforms (see 3.4). 
138 Interview ACP-K 25.3.11.  
139 Interview PK-B 3.3.11. 
140 Interview PK2-A 7.2.11. 
141 Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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Table 3 shows the overall results obtained for questions regarding perceptions of local 
security before and since CP was introduced. The following section disaggregates the 
results by case site and explores the contrast between responses in mitaa A and B, 
where CP was operating relatively consistently at the time of the survey and residents 
were generally very familiar with the system, and mtaa C, where leaders had failed to 
establish regular CP activities and a third (33%) of those interviewed were either 
unaware of the existence of CP institutions or were unfamiliar with their activities.  
 
Table 3: Perceptions of safety in the three case sites, before and since CP was introduced. 
 Before CP was introduced (n=66) Since CP was introduced (n=108) 
 Not safe/very 
dangerous (%) 
Quite 
safe/very safe 
(%) 
Not safe/very 
dangerous (%) 
Quite 
safe/very safe 
(%) 
How safe was/is it to walk 
around the area alone during the 
daytime?  
14 86 4 96 
How safe was/is it to walk 
around the area alone at night? 77 18 44 54 
How safe was/is it to be at home 
alone at night? 47 52 19 80 
How safe was/is it to leave 
valuable items in your home? 71 29 38 61 
 
 
Perceptions of safety before CP began and since 
 
Mwanza’s crowded informal settlements, like that in which mtaa A was located, are 
considered to be particularly crime-affected parts of the city (e.g. Joel 2009).142 Over half 
(53%) of respondents in mtaa A reported that they, or a member of their household, 
had been a victim of crime since they had moved to the area,143 sometimes multiple 
times, and the large majority of incidents had occurred at home or elsewhere in the 
mtaa. These included burglary (22% of respondents) and robbery where force was used 
(17% of respondents). Complaints made by residents about the period prior to the start 
of ulinzi shirikishi in mtaa A included the ubiquity of vibaka (petty thieves) who stole 
phones, bags and even people’s clothes and shoes, and were sometimes armed with 
knives.144 Wadokozi (opportunistic thieves), who stole items carelessly left outside 
houses, were also considered to have been a problem.145 A more serious threat was 
posed by majambazi (armed thieves, thugs) who used fatuma (large stones) to break 
people’s doors.146 At night would-be thieves were reported to pass between houses, 
looking for unoccupied dwellings and households with valuable property, meaning 
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142 Also interviews: Sgt-Nyamagana 24.1.11; PSC1 19.2.11. 
143 All incidents mentioned had occurred since 2004. 
144 Survey respondents: 1; 19; 20; 21; 22; 24; 31; 32; 35. 
145 Survey respondents: 15; 31.  
146 Survey respondents: 4; 28. 
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that televisions and radios had to remain silent.147 Some residents claimed that those 
who wished to use the cover of night for illegal activities threw stones at other 
residents to persuade them to retreat indoors and leave the coast clear.148 Before CP 
was introduced, motorbike taxi drivers considered it too dangerous to deliver 
passengers to the majority of the mtaa.149 Women were considered particularly 
vulnerable to crime before CP was introduced,150 including young girls who risked 
becoming victims of robbery and sexual assault on their way home from school.151 
 
When asked about security in the present, many fewer residents considered the area to 
be unsafe than had done so before CP started. There was a corresponding increase in 
the number of people who felt safe in the mtaa since CP had started, as illustrated by 
Figure 8. Only one of those interviewed considered the area to be ‘very dangerous’ at 
night in the present, and 47% said it was now ‘very safe’. This pattern was also 
apparent when residents were asked about their safety when at home alone at night 
and the likelihood that items left in their home would be stolen (see Figures 9 and 10). 
There was little difference between women and men’s feelings about their personal 
safety in the area, and in fact women were more likely to feel safe at night.  
 
A common indication given of the relative safety of the area was the fact that items, 
such as utensils, could now be left outside the house without fear that they would be 
stolen.152 During patrols observed, the chairman proudly pointed out laundry left 
drying outside houses overnight. Others emphasised that it was now possible to walk 
the streets at night without fear,153 even when using a mobile phone.154 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
147 Survey respondents: 8; 29; 32. 
148 Survey respondents: 29; 36. 
149 Interview chairman-A 22.2.11. 
150 Survey respondents: 5; 31; 32. Interviews: TCL-A 1 16.2.11; TCL-A 12 17.2.11; TCL-A 6 17.2.11. 
151 Survey respondents: 3; 17. Interviews: TCL-A 1 16.2.11; kamanda-A 1 15.7.11. 
152 Survey respondents: 9; 15. Interviews: TCL-A 3 17.2.11; TCL-A 2 23.2.11; TCL-A 4 23.2.11; TCL-A 10     
25.2.11. 
153 Survey respondents: 27; 30; 36. Interviews: TCL-A 12 17.2.11; TCL-A 5 25.2.11. 
154 Survey-36. 
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Figure 8: Perceptions of safety when walking alone at night in mtaa A. 
!
 
Figure 9: Perceptions of safety when at home alone at night in mtaa A. 
!
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Figure 10: Perceptions of safety of valuable items left at home in mtaa A. 
!
!
In mtaa B, a smaller proportion of residents (39%) claimed that they had been a victim 
of crime since moving to the area than was the case in A. The incidents reported were 
also typically less serious, being mainly petty theft of household items. However, some 
residents complained that before CP started a person moving around the mtaa at night 
was liable to be robbed and that opportunistic theft from outside and inside homes 
was common.155 
 
As in mtaa A, there was a positive change in perceptions of personal safety in the mtaa 
since CP was introduced (see Figures 11 & 12). The difference between responses given 
by men and women was negligible. 71% of those interviewed considered the mtaa to be 
safe at night in the present, which was the highest proportion of any of the three sites. 
Respondents were also more likely than in the other case sites to consider it to be safe 
to be at home alone (100%) and to leave valuable items in their homes (79%). The latter 
proportion represented a considerable increase from the 21% who thought it had been 
safe to leave property at home when there was no community security system. (Figure 
13).   
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155 Survey respondents: 37; 39; 41; 45; 48; 58; 60; 62; 66; 69; 72. 
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Figure 11: Perceptions of safety when walking alone at night in mtaa B. 
!
 
 
Figure 12: Perceptions of safety when at home alone at night in mtaa B. 
!
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Figure 13: Perceptions of safety of valuable items left at home in mtaa B. 
!
 
In mtaa C, however, where ulinzi shirikishi had lapsed before the survey was conducted 
and leaders were struggling to reform the system, there was no such clear difference 
between perceptions of safety prior to and since the concept of ulinzi shirikishi was 
introduced in the mtaa (see Figures 14-16). Whilst residents were more likely than 
residents of the other mitaa to consider the area to have been relatively safe before CP 
was attempted, they were also more likely to consider the area to be dangerous in the 
present.  
 
Figure 14: Perceptions of safety when walking alone at night in mtaa C. 
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Figure 15: Perceptions of safety when at home alone at night in mtaa C. 
!
 
Figure 16: Perceptions of the safety of valuable items left at home in mtaa C. 
!
 
Figure 17 provides a comparative picture of perceptions of safety at night in the three 
mitaa at the time the survey was carried out. It is notable that in A and B the proportion 
of residents who considered their area to be safe at night was over twice as large as 
those who gave this response in C.  The chart also shows the findings of a victimisation 
survey carried out in Mwanza and other urban areas of Tanzania in 2008 (UNODC 
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2009).156 Residents of A and B were more likely to feel safe in their neighbourhoods at 
night than participants in the victimisation survey, whereas respondents in mtaa C 
were likely to feel less safe.  The proportion of all respondents who considered their 
neighbourhood to be safe/not safe at night is the same as that reported in the 
victimisation survey.  
 
Figure 17: Perceptions of safety of walking alone at night in the three case sites and in other urban 
areas of Tanzania. 
!
Source: survey data collected by author and UNODC (2009). 
 
It was notable that, in contrast to the other two mitaa, women in mtaa C were more 
likely than men to consider the area to be unsafe. Only three of the 18 women 
interviewed in the mtaa felt that it was safe to walk around the area after dark, and half 
of the women felt it was not safe for them to be at home alone at night. Vibaka, 
sometimes armed with knives, made the area unsafe at night,157 and women were 
particularly vulnerable to theft in the streets, and when in their homes.158 42% of those 
interviewed in mtaa C claimed that they or a family member had been a victim of crime 
since moving to the mtaa, and a large majority of these incidents had taken place at 
home or in the neighbourhood. A quarter of all respondents had experienced burglary 
or attempted burglary. In August 2011, when the survey was carried out, seven of 
those interviewed had already been victims of crime that year.   
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156 The survey involved 1,888 households in Dodoma, Mbeya, Moshi, Mwanza and Tanga.  
157 Survey respondents: 75; 80; 81; 82; 84; 87; 95; 99; 103; 105; 107. 
158 Survey respondents: 75; 94; 103; 108. 
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Did community policing make a difference?  
 
The data explored above regarding residents’ perceptions of safety both before and 
since CP was introduced suggest that CP had an impact on how safe respondents felt 
in their neighbourhoods. In the area in which CP did not endure, residents were more 
likely to feel unsafe when walking alone in the mtaa, when at home on their own and to 
fear that valuable items might be stolen from their homes. This was the case despite the 
fact that in those areas where CP was now practised, residents had felt less safe before 
CP was introduced.  
 
Survey participants were also asked to rate the extent to which they thought that CP 
had improved safety in the mtaa.159 In both A and B the large majority of respondents 
felt that CP had had an impact on the safety of their area. 90% in A and 100% of 
respondents in B said that CP had helped ‘a lot’ or ‘to some extent’ to improve safety in 
the mtaa. 89% of those residents of mtaa C who were aware that CP had been initiated 
considered CP to have had a beneficial impact on local safety.  
 
The success of ulinzi shirikishi in improving safety was attributed to the deterrent effect 
of patrols, which stopped would-be thieves from entering the area,160 and the 
investigative skills of the community police, who were local residents themselves, and 
thus able to identify criminals operating in the neighbourhood.161 
 
Respondents were also asked to rate the ability of the community police to prevent and 
investigate crime in the mtaa (see Figure 18). In both A and B162 the majority gave 
positive appraisals of the ability of the community police to prevent crime (58% and 
68% respectively). In C, however, only 28% gave an unequivocally positive appraisal of 
crime prevention through CP, probably reflecting the intermittent nature of patrols. A 
high proportion (42%) said that the community police did nothing at all to prevent 
crime in the mtaa.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
159 Only those who had been resident in the mtaa since before the introduction of CP were asked this 
question and percentages given refer to the proportion of these respondents, rather than of the total 
number of respondents.  
160 Survey respondents: 26; 31; 40; 88. 
161 Survey respondents: 19; 26; 33; 77; 96.  
162 Percentages refer to respondents resident in area of mtaa B where CP was operating only.  
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Figure 18: Perceptions of the ability of the community police to prevent neighbourhood crime. 
!
  
Respondents were also asked to rate the ability of the community police to investigate 
crime in the mtaa. In A, where investigation and dispute resolution were significant 
components of community policing, preventative and investigative activities received 
almost equal ranking, with over half of respondents considering ulinzi shirikishi to be 
‘very good’ or ‘good’ at investigating crime. Unsurprisingly the investigative functions 
of guards in B were not ranked as highly as their activities were largely limited to 
patrolling and crimes were not usually reported to them. In mtaa C, 36% thought that 
sungusungu were good at investigating crimes, however 39% said they did nothing at 
all to investigate crime (Figure 19), reflecting the sizeable proportion of the population 
who were not aware there was a CP system in place. 
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Figure 19: Perceptions of the ability of the community police to investigate neighbourhood crime. 
!
 
 
Community policing versus state policing  
 
Tanzania has a very low police to population ratio and the police force struggles with 
significant shortages of human and material resources, and crucially stations often lack 
means of transport, meaning that police are rarely seen in residential areas outside of 
the city centre. Thus it was not surprising that over a third of those surveyed in all 
three of the sites (34%) said that the police did not do anything to prevent crime in 
their mtaa. This proportion was consistent across A, B and C (33%, 36% and 33% 
respectively), despite the variation in distance to the nearest police station. The police 
were frequently described as confining their patrols to main roads, which could be 
passed by vehicle, rather than entering the vichochoro (narrow footpaths between 
houses) where people actually live and where crimes are committed.163 In the words of 
one interviewee in mtaa B: ‘the police are only found in the important areas, not with 
wananchi (ordinary people)’.164 Police were also widely criticised for taking a long time 
to respond to reported incidents.165  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 Survey respondents: 6; 20; 28; 29; 62; 90; 92. Interviews: TCL-A 6 17.2.11; TCL-A 7 23.2.11; TCL-B 7 
8.2.11.  
164 Survey-62.  
165 Interviews: TCL-C 3 17.11.11; kamanda-A 2 25.11.11. 24 (22%) of the survey participants also 
spontaneously mentioned this to explain why they considered the police to be ineffective in preventing 
crime in the mtaa. It is possible that a higher proportion of residents would have expressed this view had a 
question that asked directly about police response time been included.  
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Employing a commercial security guard was not feasible financially for the large 
majority of residents of the three case sites. Only one participant in the survey (resident 
in mtaa C) had a guard at their residence, as the compound also contained their 
business premises. In this context, CP was welcomed as a service that was otherwise 
largely absent. This was reflected in residents’ attitudes regarding the contribution of 
time or money towards CP. As one resident of A explained, ‘people need ulinzi 
(security). If we didn’t contribute what could we depend on?’166 In contrast, when CP 
was not in place, options could be limited:  
 
If the police catch people they can pay a bribe to be set free… In 
the past I would have gone to the ten-cell leader, but now it 
would have to be the police. But all they do is give you an RB.167 
If you pay a bribe they will find the suspect. Corruption puts us 
at risk. Really I have nowhere to go for help.168  
             
The community police, in contrast, offered a very localised service, in terms of both 
proximity to people’s dwellings and familiarity with the local context. Over half of 
respondents (51%) said they would prefer to report a crime to an actor within the mtaa, 
either the chairman, a ten-cell leader or the community police, whereas only 35% said 
they would go straight to the police.169 
 
The community police were also ‘closer’ to the community in terms of their experience 
of living amongst the population being policed, and were thus assumed to know 
which residents were involved in criminal activities.170 As one survey participant in C 
explained, ‘they are closer to us than the police and they have the ability [to investigate 
crimes in the mtaa] because they live with the community and the vibaka [petty 
criminals]’171 It was possible to report suspicions to the community police without 
being required to provide evidence, and they would sometimes undertake to gather 
evidence themselves through nocturnal surveillance. Residents of A and B, where CP 
had operated consistently over the past two to six years, were more likely to positively 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 Survey-17. 
167 Report book number, which indicates that a statement has been recorded.  
168 Survey-92 (unemployed 32 year old male resident in mtaa C). 
169 For 10% reporting preference was affected by the type of incident. A small theft, for example, would be 
reported to the mtaa chairperson whilst a more serious offence would be reported to the police. The full 
findings of the Afrobarometer 2011 survey in Tanzania had not been released at the time of writing, 
however the 35% of respondents who preferred to report crimes to the police can be compared to 62% in 
urban Kenya (Afrobarometer 2012b), and 41% in urban Uganda (Afrobarometer 2012b).  
170 Survey respondents: 19; 26; 31; 33; 83; 96. Interview TCL-C 3 17.11.11.  
171 Survey-83 (24 year old female, occasional water seller). 
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rate the ability of the community police to prevent crime than they were to praise the 
police (see Figure 20).172  
 
Figure 20: Assessments of the ability of the community police/police to prevent neighbourhood crime 
(A and B only) (n=64). 
 
!
Other commonly voiced criticisms of the police related to their lack of action upon 
reported crimes, whereby the victim is expected to arrest a suspected perpetrator 
themselves and deliver them to the police. The police were also accused of demanding 
money before performing any service, which had led some survey respondents to 
abandon cases lodged with the police when the costs became prohibitive.173 Officers 
were also considered likely to accept bribes from those arrested and release them, 
possibly putting those who report a crime at risk (see also Plyler 2007: 133-134). Thus 
the chairman of A complained:  
 
The police and the courts are very problematic. You might 
know a person who’s a thief and take them to the police, but 
after a few weeks you see they are back walking around and if 
you ask them they say he has not been charged according to the 
law.174 
                        
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
172 Positive responses were either ‘very good’ or ‘good’. Negative responses were ‘not good’, ‘very bad’ or 
‘they do not do anything to prevent crime in the mtaa’. The overall percentage of respondents in all three 
mitaa who rated the police capacity to prevent crime in the mtaa as ‘good’ or ‘very good’ was 29%, which is 
much lower than the 51% of Tanzanians who said the government was doing well at reducing crime 
according to the 2011 Afrobarometer survey (Afrobarometer 2012a).  
173 Survey respondents: 8; 82.  
174 Interview chairman-A 13.1.11. 
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Such claims are possibly partly related to misunderstanding of laws governing due 
process and bail procedures. However, as outlined in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.2) the 
police have consistently been rated the most corrupt public institution in popular 
surveys conducted in Tanzania.  
!
6.2 Collective participation in community policing   
 
Despite the large majority of survey respondents considering it ‘fair’ to participate in 
or contribute to CP in principle, in all three areas the community police had consistent 
problems in sustaining the collective action necessary for ulinzi shirikishi.  
 
In only one of the case sites (A) was CP sustained throughout the entire fieldwork 
period (October 2010 – November 2011). This was largely the result of a strong 
sanctions regime, and the selective benefits available to leadership, discussed in 
sections 6.2.4 and 6.3.2. In mitaa B and C, participation was less rigorously monitored 
and enforced and lack of trust in leaders decreased the likelihood that residents would 
contribute funds for CP.  
 
6.2.1 Popular acceptance of the principle of participation    
 
A very high proportion of survey respondents, 89%, considered it ‘fair’ to participate in 
or contribute financially to CP institutions. This was consistent across the three mitaa, 
despite many in C being yet to see any improvement in local security as a result of CP. 
Typical explanations for this included the assertion that it was fair as ‘ulinzi ni wa kila 
mtu’ (security is for every person),175 and the amount of money required was small.176 
Others stressed the idea that contributing or participating was a necessity as there was 
no alternative to community action, implying police and government inability or 
unwillingness to provide security.177 However, in practice acceptance of the fairness of 
cooperating in CP and the necessity of doing so did not preclude considerable 
difficulty in organising the collective action required.   
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
175 Survey respondents: 16; 25; 48.  
176 Survey respondents: 35; 62; 69; 72.  
177 Survey respondents: 17; 61.  
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6.2.2 Failure to institutionalise CP in mtaa C  
 
The difficulties leaders faced in organising CP in mtaa C were outlined in the previous 
chapter (5.5.3). Although by November 2011 occasional patrols were carried out, a 
third (33%) of those surveyed in the mtaa were either unaware that CP had been 
introduced or thought that the idea had been abandoned. 42% said that neither they 
nor a member of their household had ever participated in or contributed money for 
CP.  
 
The secretary of sungusungu explained that attempts to collect contributions from 
residents were hindered by a lack of popular understanding about what the money 
was for and the aims of CP more broadly.178 Public meetings about CP had been poorly 
attended and no subsequent attempts were made to popularise the idea. There were no 
procedures in place for monitoring collection of funds and identifying those who had 
failed to do so. Sanctions were not enforced for failure to contribute funds or to 
participate in patrols. In addition suspicions of the chair of the security committee, 
who was thought to have abused his position in the past, made ten-cell leaders 
reluctant to collect funds and prevented others from contributing.179 The chairman of 
the security committee was subsequently removed from his post and when the 
research was concluded in November 2011 had not yet been replaced.  
 
6.2.3 Partial institutionalisation of CP in mtaa B 
 
The chairman of B, a retired police officer, held a strong personal commitment to 
maintaining security in his mtaa. However, despite his pride in having been the first to 
start ulinzi shirikishi in Mwanza, he had on many occasions considered ending the 
system due to persistent failure to collect a sufficient amount of money from residents 
to pay the community guards their agreed salaries.180 Furthermore, CP activities 
occurred in only half of the mtaa as following the merger of two pre-existing mitaa in 
2009 to form the new administrative unit of B, CP had not been extended across the 
entire area, despite the chairman’s desire to do so. 
 
When CP was established in 2005, 20 young men from the mtaa were employed as 
guards. However, when full payment was not received over consecutive months, the 
guards ceased reporting for duty. By February 2011 only half of the original group 
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178 Interview secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11. 
179 Interviews: mtware-C 24.8.11; secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11; TCL-C 3 17.11.11. 
180 Interviews chairman-B 2.12.10 & 28.1.11.  
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remained, the others having found alternative employment. The shortfall in funding 
was initially blamed by leaders and the guards themselves on residents’ failure to 
contribute as required. As was the case in C, it was rare for a person to refuse to give 
money. However, delaying payment or claiming that a spouse had not left money for 
the payment was common.181  
 
Attempts were made to increase the amount of money collected. Tenants, as well as 
homeowners, were asked to contribute. Ten-cell leaders carried out a census to 
establish the number of those eligible to pay. Although this led to an initial increase in 
payment received by the guards, and some young men who had previously stopped 
participating returned to work, by October 2011 there were only seven guards 
remaining, and they complained they had not been paid since August.182 At this time 
the young men stopped going to patrol at night without informing the mtaa chairman 
of their decision. When this was revealed at a public meeting those present were angry 
and many claimed that crime had increased during this period. It was deemed 
essential that guarding should resume.183 The chairman and security committee again 
emphasised the importance of increasing revenue collection, claiming that residents of 
the unplanned section of the mtaa, the relatively poor, were the worst offenders. This 
explanation was contested by one security committee member, however, who accused 
his colleagues of embezzlement at a public meeting in October 2011.184  
 
The chairman had attempted to extend the system of CP operating into the remainder 
of the mtaa. However, he claimed to have difficulties in organising public meetings all 
residents would attend, due to the size of the area. Several ten-cell leaders, one of 
whom was the former chairman of the area, suggested that people did not consider CP 
to be necessary as individuals were able to take private measures to improve security, 
by purchasing guns that could be fired in the air to deter would-be criminals,185 or 
hiring private security guards and building walls around their houses.186 In the words 
of the former chairman of the area, an elderly gentleman living in a relatively humble 
dwelling:  
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181 Interviews: chairman-B 14.2.11; security committee member-B 1 20.11.11. Observation of public meeting 
30.10.11. 
182 Interviews: guard-B M 20.10.11; security committee member-B 1 20.11.11. 
183 The importance placed on having a local security system was apparent at both of the public meetings 
attended, consistent with the chairman’s claim that whenever the survival of ulinzi shirikishi is called into 
question people protest that it must continue (interview chairman-B 2.12.10). 
184 Observation of public meeting 30.10.11. 
185 Interview TCL-B 5 24.7.11. 
186 Interview former chairperson of part of mtaa B 6.11.11. 
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After [the new chairman] was elected he tried very hard to start 
CP. They called the people [to a meeting], they agreed, but I 
don’t see that anything has happened….This mtaa is difficult. 
There are rich people here. They don’t want to contribute… If 
you tell a rich person to leave his home and guard, there is no 
way he will agree. He will say ‘I have my own guard, I have my 
own dog and that’s enough.’… To govern a rich person, 
somebody of means, if you talk to him he’ll just look at you like 
you have a problem…. But we are just trusting in God. We 
protect ourselves. I don’t have a gate.187 
 
6.2.4 Enforcing participation in mtaa A 
 
In A night patrols were carried out without cessation from the time that CP was 
introduced. Sustaining CP was predicated upon strict monitoring of participation by 
the makamanda, with the assistance of ten-cell leaders, and enforcement of sanctions for 
non-compliance. However, organising collective action was onerous and time 
consuming.  
 
The makamanda of A were obliged to spend a considerable part of their working night 
rounding up those scheduled to participate who had failed to report for duty. During 
the first night patrol observed only two of those who were supposed to participate 
reported at the correct time. The makamanda subsequently loudly banged on the doors 
of people they thought to be shirking their patrol date. In one of these cases the young 
man in question was able to excuse himself by showing his injured foot; another 
demonstrated that it was actually not his date to patrol; and a third reluctantly agreed 
to participate, despite having tried to excuse himself with a toothache. The fourth 
person was not at home, and the makamanda promised his sister that he would be taken 
to the police the next day.188 This was apparently not an atypical evening.189 The 
chairman acknowledged that it was very hard work to sustain ulinzi shirikishi, and 
claimed that, ‘wanapenda ulinzi, lakini hawataki kulinda’ (they like security, but they don’t 
want to guard).190 
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187 Interview former chairperson of part of mtaa B 6.11.11. 
188 Observation of patrol 29-30.1.11.  
189 Interviews: kamanda-A 5 29.1.11; kamanda-A 3 8.8.11. 
190 Interview chairman-A 21.2.11.  
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In addition to the very public sanction for non-attendance to patrol described above,191 
failure to participate could result in a fine or, in the case of persistent offences or 
unwillingness to cooperate with the mtaa government, in police prosecution and a 
possible prison sentence.  
 
However, the way in which CP was organised in A may undermine its sustainability in 
the future. Ostrom (2000: 150) outlines several necessary characteristics of rule design 
for the effective governance of use of common pool resources which are highly 
relevant to the future of CP as practised in mtaa A. Firstly, if some are obliged to 
provide greater inputs than the average user but receive fewer benefits, they will be 
less willing to contribute in the long term. Secondly, individuals should be able to 
participate in making and altering the rules that govern them if they are to be well 
adapted to local circumstances and considered to be fair. These conditions have not 
been met in A, as discussed in sections 6.3 and 6.5. In addition, the conditions specified 
by Ostrom depend upon a degree of transparency and the accountability of those 
responsible for monitoring and sanctioning behaviour of others, in order for residents 
to know that rules are equitably enforced and to enable the swift resolution of any 
conflicts that might endanger intra-community trust. The following chapter explores 
the typical lack of accountability and transparency of local governance in Tanzania and 
the implications for cooperation in the interests of public security.    
 
6.3 Costs and benefits of participation   
6.3.1 Unequal distribution of the costs of participation  
 
CP like other forms of ‘community-driven development’ is often presented as being a 
low cost means of providing services (see 2.2.1). As one police sergeant told a group of 
CBO members assembled for training, ulinzi shirikishi ‘ni mpango wa kupunguza uhalifu 
kwa gharama nafuu’ (is a way of reducing crime at a low cost).192 However, the costs 
involved were not always considered low by residents of the three mitaa, and 
particularly the relatively poor.  
 
In mtaa B, and briefly in mtaa C, residents were obliged to contribute financially each 
month in order to employ local guards. Some considered the amounts requested 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 Houses are typically located very close to each other and do not have glass in the window frames, 
meaning that the noise made by the makamanda and any subsequent discussion was entirely audible to 
neighbours. 
192 Observation of training 19.11.11. 
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negligible, and would have been happy to pay more,193 however participation through 
financial contributions could be very difficult at a time of economic hardship related to 
rising food prices, drought and rationing of power supply. In both mitaa some 
residents struggled to pay monthly contributions.194 In mtaa B, for example, security 
committee members sometimes failed to collect enough money from the unplanned 
section of the mtaa, whereas in the surveyed area with typically much higher quality 
housing, residents often paid a year’s worth of monthly contributions at once. When 
guards stopped patrolling for a brief period in 2010 due to unpaid salaries, residents of 
the surveyed area offered to double their individual contributions in order to maintain 
the service in their area only.195 Although some efforts were made to take socio-
economic inequalities into account, for example by taking more money from those who 
owned a car, the extent of variation was such that for some the amount required was 
trifling, whereas for others it was difficult to spare.   
 
The relatively poor were also disadvantaged by systems of CP that relied upon 
‘voluntary’ labour. Participation in night patrols was physically demanding and 
potentially dangerous. Participants were poorly equipped, carrying only ‘traditional’196 
weapons, and usually did not have suitable footwear or warm clothing. The majority 
had no training in ensuring their own safety or that of an apprehended person. In all 
three areas, members of patrols had in the past been attacked resulting in injury, 
including a non-fatal gunshot wound in C. It was also possible that participants might 
be mistaken for perpetrators of crime, and this had occurred in both A and B. Thus 
perceptions of danger understandably made some reluctant to participate in patrols.197  
 
In both A and C, wealthier residents, and those who had regular employment, could 
opt to pay a fee in lieu of participation in a night patrol. This shifted the burden of 
labour to those who could not afford to opt out, generating resentment and potentially 
compromising the ability of poorer residents to pursue their own livelihoods.198 As one 
resident of C explained:  
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193 Survey respondents: 41; 69; 72 (all residents of B). 
194 Interviews: chairman-C 14.11.11; TCL-B 8 15.11.11; mtware-C 18.11.11. Observation of public meeting-B 
30.10.11. 
195 Observation of public meeting 30.10.11. Interview: guard-B M 30.10.11. 
196 The word ‘jadi’, or ‘traditional’ was frequently used to differentiate the unsophisticated weapons of the 
community police from those of the police and majambazi.  
197 Interviews: chairman of mtaa neighbouring B 13.7.11; WEO-BT 11.2.11; Survey respondents: 14; 84; 94.  
198 See Cleaver & Toner (2006: 214) for similar findings regarding participation in communal labour in 
Moshi Rural District, Tanzania. 
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Those with gates don’t want to go and guard. They won’t come 
outside if you knock to ask them if it’s their turn. It’s just sisi 
wadogo (us small people).199    
 
6.3.2 Selective benefits through community policing  
 
Leaders of CP institutions were sometimes able to receive remuneration for their 
efforts, which enabled them to continue to devote time to CP. Whilst these selective 
benefits were conducive to ensuring CP could be sustained, other residents could be 
left confused about how money was being used, leading to fears of corruption and the 
perception that CP ‘only helps the leaders’.200 Whether justified or not, fears related to 
misuse of public funds hindered collective action and may have negative effects on the 
future sustainability of CP. Furthermore, the availability of selective economic benefits 
may in the future lead community police to prioritise non-collective services over 
crime prevention across the entire mtaa.  
 
It was not necessarily considered problematic that those participating in CP should 
receive some compensation for their efforts. In both A and C, where patrols were 
carried out by volunteers, plans to employ permanent local guards had been endorsed 
at public meetings, and, when asked an open ended question about how to improve 
CP, a fifth of survey participants in these mitaa said that participants in ulinzi shirikishi 
should receive allowances.  
 
Making money from policing activities is not necessarily inconsistent with being seen 
as a legitimate security provider as policing may cost money to undertake, and actors 
may identify their activities as constituting a job for which they are entitled to 
remuneration (Buur & Jensen 2004), as was the case for the young guards in B. 
However, claims that community police have only pecuniary motives may play an 
important part in negotiations over what constitutes legitimate authority and 
undermine the claims made by CP institutions to represent the ‘community’ (ibid.: 
146). In A and C the community police charged a small fee for investigative or dispute 
resolution services. However, this was usually described as ‘hela ya miguu’ (expenses) 
or posho (an allowance), rather than as a fee. Similarly, Green (2012: 318-319) observes 
that those who are paid by civil society organisations for the duration of a project tend 
to describe themselves as volunteers who are receiving ‘posho’ (an allowance), rather 
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199 Survey-92 (unemployed 32 year old male, mtaa C). 
200 Survey-10 (mtaa A). 
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than as recipients of a salary, reflecting the importance of voluntarism in establishing 
closeness to the poor and a legitimate role in community development.  
 
In A, the makamanda did not have regular or substantial alternative incomes, and some 
financial incentive was probably important in enabling them to sustain their 
commitment to CP, although they claimed to be motivated only by their desire to serve 
the community.201 The costs of running the office, for example payment of rent and 
purchase of stationery and furniture, and a contingency fund for medical treatment 
were also funded through CP fees and any fines imposed. The amount of money that 
the makamanda could make was therefore relatively small, sometimes reaching 8,000 
TSH per week, although this was described as unusual.202 The makamanda claimed that 
the amount of money collected from contributions, excluding fines and fees for 
services provided, barely covered running costs.203  
 
Although the sums involved may have been relatively small, the pursuit of personal or 
group economic gains shaped the service provided. Firstly, the makamanda increasingly 
attempted to solicit economic contributions from residents rather than encouraging 
them to join patrols. This meant that the burden of patrolling was largely born by 
poorer residents, as discussed above, and the smaller number of participants 
potentially made patrolling less safe.204 Although it was agreed at a public meeting that 
guards would be employed through community contributions, as was the case in mtaa 
B, the makamanda, who would have lost out financially were this to happen, had not 
taken any steps to reform the system when the research concluded in November 2011.  
 
Economic incentives may encourage the community police to operate more like a 
private security provider in the future, rather than providing collective benefits across 
the neighbourhood, as was observed of some sungusungu organisations (Heald 2002: 
24). For example, the community police in A had apprehended a private security guard 
colluding with thieves the previous year. The grateful representative of the mobile 
phone company whose mast the guard had been employed to protect recommended 
that the community police should bid for contracts like theirs in the future.205 Although 
such large commercial opportunities had not yet been pursued, the community police 
were providing additional protection to business and vehicle owners who could afford 
to pay.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 Interviews: makamanda-A 1,2 & 3 26.1.11; kamanda-A 1 15.7.11.  
202 Interview: makamanda-A 2 & 6 25.11.11. 
203 Interview kamanda-A 1 15.7.11. 
204 Survey respondents: 2; 23; 24; 25; 30; 32. Interview: male residents of A 27.1.11. 
205 Interview chairman-A 11.7.11. 
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Furthermore, in all three mitaa, residents harboured suspicions that leaders were also 
appropriating public funds to make illegitimate private gains through CP. Regardless 
of whether this was true, suspicions of corruption formed a major impediment to 
collective action.  
 
In A, some residents questioned why 3000 TSH was requested from households who 
could not provide a participant for patrols. This could be expected to generate a much 
larger amount of money than could possibly be required for the purchase of torches 
and batteries. The fines imposed for non-participation were also contentious, and some 
residents suspected that leaders were inflating contribution rates and imposing 
arbitrary fines in order to enrich themselves.206   
 
In B, allegations of corruption were made against members of the security committee 
responsible for collecting contributions to pay the community police. One member of 
the committee accused his colleagues of embezzling funds intended for the guards’ 
salaries.207 Even before these public allegations were made, residents queried how their 
money was being used, as the size of the population meant that more than sufficient 
funds should have been available to pay the guards, yet they continued to complain 
they were not paid.208   
 
In C, mistrust of the chair of the security committee, who was thought to have a 
previous record of misuse of public funds, made ten-cell leaders reluctant to collect 
contributions and residents were often unwilling to give, as outlined in section 6.2.  
 
6.4 For whom did CP institutions provide security and from whom or what?  
 
CP strategies are premised upon the ‘fundamental illusion’ of community (Brogden & 
Nijhar 2005: 51). As argued in Chapter 2, the assumptions underlying CP, ‘essentialise 
and romanticise “the local”’, minimising local social inequalities and hierarchies 
(Mohan & Stokke 2000: 249).  The experience of residents of the three case sites of CP 
was affected by socio-economic, gendered and generational variables as well as their 
position within the existing formal governance structures of the mitaa. CP reflected 
localised social conflicts and became part of the way in which they were manifested, as 
leaders gained authority to protect their ‘community’ from perceived threats.  
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206 Interview male residents 29.7.11; Survey respondents: 4; 9; 10; 23; 25; 30.  
207 Interview 20.11.11; observation of public meeting 30.10.11. 
208 Survey respondents: 37; 38; 47; 51; 55; 59; 67. 
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The general benefits provided by preventative patrols carried out by community police 
were largely collective. The entire population benefited from safer streets, and by 
doing so they did not prevent any other residents from doing the same. However, in A, 
and to a lesser extent in C, CP services became quasi-commercialised, whereby 
residents were obliged to pay for investigation of crimes, which poorer residents were 
unable to do.  
 
Security, in addition to referring to the protection of an individual from violence and 
other threats, is also ‘a process of political and social ordering, maintained through 
authoritative discourses and practices of power’ (Luckham & Kirk 2012: 10). The ability 
to define threats to security, or deviance, both conveys political power and is 
dependent upon and constitutive of existing power relations (Jensen 2008). In Mwanza 
those in a position to determine the objectives of CP within the mitaa were largely 
relatively senior residents in existing leadership positions. CP became a means of 
dealing with pervasive anxieties about ‘idle’ vijana (young men) and exerting greater 
control over young people in the mitaa. 
 
6.4.1 CP in a context of socio-economic inequality: affording access to 
services  
 
The positive assessments of the impact of CP on public safety were outlined in section 
6.2. No obvious patterns emerged from the survey data to suggest that particular social 
groups, whether defined by gender, socio-economic status or age, were more or less 
positive about the preventative effects of ulinzi shirikishi. Although a few complained 
that CP benefited only those who had property that was worth protecting and should 
thus be paid for by local business owners,209 this was not a commonly expressed view 
and it could be argued that relatively poor residents had the most to gain from CP. The 
most common crimes affecting the three mitaa, theft of small items from pedestrians 
and burglary, could affect any resident. Poorer residents were less able to take 
alternative measures to prevent or deal with crime, such as employing a private 
security guard, building a wall around their property or making a potentially 
expensive visit to the police station, and even a small theft would have a greater 
relative impact.  
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However, charges for other policing services were prohibitive for some residents. In A, 
where fees were charged for investigation of crimes or arrest of a suspect, several 
survey respondents commented that they would not report cases to the community 
police as they anticipated being asked for money,210 and many who did use the service 
in order to obtain the arrest of a suspect subsequently complained that they could not 
afford to pay.  
 
As noted above (6.3.2), the ability to charge for policing services may lead to less 
‘community’ orientated policing in the future. It should be recognised, however, that 
CP services were not necessarily more expensive than referring a case to the police 
force.  
 
6.4.2 Policing vijana: ‘idle’ youth and crime  
 
The mtaa government has been given responsibility for local security through CP on 
the basis of its responsibilities in law, but also as it is assumed to be ‘karibu na jamii’ 
(close to the community) (TPF 2008b: 1). Protection of the ‘community’ is typically 
central to the claims local policing institutions make to authority (Buur & Jensen 2004: 
146). However, ‘community’, and thus who is worthy of protection is not a stable and 
uncontested category, and various forms of ‘everyday policing’ are an important way 
in which community is constructed, performed and maintained (ibid.). Designation of 
what, or who, is ‘criminal’ can be a key way in which local power relations are 
constructed and contested, and policing is thus closely linked to localised social conflict 
(Jensen 2008). In Mwanza, as Plyler (2007: 130) observes:  
 
…who can be categorized as a thief depends on economic, age, 
and gendered identities…Tanzanian thieves are generally 
young, poor men who lack economic security and the financial 
means to be self-sustaining. They are not random targets, but 
are (poorly) situated in social and economic hierarchies. 
 
CP increased the powers of occupants of existing leadership positions, mostly 
relatively senior residents, to enforce their understandings of appropriate behaviour 
within the mtaa. Those deemed to contravene these standards most frequently were 
vijana (young men), who were seen as a threat to other residents, particularly when 
they congregated in groups and occupied public space. As a consequence young men 
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could find themselves subject to arrest or violent punishment when they breached the 
moral standards of their elders, even when this did not contravene state law. Local 
police shared assumptions about the criminality of apparently idle vijana, and 
sometimes supported local leaders in controlling younger residents.  
 
The preoccupation with ‘idle’ youth in urban spaces and their supposed freedom from 
established modes of discipline and control is of course not unique to Mwanza or to 
the present day (see 3.2.4). The demographic and economic circumstances of 
contemporary African states has contributed to a sense of ‘youth crisis’, characterised 
by increasing urbanisation, high unemployment, violence, crime and the HIV and 
AIDS epidemic (Burgess & Burton 2010: 2-3). Demographically young people dominate 
sub-Saharan Africa. According to Tanzania’s 2002 census, over half of the population 
of the Tanzanian mainland was aged 19 or under (54.7%) and 78.4% were aged under 
35 (URT 2006b). High levels of unemployment and intense competition for resources 
following the economic crises of the 1970s frustrate the ability of the young to earn a 
living with implications for their ability to move into adulthood, meaning that ‘youth 
can becomes less a stage of life leading to adulthood than a permanent trap’ (Cooper: 
2008: 194). Beset by ‘poverty, idleness and ennui’ (Abbink 2005: 2-3), youth have been a 
highly visible part of violent political struggles and criminality across the continent. 
There is a rich anthropological literature exploring the intersection of policing, 
vigilantism, criminality and inter-generational conflict in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. 
Richards 1996; Heald 1999; Oomen 2004; Kagwanja 2006; Jensen 2008). As Jensen (2008: 
49) observes of Nkomazi in South Africa, ‘everyday policing remains an important 
political language and performance in settling the conflict between the young and the 
old.’  
 
Young people were expected to provide the majority of labour inputs for CP, but were 
typically not represented in leadership structures and were seen as requiring the 
supervision of more senior mtaa residents. Except in B, where guards were employed 
(although often paid only intermittently), being excluded from leadership positions 
meant that young people did not benefit from the opportunities for legitimate or covert 
financial gain through policing discussed in the previous section.  
 
The youngest kamanda in A was 35. Others were aged 45 and over, but continued to 
play an active role in patrolling and monitoring attendance, claiming that it was 
necessary to supervise the youthful ‘volunteers’ to prevent shirking. Ten-cell leaders, 
who are likely to be relatively senior and to be homeowners with families, were relied 
upon to provide information to support or discredit testimonies of younger 
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participants in night patrols. In B, the guards, the oldest of which was 29, were 
supposed to be supervised by the chairman and the security committee, which 
according to one of its youngest members (a businessman in his forties) should be 
senior in age to the guards to provide ‘mawazo mzuri’ (good ideas) and to prevent the 
use of excessive force which was liable to occur if the guards were not supervised.211 
Money was collected and controlled by the security committee and the mtaa 
accountant. The guards attended public meetings at which CP was discussed, having 
been ordered to do so by the chairman, but they were not called upon to speak, even 
when the matters at hand directly concerned their livelihoods. In C the leadership of 
sungusungu were all retirees, the oldest of whom was 88. In all three mitaa the rank and 
file participants in CP were expected only to participate in the physical aspects of 
policing, mainly patrolling the mitaa and arresting suspects, rather than tasks requiring 
judgement such as investigation of cases.   
 
Attempts to monitor and reform the activities of young people were an important 
element of CP in all three mitaa, reflecting popular concerns about youth who are 
perceived to be idle and possibly using illegal substances and thus prone to commit 
crimes. Residents of the three case sites were asked to describe the kind of people who 
committed crimes in the mtaa. 92% identified young men (vijana wa kiume) as the main 
perpetrators of local crime. 13% claimed that young women (vijana wa kike, wasichana) 
were also involved, although this was typically thought to be in a secondary capacity, 
for example tricking victims into situations where they could be robbed by young men. 
The assumption that it was young men who committed crimes was shared by the 
leaders of CP institutions.212  
 
Respondents emphasised that many vijana were unemployed and 40% associated drug 
usage (mainly marijuana) with crime, partly due to the imperative to steal in order to 
afford drugs, but more commonly due to the assumed effect of illegal substances on 
the behaviour of young people. For example:  
 
The whole ward is dangerous because of marijuana. A person 
gets high so they can go and commit a crime.213 
                
It [smoking marijuana] contributes significantly to crime in the 
mtaa. They smoke and then lose respect for elders.214 
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211 Interview security committee member-B 2 5.7.11. 
212 Interviews: MEO-B 9.12.10; chairman-A 13.1.11; kamanda-A 2 26.1.11; chairman-C 5.7.11; security 
committee member-B 2 5.7.11.   
213 Survey-8 (20 year old male school pupil, mtaa A). 
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Vijana steal after smoking marijuana and taking other drugs…If 
you see a group of 10 young men, you know that 4 or 5 are 
taking something.215 
     
In addition to drug use, a lack of parental discipline was also blamed for youth 
criminality. Parents might also be dependent upon the proceeds of crime brought into 
the household by their offspring, and thus endorse their activities.216  
 
Youth is not a fixed category that can easily be abstracted across different cultural 
contexts, but rather ‘consists of a constantly shifting population moving in and out of 
locally determined notions of youthfulness’ (Burgess 2005: viii). The specific age range 
respondents described as ‘vijana’ was quite varied but most commonly fell between 15 
and 25. However, 14% of participants implicated younger children, from the age of 10, 
in committing crimes and leaders also claimed that, ‘even children’ were involved.217  
 
The formation of groups or gangs by young men and their congregation in public 
spaces in the mtaa to smoke or ‘piga stori’ (chat) gave a visible focus for popular fears. 
When describing areas of the mtaa thought to be dangerous, many residents attributed 
this to the presence of groups of vijana. In all three mitaa, groups of young men could 
be observed from the early evening in places identified by residents as their kijiwe.218  
 
The typical image of a local criminal is exemplified by this account given by a 46 year-
old female resident of C:  
 
There is a lot of smoking of marijuana [in the mtaa]. They 
[vijana] sit on those big rocks and play cards and smoke. There 
are lots of groups of them with different names. One is called 
Nigeria. They are already a lost cause (wameshindikana). They’re 
often affected by the disintegration of their families. Some of 
them have been forced away from their homes and they don’t 
have any work or anything else to do. Recently a girl of 15 was 
passing this area at 7pm on a day when the electricity was off 
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214 Survey-96 (53 year old male farmer, mtaa C).  
215 Survey-90 (34 year old male knife sharpener, mtaa C).  
216 Interviews: chairman-A 1.12.10; kamanda-A 2 26.1.11; PK-A 2 7.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; WEO-C 24.2.11. 
Survey respondents: 29; 107.  
217 Interview ntemi-C 10.7.11. Also interviews: kamanda-A 2 26.1.11; TCL-A 10 25.2.11; TCL-A 8 26.2.22.  
218 Kijiwe literally means ‘small stone’ but can be translated as ‘jobless corner’ (e.g. Mtani 2007: 76; Reuster-
Jahn & Kießling 2006: 7), where young men congregate. See Reuster-Jahn & Kießling (2006: 7) for further 
discussion of the term.  
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and she was stabbed for no reason.219    
         
Although there was some disagreement as to whether the perpetrators of crime in the 
mtaa were mtaa residents, the dominant perception was that they were ‘watoto wa humo 
humo’220 (children from here) and were well known in the mtaa. 18% of survey 
participants asserted that those committing crimes in the mtaa were from other areas of 
the city, sometimes those neighbouring the mtaa concerned. However, 51% stressed 
that criminals came from within the ‘community’, and thus had knowledge of local 
geography and opportunities to steal,221 although they might also work with others 
from outside. The notion that criminals were embedded in the community was 
apparent in assertions that the youths concerned were ‘our children’.222  
 
The following summary of an account given by the MEO of B about the rationale for 
establishing ulinzi shirikishi in the mtaa is illustrative of the importance of fears of youth 
criminality and indiscipline in the establishment of CP:  
 
There were young men who could be seen congregating with 
no particular purpose or occupation and smoking marijuana. 
This coincided with a spate of robberies. It was feared that these 
young men could be a bad influence on other children in the 
mtaa, of which there are many. The first objective of CP was to 
arrest these young men and bring them to the mtaa office to be 
instructed to change their behaviour and, importantly, to 
refrain from inviting young men from other areas into the mtaa. 
The mtaa leadership also visited the houses of the parents of 
these young people to persuade them to talk to their children. 
Those young men who were thought to be actually breaking the 
law were taken to the police for prosecution.223  
 
One of the main objectives of night patrols in all three mitaa was controlling and 
preventing the movement of people, and particularly young men, around the mtaa at 
night. However, women were also subject to the attentions of the community police, 
whether they were lectured as to the risks of being abroad at night,224 or suspected of 
having the intention of breaching standards of sexual morality (see below). Often those 
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220 Interview kamanda-A 3 8.11.11. 
221 Survey respondents: 27; 47; 45; 55; 60; 75; 77; 85. 
222 Interviews: TCL-B 7 8.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; TCL-A 7 23.2.11; TCL-A 11 23.2.11. 
223 Interview MEO-B 9.12.10. 
224 Observation of patrols in A  29-30.1.11 and 21-22.2.11.  
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encountered during the patrol were automatically assumed to be guilty should they 
not be familiar to the guards. One 20 year old man in A, who was himself attending 
school, explained that CP had improved safety a lot in the mtaa as if the community 
police encounter a kijana who is wandering around the mtaa for no reason they beat 
him.225 Another resident, a 34 year old man, complained that he and his brother had 
been arrested when returning late at night from watching a football match in a bar. 
They were obliged to pay a fine of 10,000 TSH in order to obtain their release.226 Other 
young men had been beaten and fined for the same reason,227 leading one resident to 
complain that the community police did not know the law: ‘They just catch people who 
are walking at night.’228  
 
Similarly in B, survey participants gave examples of the guards harassing residents 
who were returning to their homes after the patrols had started and threatening them 
with punishment if they were not recognised.229 Residents who were intoxicated or 
rude to the guards might be given a physical punishment or obliged to join the guards 
for the rest of the patrol.230 When CP was first introduced, patrols commenced at 19.00. 
The guards thus encountered a larger number of people in the streets and found it 
difficult to establish their authority to interrogate other residents. They attempted to 
earn respect by administering serious beatings to those they met, although following 
some additional training from the chairman and MEO, and the shifting of the patrol 
time to 23.00, they were no longer so hasty to resort to violence.231 The use of violence 
against suspected thieves, however, is not necessarily considered problematic. As one 
security committee member in B explained, ‘mwizi akipatikana lazima apigwe’ (if a thief is 
caught he must be beaten).232  
 
The following account of one incident observed during a patrol in B illustrates the way 
in which the movements of young people were policed, particularly when sexual 
morality appeared to be at stake:    
 
After walking for about ten minutes we saw two young men and two young women walking 
slowly along the path in front of us. M [a community guard] shouted at them, ‘mnafanya nini?’ 
(what are you doing?). They stopped and one of the men replied ‘tupo tu’ (nothing, we’re just 
here). M and the others approached and M began an interrogation of the men. They claimed to 
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225 Survey-8. 
226 Survey-34. 
227 Survey-33. 
228 Survey-10. Also survey-13. 
229 S37; S51; S67. 
230 Interview Chairman-B 14.2.11. 
231 Interviews: MEO-B 9.12.10; B-guard M 18.2.11. 
232 Interview security committee member-B2 5.7.11. 
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be from the neighbouring mtaa. The women said they were from mtaa B and the men were 
escorting them to their houses. Throughout the conversation M was holding his club over his 
shoulder. The guards told the men to go home, telling them they shouldn’t be in this area after 
11pm. Although the men tried to remonstrate, appealing to the guards to be sympathetic and 
recognise that they just wanted to walk their girlfriends home, their pleas were flatly rejected. M 
shouted that ‘ni sheria zenu, lakini sio sheria zetu’ (those are your rules not ours). The men left, 
leaving the women to further interrogation.  
 
The women were ordered to ‘kaa chini’ (crouch on the floor) and asked for the name of their ten-
cell leader and the chairman of the mtaa as proof that they were indeed resident in mtaa B. They 
could not remember the name of their ten-cell leader but one woman claimed she had 
contributed money for community policing and could show them a receipt. M said they would 
go to her house the next day to verify this. They protested that they had thought it was only 
10pm and had been returning from work. The guards weren’t willing to accept this explanation 
without proof either and D [a community guard] said he would go the next day to see if they 
were actually working in the bar they claimed.  
 
Throughout the encounter the manner of the guards towards the young women, who appeared 
younger than the guards, was very aggressive. They used raised voices and stood over the 
women who had been made to crouch on the floor. The women were repeatedly told they should 
not be bringing people into the mtaa after 11pm. At one point a guard threatened to slap them if 
they didn’t heed the warnings and D warned that if they were to do the same again, ‘mnajua 
tulivyofanya zamani’ (you know what we used to do).233 
 
Community police in C were cooperating with police to deal with the ‘problem’ of 
unemployed youth in the mtaa through pre-emptive arrests and were willing to frame 
those against whom no evidence of wrongdoing could be found. Leaders explained:  
 
Before [CP] we used to have 3 or 4 incidents [of crime] per 
week. It was bad. But we’ve improved the situation as now we 
arrest young men who we think are involved in crime and take 
them to the police. This is very effective. We have joined hands 
with the police…the youth don’t like us. They don’t like ulinzi 
[security].234 
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233 Observation of patrol 18-19.2.11. The guards were threatening to violently punish the women, by 
referring to their practices in the early days of CP, discussed above.  
234 Interview: secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11. 
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If we get complaints about a kijana we go and fetch him and 
bring him to our office. If we can’t find out anything specific 
that he’s done wrong then we take him to the police who will 
find marijuana or gongo (illicit liquor) on them. They know that 
even if there is no case against them, a case will be found at the 
police station… Vijana really hate us. Especially me… They say, 
‘that soldier is a bad man’, but other people are happy.235 
 
MEOs interviewed in the ward in which C is located emphasised the importance to the 
philosophy of ulinzi shirikishi of the Swahili saying, ‘Mtoto wa mwenzio ni wako’ (your 
neighbour’s child is yours), which implies that all adults should take responsibility for 
the behaviour of young people. They described one of the ‘successes’ of CP as the fact 
that residents could now call the police when they saw groups of young people 
congregating in the area and the police would come to patrol there. Residents of both 
A and B expressed their appreciation of periodic police operations to remove young 
men from the mitaa.236  
 
There was a tendency to place collective responsibility on youth for the crimes of their 
peers. In A following an incident whereby perpetrators could not immediately be 
identified the makamanda called those ‘known’ to be ‘vibaka’ and threatened to take 
them to the police if any stolen property was not returned, encouraging young people 
to find out which amongst them was responsible.237 One kamanda explained how 
following an armed robbery perpetrated by two unidentified teenagers, she and a 
colleague arrested another young man from the mtaa and interrogated him as to the 
perpetrators, threatening to beat him until he told them a name, which he promptly 
did.238 To some extent, as Buur (2003: 34) finds in New Brighton, South Africa, the 
wrongful accusation or punishment of a young man or boy was considered justifiable 
as ‘youths are considered “generic criminals”’. The security of the community might be 
considered to outweigh the rights of individuals, which provides a justification for 
violent punishment or ‘mob justice’, even if the victim is innocent (Plyler 2007: 129). 
 
In contrast, in one mtaa neighbouring A the chairman had not attempted to start CP, 
seeing it as merely a money making scheme for those involved. As a young man 
himself who had attended school with many of the other young residents, he was 
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235 Interview mtware-C (a retired soldier) 18.11.11. 
236 Survey respondents: 23; 37; 48; 51; 65.  
237 Survey-5. 
238 Interview kamanda-A 2 25.11.11. 
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confident that if an incident was reported or anticipated he would be able to reason 
with the perpetrators.239  
 
6.5 Is CP more responsive policing?  
 
CP has been promoted as a means of making policing more responsive, being ‘policing 
which is determined by strategies, tactics and outcomes based on community consent’ 
(Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 2). Whilst CP provided a valued service in Mwanza, and 
addressed threats to local safety as defined by the majority of residents, albeit at the 
expense of others, responsiveness to citizens was not embedded in CP practices. 
Responsiveness can be understood as:  
 
…the desired attitude of power-holders towards citizens: we 
wish them to be responsive to the concerns and problems of 
ordinary people, to listen with impartiality and fairness to 
divergent views and to subject all expressions of need and 
interest to publicly agreed rules for weighing the merits of 
competing claims.  
           (Goetz & Jenkins 2005:13) 
 
In contrast to the ideal of a ‘community-based’ initiative, CP could be experienced 
largely as coercion and harassment, and was perceived by some as entailing the partial 
and arbitrary exercise of power. This was not only the case for those young people 
subjected to pre-emptive arrest or punishment. In mtaa A, where CP had proved most 
durable and the community police performed the widest range of functions, some 
residents made bitter complaints about the perceived unfairness of their treatment at 
the hands of the makamanda and the narrow interests served by CP. 
 
Although the chairman of A stressed his understanding of polisi jamii as something 
which involved the entire community,240 it was more common for survey participants 
to refer to the community police as a particular group of people with their own 
interests and objectives, rather than a ‘community owned’ institution over which they 
had influence.241 Fears that public money was being diverted to private interests were 
discussed in section 6.3.2. Some residents also suspected the community police of 
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239 Interview Chairman-KA 12.8.11. 
240 E.g. Interview Chairman-A 26.1.11. 
241 See Cleaver & Toner (2006) for similar findings with regard to water user committees elsewhere in 
Tanzania.  
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stealing from people’s homes. One story that was mentioned several times related to a 
woman who had reportedly been forced to leave her home to participate in a patrol at 
night, but had returned to find that all of the possessions had been stolen.242 One 33 
year-old woman who had recently moved to A claimed:  
 
The makamanda are vibaka. Those wearing the uniforms are 
dangerous. They’re thieves. They bang on people’s doors at 
night and then force their way inside to have a look around if 
there’s anything to steal.243 
 
A more common complaint related to the way in which the makamanda went about 
mobilising popular participation in CP. Participation was often described as a result of 
coercion, whereby, ‘they force you to do it. It’s compulsory, otherwise you get fined’.244 
The makamanda were aware that forcing people to participate in community policing 
was affecting their social relationships in the mtaa. One kamanda, for example, 
explained: ‘people are complaining a lot about polisi jamii. A large proportion [of 
residents] hate us. Forcing people to go and guard makes them hate us’.245 In addition 
to the disturbance caused by the makamanda when they banged on doors and 
harangued latecomers into patrolling, some claimed that leaders had used, or 
threatened violence, when collecting them for duty.246 CP entailed considerable 
intrusion into the homes and lives of other residents. During one patrol observed, for 
example, the makamanda awoke one man who, upon hearing the considerable 
commotion outside, rushed to the door without dressing. He subsequently became an 
object of mockery for the five minutes it took to establish that he was not actually 
scheduled to patrol that night. As discussed above, the relatively poor were more 
likely to have such experiences, as the better off could pay to excuse themselves from 
patrolling. Furthermore, those living in poorer quality housing in the unplanned 
sections of the mitaa, where houses are much closer together and have mesh rather 
than glass in the window frames, were more likely to be disturbed at night by the noise 
made by the makamanda when recruiting participants.  
 
The community police could thus be perceived as needlessly aggressive towards other 
residents and somewhat heartless, as illustrated by the following statements made by 
residents:  
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242 Survey respondents: 9; 10; 18; 25. 
243 Survey 25.  
244 Survey-13. 
245 Interview kamanda-A 2 25.11.11. 
246 Survey respondents: 13; 19; 31.  
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Ulinzi shirikishi is not working! The chairman is not working, 
even though we elected him. The community police are very 
aggressive at night. They even come into people’s bedrooms! 
They took one of our neighbours who was ill and couldn’t 
patrol to the police and fined him 10,000 TSH. They just protect 
the motorbikes and cars and shops on the road. They don’t 
protect us. We just depend on God. We don’t want community 
policing. We’d rather just protect ourselves…It [CP] just 
disturbs us!247 
 
My tenant was beaten by the community police. He refused to 
go to guard so they took him away and beat him. But then they 
came back and came inside the house searching for something. 
We don’t know what they were looking for. They took away 
our panga (machete) because they said the tenant had 
threatened them with it… They take even small children to go 
and guard. Better the police than community policing!248 
 
They took me to the office until morning because my husband 
was working in a factory and wasn’t there. I would have been 
OK if they’d taken me with them to patrol, but they kept me in 
the office where it was very cold. My husband came in the 
morning and paid a fine of 5000 TSH.249 
 
They knock on doors and disturb people and demand money 
before they’ll do anything. It would be better if people guarded 
their own houses.250 
 
They came around checking on the state of cleanliness around 
our houses.251 I had only buried my child a few days 
previously, but they found some problem here. I hadn’t had 
chance to do any cleaning! They took me to the office. I was in 
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 247 Survey-9 (46 year old female, petty trader). 
248 Survey-13 (22 year old female, housewife). 
249 Survey-31 (31 year old male, shop owner). 
250 Survey-14 (18 year old male, welder). 
251 The community police had begun to monitor and enforce sanitation by-laws, which also enabled them 
to impose fines to be shared with the Ward Health Officer. 
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tears, but one woman just asked me if I thought I was the only 
person who’d ever lost somebody.252 
 
We give money, but incidents [of crime] are still occurring. 
Even if you’re ill you are told to give money. What do they 
collect this money for?253 
 
‘Local’ policing is typically assumed to offer advantages of accessibility, both in terms 
of proximity to where users live, and in using comprehensible language rather than 
formal legal terms and procedures (e.g. Baker 2009b: 86). The accessibility of CP in the 
first sense was valued, as noted in section 6.1.3, and it could be easier to approach the 
community police because they did not require the production of evidence, as the 
police might. However, the more ‘informal’ aspects of CP in A were a cause for 
concern for some residents who would have preferred greater consistency with formal 
state procedures and the law, rather than what they perceived to be the arbitrary and 
unfair enforcement of rules determined by personal and group interests. Three 
participants in the survey claimed to have themselves been wrongly accused of a crime 
or unfairly punished by the makamanda,254 and more general concerns related to the 
leaders’ lack of knowledge of legal processes and that they exercised considerable 
discretion.255 These respondents did not reject the principle that members of the 
community could perform a local policing role, but suggested the need for additional 
training, or an oath to uphold the law, so as ‘they shouldn’t take the law into their own 
hands’.256 
 
Although it was recognised that people did not necessarily enjoy sacrificing their time 
to patrol, more fundamental opposition to CP was sometimes dismissed by leaders, 
and local police, on the basis that those who complained were criminals themselves,257 
or needed more education in order to understand the importance of CP.258 
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252 Survey-30 (30 year old female, housewife).  
253 Survey-25 (31 year old female, housewife). 
254 Survey respondents: 17; 30; 34.  
255 Survey respondents: 10; 17; 18; 25.  
256 Survey-18. 
257 Interviews: Chairman-A 1.12.10; OCS-A 12.1.11; kamanda-A 1 26.1.11; PK-A 2 7.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; 
TCL-A 9 16.2.11;  
258 Interviews: TCL-B 7 8.2.11; TCL-A 1 16.2.11; PK-C 30.10.11; TCL-B 3 6.11.11.  
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed the performance of CP in Mwanza in terms of its impact on local 
perceptions of security and policing, its sustainability and the distribution of the costs 
and benefits of participation. CP was widely praised for having reduced crime and 
extended a policing service into areas from which the state police were deemed to have 
been largely absent. However, this account of CP in the three mitaa demonstrates the 
difficulty of evaluating community-based development projects and the ‘ambivalence 
of success’ (Cleaver & Toner 2006: 216). As Cleaver & Toner (2006: 216-217) observe of 
community management of water supply elsewhere in Tanzania, although projects 
may improve residents’ quality of life, and the principle of participation or 
contribution may not be contested, it should not be assumed that this reflects 
‘community’ ownership and inputs, and that ‘community’ institutions do not represent 
distinct groups with private interests. CP provided a service that was largely absent 
before and is perceived by residents to have significantly improved local security. 
However, residents also resented being coerced into communal labour and feared 
public funds were being misused. Certain groups within ‘communities’, the relatively 
poor and the young and unemployed, were particularly likely to experience CP as an 
unmanageable and unfair burden, or as arbitrary restriction of their freedom. In two of 
the three mitaa it proved difficult to sustain CP, and these negative experiences of CP 
may make the organisation of collective action to improve local security even more 
difficult in the future. The following chapter attempts to explain these outcomes by 
situating CP within the broader context of local governance in Tanzania, histories of 
participation in local development and the nature of partnerships between 
communities and the police.  
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Chapter 7: From Sungusungu to Ulinzi Shirikishi: Compulsory 
Participation, Party Politics and Partnership with the Police  
 
The previous chapter considered the performance of neighbourhood CP institutions in 
three mitaa across four dimensions: their impact on public safety, their ability to initiate 
and sustain collective action, the extent to which they were responsive to community 
needs and wishes and the way in which the costs and benefits of CP were distributed 
across communities. In summary, where CP was working it was largely deemed to 
have brought about significant improvements in local safety and to have some 
qualitative advantages over relying upon the state police. The notion that citizens 
should participate in providing security was widely supported. However, in two of the 
case sites considerable collective action problems had halted CP, partly attributable to 
suspicions of corruption in the mtaa government and its sub-committees. Where it was 
operating consistently, CP could be very unpopular and tended to disproportionately 
burden poorer residents and to be aimed at controlling the movements and activities of 
young men, increasing resentment of the reforms and of local leaders.  
 
In order to understand and explain the mixed outcomes of CP in Mwanza it is 
necessary to situate contemporary practices in the context of local governance in 
Tanzania. CP reflects historical understandings and practices of ‘participation’ in local 
development, which emphasise the obligation of citizens to contribute towards 
national development. The mtaa government, which was given responsibility for CP, is 
not subject to strong accountability mechanisms, which might have made CP more 
responsive to residents and reduced obstacles to collective action. Local development 
can be highly politicised, and multiparty political competition, reintroduced in 1992, 
means the old ways of organising self-help do not always work.  
 
Partnership between local policing organisations and the state police was largely 
positively received on both sides. However, CP was affected by the broader capacity 
constraints which hinder police performance in other areas and partnership did not 
mitigate, and in some cases reinforced, the unequal outcomes of CP and collective 
action problems within the mitaa.  
 
In the first section of this chapter perceived connections between sungusungu and 
contemporary CP practices are discussed. Although familiarity with the concept of 
sungusungu facilitated introduction of CP, the ways in which participation in and 
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support for sungusungu were sustained are not viable today. The second section 
addresses the importance of histories of local development and the local governance 
context for contemporary CP practices, highlighting parallels with ‘self-help’ and 
participatory development in other sectors and emphasising the impact of party 
political competition on governance in the mitaa. The final section explores how the 
relationships established between state and community police affected the service 
provided, concluding that although CP was generally considered a considerable 
improvement on sungusungu, due to collaboration with the police and respect for state 
law, the police have not been able to mitigate collective action problems in the mitaa or 
the unequal distribution of costs and benefits resulting from CP.  
 
7.1 Sungusungu to ulinzi shirikishi  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (3.4), CP as practised in Tanzania was not based entirely on 
imported ‘western’ models, as has often been the case in other aid recipient countries 
(Brogden 2004). Reformers evoked historical models of local policing, and in particular 
sungusungu, although in its modern form, sungusungu was expected to comply with 
state law and respect human rights. CP was not typically seen by research participants 
as something which had originated abroad and been introduced to Tanzania. Many 
were intrigued to know whether polisi jamii existed outside of Tanzania, and one highly 
committed police sergeant in Mwanza on several occasions invited the author to 
participate in television broadcasts, as he hoped that demonstrating international 
interest in polisi jamii would increase its popularity.  
 
Sungusungu was reflected in contemporary reforms in terms of both the organisational 
model used and often the personnel involved. In all three case sites, people who had 
previously held leadership roles within sungusungu were closely involved in CP,259 as 
‘you need an experienced person, so we are using those who have experience of 
sungusungu.’260 In some mitaa in Mwanza, including mtaa C, Kisukuma terms for the 
sungusungu leadership structure were used, such as ntemi and mtware. The chairman 
explained that ‘tulifuata mfililizo uliokuwepo’ (we followed the system that was already 
in place).261 
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259 This included one female kamanda in A, two security committee members in B and the mtaa secretary 
and chairman of security committee in C. 
260 Interview kamanda-A 2 26.1.11. 
261 Interview Chairman-C 5.7.11. 
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Some residents did not understand ulinzi shirikishi to be something distinct from 
sungusungu.262 For example, one ten-cell leader explained: 
 
It’s not that sungusungu has died. Its name has changed. Now 
we call it ulinzi shirikishi, but it’s origin is sungusungu… there’s 
no difference (Sungusungu si kama imekufa. Ni tuseme jina 
limebadilika. Sasa hivi ndiyo tunaita ulinzi shirikishi, lakini asili yake 
ni sungusungu… tofauti hamna).263 
 
Other ten-cell leaders cited the importance of people having seen the benefits of 
sungusungu in the past,264 and being quickly and easily able to understand and accept 
the concept as it was a reintroduction or development of an old system.265 Thus 
adopting models that approximated that of sungusungu was a convenient option, or a 
‘loophole’,266 for police and local leaders. Leaders had knowledge of an existing 
template for local policing and residents were quickly able to understand what was 
expected of them. As discussed in the previous chapter, it was very rare for residents 
to question the principle of participation in local policing. By using terms associated 
with sungusungu and describing ulinzi shirikishi in similar terms, leaders avoided the 
costs and uncertainty associated with attempting to construct entirely new institutions. 
To some extent ulinzi shirikishi was thus able to ‘piggy-back’ on the familiar idiom of 
sungusungu (Lund 2006b: 692). 
 
The utility of sungusungu structures has been recognised in development interventions 
in a range of sectors, including community based forest restoration (IUCN 2002) and 
wildlife conservation (National Geographic 2013), largely on the basis of their 
‘traditional’ status and proven efficacy. This is most clearly articulated with regard to 
policing in publications of the UN HABITAT sponsored Safer Cities programme 
introduced in Dar es Salaam in 1997, which sought to revive sungusungu to prevent 
crime in the city. Sungusungu were described as ‘proven and promising structures and 
strategies to work through in communities’ (2000: v). However, it is important to 
remember that the ‘success’ of sungusungu in urban Mwanza was largely due to its 
close ties to what was then the country’s only political party, CCM, and the use of 
brutal methods of interrogation and punishment. Eventually the association of 
sungusungu with CCM and the use of violence were instrumental in sungusungu’s 
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262 Sungusungu and ulinzi shirikishi are also often used interchangeably in newspaper articles about CP (e.g. 
Nditi 2012; Guardian Correspondent 2013). 
263 Interview TCL-B 4 16.11.11. 
264 Interview TCL-B 3 6.11.11. 
265 Interview TCL-C 1 15.11.11; TCL-C 2 14.11.11; TCL-C 5 18.11.11; TCL-B 4 6.11.11. 
266 Interview ACP K 25.3.11.  
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decline. Today, CP must operate in a different context, which is explored throughout 
the remainder of this chapter. Firstly ulinzi shirikishi must now work under the 
auspices of the police, and espouse, at least in principle, the importance of human 
rights, and secondly the reintroduction of multipartism has had important implications 
for organising collective action at the local level.  
 
7.2 Local governance and development in Tanzania  
 
Participation in CP in Mwanza was made compulsory through by-laws, and, 
particularly in mtaa A, was maintained through the application of strict sanctions. 
Although they often welcomed improvements in local safety, residents did not 
necessarily see ulinzi shirikishi as a ‘community’ led initiative over which they had 
influence. Suspicions of how public funds were being used were rife. These findings 
should be seen in the context of the history of ‘self-help’ in Tanzania, and the nature of 
local governance at the mtaa level.  
7.2.1 Why participate 1: compulsion and obligation   
 
A brief history of self-help in Tanzania was provided in Chapter 2 (2.4). The historical 
trajectories of participation in local development in Tanzania have produced a 
particular understanding of what participation is and is for, which informs how CP is 
practised today. In contrast to donor justifications for participatory projects which 
emphasise the empowerment of local people and their involvement in decision 
making, Tanzanian expectations of participation, rooted in Nyerere’s concept of self-
reliance (kujitegemea), emphasise the obligation of citizens to contribute labour and 
resources for national development (Marsland 2006). Self-help during the socialist 
period was typically enforced through by-laws and directed towards ends determined 
from above. Citizens were expected to realise their responsibilities, rather than shape 
the direction of local development. Considerable continuities are apparent in 
participatory projects today and local government planning remains largely ‘top 
down’. As was the case for self-help during the one party era, participation in CP was 
enforced through by-laws, threats and occasional violence (see 6.2.4 and 6.5). 
 
The process of introducing CP began with police instructing leaders as to the 
responsibilities of local government and other community members with regard to 
security. This knowledge was then taken back to the mitaa and presented to public 
assemblies where proposed systems of CP were endorsed. As one resident of A 
explained:  
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The office just gave the plan to the community and forced them 
to implement it. There was no consultation. They didn’t even 
hold a meeting. They just sat in their office and decided 
amongst themselves. They told the ten-cell leaders to bring 
names [of people eligible to participate] and said that if people 
didn’t do it they’d be fined. I was told that as a former police 
officer I’d be on the committee, but they never called me.267 
 
After the consent of the community had been obtained at a public meeting (discussed 
further below), the participatory element of ulinzi shirikishi largely entailed popular 
contributions of money or labour, and volunteering information about local crime. 
Difficulties in sustaining CP were often blamed by the mitaa chairmen and ten-cell 
leaders on the community’s lack of understanding of the concept and their 
responsibilities. It was considered necessary that residents receive more education so 
that they would appreciate the importance of CP.268 This perspective was also apparent 
in police narratives about CP, which credited the reforms with having made people 
realise that they shared responsibility for local security with the police. 
 
7.2.2 Why participate 2: personal and group accumulation  
 
The trajectory of CP in mtaa A demonstrated the extent to which community-based 
development is not always distinct from commercial forms of service delivery, and that 
actors involved in local governance may be pursuing personal economic gains. The 
community police initially provided a free service for all residents affected by crime. 
However, the service became gradually more orientated towards providing private 
goods for individuals who could afford to pay, and a certain group of individuals 
assumed the role of patrolling in exchange for financial contributions from others.  
 
This reflects the fact that various forms of ‘voluntary’ or ‘community-based’ 
associational groups already provide many more easily excludable, and thus 
chargeable, services in Mwanza’s low-income mitaa. Participation in providing goods 
and services does not necessarily demonstrate recognition of shared collective 
objectives, but may be a means of pursuing personal or group economic or other 
objectives. Voluntary participatory projects may often thus be assumed to have 
benefits for members, rather than the entire geographically defined community (see also 
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Dill 2009). In a training session for representatives of CBOs from across Mwanza on CP 
and establishing small businesses observed by the author, for example, attendees 
debated the potential for their CBOs to make money through solid waste collection. 
However, it was concluded that in some areas this would not work because the mitaa 
governments were very protective of their monopoly on this lucrative service.269 In 
mtaa A, the chairman was hopeful that he could in the future establish a CBO or NGO 
to improve sanitation in the mtaa. He had already organised for the community police 
to carry out weekly inspections of the area. Whilst the laudable intention was to use CP 
to improve security in a more holistic sense, to include threats to safety from poor 
sanitation, it was also the case that the community police could now impose fines for 
infringements, which they shared with the Ward Health Officer.270 The quasi-
commercialisation of CP in some areas demonstrates the importance of interrogating 
assumptions about the nature of community-based service delivery as opposed to 
other forms of governance. 
 
7.2.3 Accountability, transparency and collective action    
 
The role of the mtaa government in CP is predicated upon the idea that the lowest level 
of local government is ‘karibu na jamii’ (close to the community) (TPF 2008b: 1). The 
assumption that the mtaa leadership will act in ‘community’ interests is emblematic of 
the ‘rather sugary representation of village government’ (Brockington 2008: 122) that 
informs other localised development strategies in Tanzania, such as community-based 
forest management (ibid.). In fact, as discussed above, the mtaa government has often 
acted to enforce local participation in schemes devised elsewhere. Furthermore, 
residents have very limited opportunities to hold their leaders to account.271 Using 
formal accountability mechanisms specified in law can be difficult for residents due to 
the lack of transparency that characterises much of the operation of the mtaa 
government and the potential repercussions of speaking out against leaders who are 
also neighbours.  
 
The legal framework establishing local governance at the mtaa level was outlined in 
Chapter 5 (5.2). Briefly, residents over 18 years of age elect a chairperson and 6 
councillors every 5 years, on a party political basis. Additional sub-committees, such as 
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269 Training observed 19.11.11. 
270 Interview Chairman-A 11.7.11. 
271 Accountability is understood here, following Schedler (1999) as entailing both ‘answerabiity’, referring 
to ‘the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing’, and 
‘enforcement’, referring to ‘the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on powerholders who 
have violated their public duties’ (ibid.: 14).  
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those responsible for health and security, can be formed and members are selected at 
mtaa assemblies, which must be held at least every 2 months. The mtaa government is 
able to formulate by-laws, which are referred to the district level for approval. No 
personnel at the mtaa level receive a salary, with the exception of the MEO who is 
appointed as a secretary to the mtaa committee and paid by the government. Local 
governance arrangements are thus ostensibly democratic, with electoral accountability 
between citizens and their leaders and provisions are made for regular popular 
consultation. However the formal rules mask considerable variation between areas, 
and in practice the lack of transparency and limited opportunities to hold leaders 
accountable permit pursuit of private interests by leaders, which has distorted the 
outcomes of CP and often hindered collective action. As Brockington (2008: 112) 
argues: ‘In practice, in spite of all the presence of these elements of good local 
government, there appears to be little accountability, transparency and justice at work 
in Tanzanian local government.’  
 
The extent to which mitaa governments can be responsive to popular demand is 
constrained by their very limited capacity to form and implement policy. In the 
absence of regular funding, and subject to directives from higher tiers of government, 
the village and mtaa governments are to some extent reduced to being ‘government on 
paper’ (Green 2010a: 26). However, they are still often the first recourse for residents 
seeking to resolve local disputes or facing extreme financial need, although rarely can 
any material assistance be offered (Pallotti 2006, cited in Pallotti 2008: 227). The 
effectiveness and level of activity of village and mitaa governments in Tanzania is 
highly varied, and in many cases governments rarely meet at all (Green 2010a: 25). 
Whether projects are implemented can thus be highly dependent on the abilities and 
preferences of individuals.  
 
As discussed further below, the police strategy for introducing CP in the mitaa relied 
heavily upon mitaa chairpersons who were invited to seminars at which the concept 
was explained. They were then expected to organise public meetings in order to share 
information with their constituents and select leaders for CP. Police, residents and local 
leaders emphasised the importance of the chairman’s own perseverance and 
understanding of CP in whether further steps were taken. One of the polisi kata 
responsible for mtaa A, for example, explained that A was the first mtaa to start CP in 
his area because the chairman, ‘anaelewa zaidi’ (he understands more).272 The chairman 
himself criticised the laziness of other leaders who failed to take action upon 
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information provided by the government.273 The importance of a leader having the 
innate ability to explain concepts to constituents and persuade them to agree to 
proposals was also emphasised by the chairman of C in explaining why not all of the 
mitaa in his ward were practising CP.274 The chairmen of both A and B realised the 
importance of their leadership to the institutions they had created and had doubts 
about the future of CP once they left office.275  
 
Those responsible for CP were supposed to be selected by the wider community, and 
thus subject to some form of electoral accountability. However, the elections, 
conducted at public meetings, entailed a person’s name being proposed, usually a high 
status individual, and achievement of ‘consensus’ on the appointment (c.f. Lange 2008: 
1125). Thus those who claimed to have participated in the selection of the leaders for 
CP did not find it easy to identify criteria they had used to select candidates. Several 
commented that they had not used any criteria as participation meant only confirming 
the person nominated through a show of hands.276 Others described the leaders as 
having been chosen by the mtaa government or chairman,277 meaning that in A where 
the leaders of CP were also members of the mtaa government, ‘walichagua wenyewe 
ofisini’ (they chose themselves in the office).278 Only 13% of those interviewed said they 
had played any role at all in selecting the leaders of CP institutions, despite the fact 
that leaders often described themselves as having been chosen by the ‘community’.  
 
Tanzanian citizens often have very little information about local governance processes, 
particularly regarding collection and use of funds (Kelsall 2004: 57; Brockington 2008; 
Chaliga 2008). Thus increasing the transparency of local governance is a key 
recommendation made by Lawson and Rakner (2005) in their overview of patterns of 
accountability in Tanzania. In all three mitaa, residents were often unclear about the 
organisation of CP, and were especially concerned about how much money was 
collected and how it was used. Survey respondents complained that they could not 
understand why so much money was required and that they had no means of knowing 
whether neighbours were contributing or free riding. In C, over a third (35%) of those 
interviewed were either unaware of the introduction of CP, or knew of the concept but 
not how it was being put into practice.  
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273 Interview Chairman-A 13.1.11. 
274 Interview Chairman-C 5.7.11.  
275 Interviews: Chairman-B 14.2.11; Chairman-A 7.11.11. 
276 Survey respondents: 32; 50; 103.  
277 Survey respondents: 14; 55; 103; 104. 
278 Survey-14. 
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The principal opportunity residents had to solicit information from leaders and 
justification for actions taken was during public meetings, which were legally expected 
to be held at least every two months. However, these typically offer little opportunity 
to subject leaders to answerability or to have an input into local policy making (Shivji 
& Peter 2000: 58; Chaliga 2008; Rabé & Kamanzi 2012). Public meetings are forums 
‘which appear inclusive but within which very few people have authority to speak’ 
(Green 2010b: 1256). Residents often view such forums as an occasion when they are 
informed of decisions that have already been made by mtaa or more senior leaders 
(Rabé & Kamanzi 2012). 
 
Meetings are not always well attended as they require residents to give up a 
considerable amount of time and are sometimes called at very short notice, for example 
the day before the meeting is scheduled.279 The agenda, including whether a leader will 
be selected, is not necessarily known before the meeting. A survey conducted by 
Research for Poverty Alleviation in 2003 found that less than a third of respondents 
(29.95%) had previously participated in a village, mtaa or ward meeting (cited in 
Chaliga 2008: 15). In 2007, only 18% of residents of urban areas other than Dar es 
Salaam reported having been involved in production of a village or mtaa development 
plan (URT 2007: 52).  
 
There is also potential for leaders to abuse their power over the scheduling and 
recording of public meetings. Chaliga (2008: 8), in a study of village and mtaa level 
governance across 6 districts, encountered complaints that villagers often did not hear 
about a meeting until after it had been held or that V/MEOs wrote false reports of 
meetings. Although such allegations were not encountered in the three case sites, some 
did relate their frustration over the lack of reform of CP in A to the chairman’s 
reluctance to call a meeting, claiming that he would not do so as he knew he would 
face opposition to CP.280 Minutes of meetings are sent to the Ward Office without being 
reviewed by any other meeting participants. Leaders may also fail to attend meetings 
to avoid being obliged to explain their actions. 
 
At one meeting observed in mtaa B, for example, allegations of corruption were made 
by one member of the security committee against his colleagues. However, the 
accused, including the mtaa accountant, were not in attendance at the meeting, 
although they had reportedly held a closed meeting with the chairman the previous 
day. In the absence of the accountant, no records of transactions could be shown to 
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280 Interview male participants in CP, mtaa A 27.7.11. 
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residents, despite requests for evidence that no wrongdoing had taken place. The 
debate was halted by rain after 45 minutes and the meeting was abandoned without 
resolution. The earliest date at which another meeting could be held was the following 
Sunday, a week later, as the chairman was occupied with his personal business 
concerns at other times. 
 
Aside from the opportunity to withhold their vote at the following election, the 
potential for residents to exert sanctions on leaders who do not fulfil popular 
expectations is very limited. In A, for example, although some residents made very 
serious accusations about the performance of the community police, including use of 
violence and theft, none had pursued the matter further. This may be related to the 
extent to which local leaders play a mediating role between residents and other state 
organs to which a complaint might be made. Many claimed, for example, that they 
needed a letter from their chairman if they wished to go to the police station. 
 
In addition, residents may be very reluctant to speak out against leaders due to the 
potential future implications for themselves and their families. In a ‘face to face’ society 
the cost of conflicts with neighbours is very high, often resulting in impunity for the 
individual concerned, despite condemnation and distrust resulting from their actions 
(Oliver de Sardan 1999: 30). It is possible that fear of reprisals by local leaders prevents 
reporting of the misdemeanours of public officials (Tanzania Participatory Poverty 
Assessment 2003: 89). Residents rely upon good references from the mtaa committee in 
order to obtain jobs and bank loans and one’s fortunes in a future dispute may depend 
upon the judgement of the individual concerned. In C, for example, although ten-cell 
and sungusungu leaders were willing to explain that many did not trust the former 
chairman of the security committee and were thus reluctant to contribute funds to CP, 
this was not mentioned at a public meeting called to discuss why insufficient 
contributions had been received. The mtware of sungusungu expressed exasperation 
that people were afraid to speak out against this individual and he was able to 
continue in his position as mtaa secretary.281  
 
It is not necessarily the case that the mtaa government is in fact intended to be an 
institution that represents other residents. Green’s (2010a) compelling analysis of 
government and governance in Tanzania illustrates the extent to which village and 
mtaa level government constitutes the representation of central government at the local 
level:  
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What is now presented by the state as an autonomous system of 
local government (serikali ya mitaa), associated with local 
authorities and district councils, continues to convey the local 
representation of central government. This association is to be 
expected. Since independence, successive local government 
reforms intentionally blurred the separation between elected 
local authorities and centrally appointed officials, a distinction 
that has only recently been reimposed. 
                 (Green 2010a: 22) 
 
Local government in Tanzania can appear characterised by the ‘omnipresence of petty 
corruption’ (Rabé and Kamanzi 2012: 64-65). Popular fears and suspicions of 
corruption reduced the willingness of residents to contribute money and made some 
doubt that the community police were acting in the public interest, whilst the failure of 
leaders to implement plans that had been agreed was a source of frustration for some. 
Past experiences of corruption and the failure of initiatives might engender cynicism 
and reduce future willingness to participate (Marsland 2006: 78). The shortcomings of 
downward accountability were not mitigated by oversight from above. As discussed 
below, the police typically communicated primarily with leaders as representatives of 
the jamii (community), and a lack of capacity to closely monitor CP activities in the 
mitaa allowed local authorities considerable discretion.  
 
The limited transparency and meaningful accountability mechanisms within the mitaa 
had negative implications for organising local collective action. The lack of information 
available to residents about the contributions made by others and how money was 
used by leaders, as well as limited opportunities to discuss and resolve nascent 
conflicts, did not generate conditions under which ‘reciprocity, reputation and trust 
can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self interest’ (Ostrom 1998: 
3). Instead, residents were often reluctant to contribute funds due to fears that they 
would be misused and resented what was perceived as the partial application of rules 
that they had little opportunity to influence. 
 
7.2.4 Politicisation of local development 
 
An additional impediment to organising collective action at a local level was the extent 
to which CP and other local development initiatives are associated with party political 
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competition. Whilst there are continuities in the practice of local development, 
discussed above, the shifting political landscape has produced new challenges to the 
legitimacy of local leaders and the organisation of collective activities within mitaa in 
urban Mwanza.  
 
Party political competition and the delivery of local public goods  
 
Although Tanzania’s ruling party, CCM, has retained the presidency and a 
parliamentary majority since the reintroduction of multiparty competition in 1992, the 
elections held in 2010 saw a surge in opposition fortunes, particularly in urban areas 
including Mwanza. Both of Mwanza’s two urban constituencies, Nyamagana and 
Ilemela, were taken from CCM by CHADEMA. CHADEMA was also much more 
successful than in the past at the local level, winning 11 of 21 wards in the city, and a 
CHADEMA affiliated councillor was selected to be mayor.282    
 
Members of mitaa and village governments are elected on a party political basis, and 
there may be multiple parties represented in the mtaa government. The politicisation of 
local development emerged as a significant impediment to organising collective 
participation in CP. Local politicians are keen to take credit for any improvement in 
local conditions in the hope of boosting future electoral prospects, and may thus seek 
to block development initiatives that are likely to be credited to other actors (Marsland 
2006: 73-76; Lange 2008), particularly if they represent an opposing political party 
(Rabé & Kamanzi 2012: 61).283 The association of development policies with the 
governing party should also be understood in the context of the history of local 
development in a one party state discussed in Chapter 2 (2.4), whereby citizens have 
been required to participate in self-help under the direction of the government, which 
was often indistinguishable from CCM. In addition, the ruling party has utilised 
patronage to stimulate community-based development as part of attempts to increase 
its popularity since the introduction of multi-party competition (Kiondo 1994: 60-61). 
 
In this context, CP has been undermined by party political competition at the local 
level, leading the IGP to urge people not to use their political affiliation as an ‘excuse’ 
not to participate (Kazoka 2011b). The principle of ulinzi shirikishi is contested by 
opposition party supporters on the basis that it is a CCM policy aimed at increasing 
support for CCM by improving local safety, and that CP relieves the CCM government 
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which it was decided to establish a separate municipal council for Ilemela and a CCM candidate was 
elected to head the new Nyamagana Municipal Council.  
283 See Fjeldstad (2001: 10) on similar conflicts over the payment of local taxes. 
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of its responsibility to provide security for citizens (Sarya 2009; Guardian on Sunday 
correspondent 2011).284 
 
In the three case sites, the mitaa governments were CCM dominated and party political 
factions did not emerge within the local authorities. However, in mitaa neighbouring 
both A and B, political differences were cited as having directly obstructed the 
formation of community policing initiatives.285 Although they had been able to 
establish CP, leaders in all three mitaa acknowledged that some residents continued to 
associate the policy with CCM.286 The secretary of sungusungu in C, for example, 
claimed that ‘vyama vinasumbua’ (parties cause trouble), as people sometimes protested 
that they could not guard as ‘ni kazi ya CCM, ni wazo wa CCM’ (it’s CCM’s work, it’s 
CCM’s idea).287 Despite claiming that polisi jamii was not political, local leaders did on 
occasion themselves associate the concept with CCM, and alluded to the fact that 
promotion of polisi jamii featured in the party’s 2010 manifesto. For example, at a public 
meeting convened to encourage ten-cell leaders to collect money to fund the 
employment of guards in C, the secretary of sungusungu urged attendees to work 
harder as they were all responsible for the ruling party’s manifesto and anybody who 
did not fulfil their obligations to the party would be replaced.288  
 
It was not only ulinzi shirikishi that was attributed to political motivations. The MEO of 
B explained:  
 
We have lots of good ideas about collective work we could do, 
but there is politics in the minds of the people. When people 
come with an idea for a programme they use it to expand their 
own political influence, so implementation doesn’t work. 
People are worried when you introduce a new programme as 
they think it’s politics coming in. Even when community 
policing was introduced, people said they thought it was the 
idea of one politician wanting to expand his own support.289  
       
In addition to encountering resistance to CP when it was perceived to be a CCM 
electoral strategy, leaders experienced more general opposition to the notion of 
contribution to collective works. Although 90% of survey respondents claimed they 
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284 Also interviews: RPC Mwanza 30.6.11; ACP LK 18.10.11. 
285 Interviews: Chairman-mtaa neighbouring B 13.7.11; MEO-A 15.11.11. 
286 Interviews: Chairman-B 9.12.10; Chairman-A 11.7.11. 
287 Interview secretary of sungusungu-C 23.11.11. 
288 Observation of public meeting, 5.8.11. Also interview Chairman-B 22.2.11. 
289 Interview MEO-B 9.12.10. 
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considered it ‘fair’ to contribute to or participate in CP, in practice the principle of self-
help was frequently challenged. Many of those interviewed felt that since the end of 
the one party era it was more difficult to organise collective development efforts as 
people had the freedom and knowledge necessary to question leaders and refuse to 
participate. This was the experience of ten-cell leaders, but was also noted by police 
officers. In the absence of opposition parties citizens could be forced to comply with 
instructions, whereas today in the multiparty context people had greater freedom,290 
and were more likely to question directives and how money collected is being used 
and to consider providing ‘development’ or policing to be the responsibility of the 
government.291 One former kamanda of sungusungu who is now a ten-cell leader in C 
explained:   
 
The problem now is that people question everything. They 
want to know what any money collected is being used for, 
where the [community] guards are etc. It’s different from 
during the one party era when it was much easier to organise 
things. Now people are better educated and you have to 
explain everything.292 
 
The former chairman of part of mtaa B, who was frustrated at the failure of his 
neighbours to act on exhortations to start CP in the area, compared the period when 
Nyerere was president, and the number of ‘wasomi’ (educated people) was few, 
favourably with the present circumstances, asking: 
 
What can you say to an educated person who has degrees? To 
govern the educated is hard work. The mtaa chairperson is a 
very small person. If you tell somebody something they just ask 
who you are.293 
 
Opposition party members were considered particularly likely to challenge the 
assumption that they should be obliged to participate in providing goods that should 
be provided by the CCM government.294 This forms a stark contrast to when 
sungusungu was first introduced in Mwanza, when people had no choice but to follow 
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291 Interviews: OCS K 20.7.11; TCL-C 5 19.8.11; TCL-B 4 6.11.11; Sgt-Nyamagana 19.11.11. 
292 Interview TCL-C 5 19.8.11. 
293 Interview former chairman of part of mtaa B 6.11.11. 
294 Interviews: TCL-A 2 23.2.11; OCS K 20.7.11; WEO-BT 16.8.11; Sgt-Nyamagana 19.11.11.  
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CCM directives as ‘the party was the government’.295 Opposition party resistance to 
participation in self-help is also reported by Chaliga (2008) and Grawert (2009: 309-
310).   
 
New realities could lead to tension between generations of leaders. The mtware of 
sungusungu in C, for example, complained that the ntemi, an 88 year old man, did not 
understand that it was now necessary to explain policies to people: ‘He thinks you can 
just force people to do things like you could with sungusungu in the past, but it’s not 
like that now’.296  
 
An additional challenge to CP in the multiparty context is the importance of ten-cell 
leaders in organising local collective action. Ten-cell leaders were useful in organising 
ulinzi shirikishi due to their knowledge of other residents and ability to monitor 
participation, as well as performing tasks such as collecting money. However, the 
legitimacy of their role in local governance is sometimes called into question. 
CHADEMA has, for example, decided that its members should elect their own ten-cell 
leaders, and argued that they should enjoy the same level of government recognition 
as those of CCM (Saiboko 2012). 
 
Of the 24 ten-cell leaders interviewed across the three mitaa, 14 (58%) said they 
experienced difficulties in carrying out their roles due to the multiparty system. They 
complained that opposition party supporters do not recognise the authority of the ten-
cell leader and that development initiatives explained by ten-cell leaders are perceived 
as emanating from the ruling party and designed to enhance its popularity. The 
chairman of B also noted that he could not rely upon ten-cell leaders to assist in 
explaining ulinzi shirikishi to the population as opposition party members would 
complain.297 
 
Young people were identified as being particularly likely to question the authority of 
ten-cell leaders and their ‘obligation’ to participate in development activities, partly as 
vijana are deemed more likely to favour opposition parties.298 One ten-cell leader in A 
explained:  
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298 CHADEMA has followed a pro-youth mobilisation strategy and Babeiya (2011: 97) describes the 2010 
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…people are afraid to have [CCM] flags outside their houses 
now.299 After the election, vijana said they would punish the 
ten-cell leaders because they were the ones causing problems in 
the mitaa by supporting CCM. They wanted to punish us as 
they say the ten-cell leaders don’t want change….Very few 
vijana voted for CCM. If you encounter a young man at 6pm on 
the street you feel like you’ve met a lion. The vijana of Mwanza 
are very intimidating (wanatishia sana).300  
        
Thus conflict over local development is not only political but generational. In Nyerere’s 
socialist Tanzania, young people were expected to contribute to nation building 
through voluntary labour (Burgess 2005: xvii). However, claims of duty to the nation 
may hold little sway over urban young people in East Africa today (Burgess & Burton 
2010: 13). Baker (2005; 2007) and Kyed (2010) reach similar conclusions in their studies 
of local policing in Uganda, Rwanda and Mozambique respectively. In Uganda and 
Rwanda younger generations are less willing to make sacrifices in the interests of 
rebuilding the nation than was the case in the immediate aftermath of war (Baker 2005; 
2007). In Mozambique, people volunteered in vigilante movements during the socialist 
period, but are much less willing today to accept that they should provide their labour 
without remuneration, as providing security is increasingly seen as the responsibility 
of a democratic government (Kyed 2010: 22). 
 
Multiparty competition at the local level has the potential to increase the accountability 
of local governance institutions and make it more likely that citizens will act to seek 
redress when they perceive leaders to have erred. On one occasion in mtaa B, for 
example, a CHADEMA member who was selected for the security committee made 
credible public allegations of corruption against his colleagues, identifying his actions 
as part of a wider CHADEMA agenda to end a political culture whereby corruption 
was accepted.301 However, it remains to be seen whether this will become the norm, 
rather than antagonistic partisanship that can block efforts to improve conditions. 
 
Political patronage and community policing 
 
Ulinzi shirikishi has also been linked to political competition through patronage 
relations. There are obvious incentives for ulinzi shirikishi to accept offers of political 
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patronage. They do not receive any regular funding aside from that which can be 
raised through community contributions and the lack of available resources makes it 
very difficult to perform their functions effectively and safely. Thus in A, the uniforms 
worn by the makamanda were donated during the election campaign period in 2010. 
The CCM ward councillor for the area claimed to have provided their belts.302 The 
future implications of patronage ties between CP institutions and politicians may be a 
cause for concern due to the potential for local forms of policing to be instrumentalised 
to some extent by politicians (e.g. Anderson 2002; Baker 2002; Meagher 2007). During 
the most recent general election campaign period in 2010, there were clashes in the 
ward in which mtaa A is located between CP groups who were campaigning for the 
parties of the chairman of their respective mitaa.303  
 
 7.3 Co-producing security in Mwanza 
 
CP as practised in Tanzania entails ‘institutionalised co-production’, defined as ‘the 
provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through regular, 
long-term relationships between state agencies and organised groups of citizens, where 
both make substantial resource contributions’ (Joshi & Moore 2004: 40). Elements of co-
production are apparent in both elements of the community policing strategy: attempts 
to improve relationships and communication between police officers and the 
‘community’, and promotion of citizen groups to provide local security. Citizens 
provided time, financial contributions and information, and police provided some 
education and training and, in theory, processed any apprehended persons in 
accordance with the law. Relationships were apparent across all four of the dimensions 
identified by Baker (2010b: 601-614) in his argument for greater attention to ‘linkages’ 
between state and non-state providers of security: sharing of intelligence; shared 
equipment and training, joint patrols and operations and enrolment. As discussed in 
Chapter 2 (2.2.1), the logic for co-production through CP reflects both the governance 
and logistical imperatives identified by Joshi and Moore (2004: 41).  
 
Police and leaders of CP institutions praised the working relationships between state 
and community police and the improved public image of the police, which facilitated 
intelligence gathering. Partnership with the police and observance of state law were 
frequently cited as making CP better than the sungusungu of the past. However, the 
inequalities in policing provision resulting from CP, continued use of corporal 
punishment and difficulty in sustaining collective participation in CP suggest that co-
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production has not fulfilled its potential to generate ‘an adequate mix [of state and 
non-state action] that does not stifle local participation and yet addresses the good of 
the whole and the particular needs of marginalized groups’ (Tripp 2003: 135). This is 
not necessarily a failure of police policy, as the aims of CP were not to revolutionise 
policing but to make pursuing existing police objectives more cost effective and 
efficient. Despite the criticisms of CP made below, however, it should be remembered 
that in many cases partnerships between the police and community groups have 
improved policing services that were previously available to residents, in some cases 
providing a service where one barely existed before. 
 
7.3.1 Mutual benefits: complementary attributes and incentives for co-
production  
 
The Tanzanian CP strategy envisages co-production based on the complementary 
attributes of the state police and their ‘community’ partners. Neighbourhood CP 
institutions have knowledge of the local population and environment and mobilise 
voluntary labour or financial contributions. The police offer access to resources which 
are highly valued by those involved in CP, including vehicles and automatic weapons, 
and knowledge of policing procedures and use of equipment. They also facilitate the 
interactions of the community police with other public agencies, for example hospitals 
and courts and can sanction those arrested by the community police with incarceration 
and the threat of prosecution. By working with the police, the community police can 
assume ‘legal’ authority for their activities, despite the fact that CP is not incorporated 
into law. 
 
Contemporary partnership is very different from the formerly antagonistic relationship 
between sungusungu and the police, whereby the activities of one actor appeared to 
threaten the livelihoods of the other and their ability to perform their roles. Co-
production has gone a considerable way towards mitigating both the violent excess 
and disregard for due process of sungusungu and the resource poverty of the police 
and their poor relationship with the citizenry. Both police officers and local 
government leaders interviewed recognised the potential benefits of pooling resources, 
reflecting a widespread acknowledgement that the police were too few to provide an 
adequate service over the entire city, and police acceptance of the importance of local 
capabilities. 
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Capitalising upon local resources  
 
The people are better at knowing local information and also 
provide voluntary labour that the police can’t afford. Incidents 
[of crime] are much fewer now. The people committing crime 
were living here, so [local] people knew who they were. Before 
CP it was the responsibility of the police, and this is why there 
were lots of incidents. There was a gap between the people 
doing [criminal] things and the police, and the police can’t 
afford to patrol.304 
 
The positive attitudes of local and senior police officers towards CP, and particularly 
the reduction it brought about in their workload, were discussed in the previous 
chapter. As the chairman of B, a former police officer, remarked: ‘The police like it [CP] 
very much. There is a good relationship. They have less work to do if there is peace.’305 
In addition, improved communication between residents and police was valued for 
facilitating intelligence gathering. Prior to the introduction of polisi jamii, there had 
been a ‘gap’ between the police and the community,306 and citizens feared police or saw 
them as enemies whom they were reluctant to assist.307 Police officers interviewed were 
unanimous in claiming a significant improvement in rates of reporting and willingness 
to communicate with the police as well as greater understanding of their work and 
challenges they face. Several officers mentioned that they could now attend social 
events such as funerals in the area in which they worked.308A particular innovation 
credited with success by both police and civilian participants was the distribution of 
police officers’ mobile telephone numbers (see 3.4.1). 
 
Forming partnerships with alternative policing providers can be problematic for state 
police forces keen to protect ‘what they see as their rightful dominance in the field of 
security’ (Baker 2009a: 378). Senior police officers responsible for CP noted the 
difficulty in altering police culture and that many police officers, ‘think community 
policing means they are being robbed of their police powers…they are far from 
understanding’.309 Police in Dar es Salaam were also initially reluctant to attend public 
meetings, fearing community hostility.310 However, in Mwanza many police have 
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realised the usefulness of sharing their workload and receiving more information from 
citizens. As one kamanda in A recalled:  
 
Now we trust the police and they trust us, but during the 
introduction of polisi jamii there were 
misunderstandings…before the seminars some policemen 
thought we were interfering with their job. But since the 
seminars everybody came to understand that they need each 
other.311 
 
Improved communication between police and communities  
 
The low expectations of police performance held by many residents were discussed in 
the previous chapter (6.1.3), and 41% did not perceive any improvement since CP had 
been introduced. However, over a third (37%) said that they thought the way the 
police carried out their work had improved. Better communication between police and 
citizens due to the distribution of police telephone numbers was deemed important, 
both in reducing police response times and in enabling residents to by-pass ineffective 
local officers. As one resident of A explained: 
 
Polisi wanashirikiana vizuri (the police cooperate well with us). 
You can just call them and they come faster [than previously]. I 
watch the polisi jamii TV show every week. I saw Sirro [the 
RPC] on there and got his number from the show. If you call 
them on the phone direct they will send people straight away. 
Not like before when they would be late.312  
 
41% of those interviewed said they had a phone number through which to contact the 
police, either the recently introduced emergency number or the personal mobile 
number of an officer. The possibility of contacting the police by mobile phone 
significantly reduces the cost of reporting crime in terms of the time and money 
required to travel to a police station. A mobile phone user could report crime 
anonymously, or could contact more senior officers rather than the local station, 
reducing fears that unscrupulous officers would accept a bribe from those arrested and 
reveal the names of witnesses. The former RPC of Mwanza Region, Simon Sirro, stated 
in his first public speech in Mwanza in 2010 that anybody in possession of information 
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who was concerned their testimony may not be kept confidential could contact him 
directly on any of his three personal mobile telephone numbers, which he listed 
(Magubira 2010). Reporting crime thus became less risky as ‘if you don’t trust those at 
the local police station you can go straight to the OCD or RPC’.313  
 
Contacting senior police officers directly is also likely to be more effective as they have 
the ability to marshal scarce resources to deal with a problem quickly as explained by 
one survey participant in A: 
 
If you go to the police they just tell you to arrest the suspect 
yourself….But if you call the RPC or somebody direct then it’s 
better. He will send a car or 2 motorbikes straight away. Polisi 
jamii is really helping.314  
 
7.3.2 ‘Sungusungu shirikishi’315 
 
Sungusungu would beat somebody, even if there was no 
evidence, until they said they had done something. Ulinzi 
shirikishi is better because now if you do something wrong they 
take you to the police and then you go to court. We trust that 
the courts are just (chombo ambacho ni cha haki).316 
 
The working relationship between the police and neighbourhood security groups and 
their compliance with state law led police officers and others to characterise ulinzi 
shirikishi as an improved, ‘modernised’ version of sungusungu. In the past, sungusungu 
and the police were not perceived as mutually dependent, but were often 
conceptualised as being in zero-sum relation to each other: sungusungu dominated 
local provision of crime prevention and resolution, at the expense of the police, the 
judiciary and the observance of state law. In the words of one ten-cell leader from A: 
‘Sungusungu was doing everything locally. After sungusungu died we realised that 
there were police!’317 
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There was some cooperation between sungusungu and the police in urban Mwanza, as 
noted in Chapter 5 (section 5.4). However, mutual suspicion generated uadui (enmity), 
whereas today ‘wakawa marafiki’ (they have become friends).318 Suggesting the 
previously unexplored potential for co-production to improve local policing, one ten-
cell leader in C explained, ‘If we could have seen the shortcomings of sungusungu, we 
could have talked to the police and rectified it and it might have survived.’319  
 
A common narrative described ulinzi shirikishi as constituting an improved version of 
sungusungu due to their adherence to the law, and particularly rules regarding 
requirements for evidence and the treatment of suspects. Whilst sungusungu beat 
suspects until they confessed, regardless of available evidence, the community police 
‘bemebelezana’ (coax, persuade),320 and have greater awareness of the law and human 
rights. Community policing thus entails a ‘modernised’ version of sungusungu,321 or 
sungusungu structures combined with education about human rights.322  
 
This view was not universally held and for a small minority the reliance of community 
policing upon collaboration with a police force deemed ineffective and corrupt was 
seen as a weakness in comparison to sungusungu.323 However, this reflected 
dissatisfaction with police performance and disregard for the law, rather than rejection 
of the idea that the community police should operate in accordance with state law. 
 
7.3.3 Practical and material support for CP: ‘It’s not community policing, it’s 
just the community’324 
 
Police offered some practical assistance to local crime prevention initiatives. The 
community police could call upon the police when they deemed a situation to be 
beyond their capacity. Mobile phone contact enabled the community police to quickly 
request support when they anticipated danger or had received reports a crime was 
likely to be committed. Patrols conducted with the police were believed to be safer for 
volunteer participants as officers present were armed with guns. In both A and B the 
community police had also received some training from police on how to safely 
approach and arrest suspected offenders and police could grant free healthcare for 
participants who were injured during a patrol. Police could also assist local leaders in 
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preventing free riding by imposing punishments including incarceration. However, the 
limited and irregular nature of police inputs meant the bulk of the burden of CP rested 
with local leaders and communities. The CP policy thus increased the responsibilities 
of the mtaa government without increasing available resources, reflecting a general 
trend in recent local government reforms in Tanzania  (Pallotti 2008). 
 
Police acknowledged that once they had given seminars for mitaa chairman, WEOs and 
MEOs, whether ulinzi shirikishi would be implemented was largely dependent upon 
the preferences and ability of these leaders.325 There was little follow up to ascertain 
whether a chairperson had taken action and no penalties for failing to do so. The 
resulting variation in the extent to which CP was practised led to considerable 
differences in local safety between neighbouring areas due to the highly spatialised 
nature of CP preventative activities, which focused on patrolling a particular 
geographic area.  
 
Once CP was established, material inputs from police were minimal. One kamanda in A 
argued that strengthening CP ‘would really help the police, but they expect us to do it 
without giving us anything to support us.326 Participants were typically poorly 
equipped and obliged to put themselves in potentially dangerous situations. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, reliance on community contributions placed a 
considerable burden on residents in difficult economic circumstances and was 
sometimes untenable. The resource constraints facing the police in Mwanza made it 
unlikely that any emergency assistance could be provided in a timely manner.327 
 
Leaders in mtaa A also claimed that police sometimes failed to support CP due to 
laziness.328 The chairman and WEO alleged that police resented the financial 
implications of CP’s success. As was the case when sungusungu took over local 
policing, police had fewer opportunities to extract rent from handling minor cases.329 
 
Many residents suggested CP could be improved through additional police support, 
such as the presence of an armed officer during patrols, additional training for 
participants or that government should provide allowances for the guards.330 A similar 
picture emerges from research in urban Malawi which found neighbourhood watch to 
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be more durable where groups were accompanied by an armed police officer for their 
own protection and to instil a sense of shared purpose (Cammack & Kanyongolo 2010: 
16).  
 
Leaders proposed additional financial or other incentives that the government could 
provide which would mitigate the collective action problems faced in their mitaa. The 
chairman of A suggested a monthly subsidy for each mtaa to enable payment of the 
guards, with the additional objective of reducing unemployment among male youth.331 
The chair of B, a retired police officer, organised meetings with district police in 
Mwanza to discuss making the status of participation in CP equivalent to that of the 
JKT, or national service, which serves as a recruiting pool for the army and the police 
force. He anticipated that enhancing the job prospects associated with CP would make 
recruitment of local guards easier.332  
 
Monitoring of ulinzi shirikishi was also limited. Police oversight and training might 
have been a means of reducing potential abuse of policing powers and the use of 
corporal punishment by CP groups (Baker 2010b: 609). However, there is little top-
down oversight of CP activities by police and the community police retained 
considerable discretion. CP groups formed in Nyamagana District of Mwanza are 
recorded in a database only due to the enthusiasm of one police sergeant, who uses his 
own personal laptop for the purpose. However, subsequent monitoring of activities 
depends on reporting by the groups themselves or the polisi kata, who, as discussed 
below, may only rarely visit the mitaa for which they are responsible. Of course, closer 
monitoring of the community police by state police would not necessarily result in 
reduced incidence of extra-judicial punishment, given the poor record of the state 
police in this regard, and, as discussed below, the police may in some cases have 
colluded with community police in wrongful arrests.  
 
7.3.4 Personalised and patronage-based relationships between police and 
communities 
 
The lack of institutionalised resource transfers between the state and CP institutions 
meant that where police and community police were working together this was the 
result of personalised relationships between individuals. These were often predicated 
upon unsustainable patronage rather than predictable interactions that might have 
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facilitated the organisation of collective action in the mitaa and cemented trust between 
participants and the police.333 
 
The extent to which police officers pursued a community policing agenda was highly 
varied. The costs of delivering training on CP, such as transport and photocopying, 
were borne by individual officers, meaning that an officer needed to have ‘moyo’ [heart, 
commitment] if they were to promote CP.334 Attending to CP tasks, such as visiting 
mitaa offices, also had to be fitted in amongst other regular work, which could be 
difficult. The recently appointed polisi kata for the ward in which C is located 
explained: 
 
The plan is to spend 2 hours in [the ward] each day, but I’m 
very much occupied with my other duties and get tired from 
my other work. Who knows where the time goes? I have the 
phone numbers of the ward leaders so if I’m too tired to go 
there I can just phone them.335 
  
Neither the ntemi nor the mtware leading sungusungu in C were aware of the identity of 
their ward police officer. Similarly, the polisi kata responsible for B credited polisi jamii 
with having made his job easier, but complained:  
 
Still, the area is big and there is no transport….so how are you 
supposed to go to the different mitaa to get information? We 
have to take a dala dala [minibus taxi], a motorbike taxi or a taxi 
and pay for it ourselves. It’s difficult. And sometimes if I’m 
tired, I don’t want to go.336 
 
Often public servants in Tanzania receive per diems in excess of a normal day’s wages 
for attending meetings with communities or other ‘stakeholders’ (Green 2003: 133-134). 
However this was not the case for police as CP was not supported by a wealthy 
international donor.  
 
If positive working relationships were formed between CP institutions and police 
officers, these were liable to be highly vulnerable to disruption due to the frequent 
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transfers of personnel within the TPF, between departments and locations. A police 
officer who is frequently transferred is also unlikely to develop extensive knowledge of 
the population amongst whom they are posted. There is little incentive to invest time 
in developing strong relationships with communities when a placement may be only 
short term. The ward police officers responsible for each of the case sites were all 
moved and replaced during the fieldwork period. A similar picture emerged at more 
senior levels. For example, the officer responsible for CP across Mwanza Region 
changed three times during the fieldwork period. 
 
The disruption caused by transfers of police officers was compounded by the fact that 
informal patronage relationships were a vital means through which CP institutions 
could gain access to resources. For example, the chairman of B and his community 
guards had received 100,000 TSH towards their activities from the former Mwanza 
RPC.337 One-off donations made by senior police or politicians, including President 
Jakaya Kikwete (Chilongola 2012), to local policing groups are regularly reported in 
Tanzanian newspapers.  
 
However, such arrangements were liable to end in disappointment. The former RPC, 
for example, had also pledged to attempt to secure daytime employment for B’s guards 
in order to allow them to supplement the irregular income received from community 
contributions. In late 2010 the chairman still had hope the promised assistance would 
be forthcoming. However, the RPC was transferred in July 2011. Similarly, the OCD of 
Nyamagana District pledged to provide some equipment, such as batons, to the 
community police in mtaa A, but was transferred before fulfilling his promise.338 
Relationships with other branches of government have been similarly patronage based 
and resulted in disillusionment. For example, the former RC of Mwanza Region visited 
B in early 2011 and promised the community police that he would work for changes to 
the recruitment procedures for the JKT (national service) that would lead to those who 
had participated in CP being prioritised, thus gaining privileged access to police and 
army recruitment. However, by August it was felt that ‘he cheated us’ as the 
recruitment period for 2011 had passed with no further news.339  
 
7.3.5 Who speaks for the community?   
 
Although police do on occasion attend public meetings to address residents, most of 
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the communication between police and communities occurs through the mtaa 
leadership. CP was to some extent subject to ‘elite capture’ (e.g. Crook 2003; Platteau 
2004; Dasgupta & Beard 2007), most clearly in mtaa A, and this was certainly the 
perception of some residents who felt that CP ‘only helps the leaders’.340 In all three 
mitaa existing leaders were influential in determining the key objectives of CP, which 
led to attempts to control the movements and activities of young people, discussed in 
the previous chapter (6.4.2). The police reinforced these strategies, and, as elsewhere, 
CP has led to the formation of alliances between police and willing local elites to 
control the ‘dangerous classes’ (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 161; see also Ruteere and 
Pommerolle 2002). This is not a failure of implementation. As Baker (2009: 82-3) 
observes of CP reforms in post-conflict Africa, the police had no intention or 
expectation that those who lead local policing institutions should be anyone other than 
existing elites.  
 
Despite the publication of police phone numbers and associated improvements in 
communication, the idea that citizen access to the police should be mediated through 
the mtaa chairperson was prevalent. Survey participants frequently commented that 
they would prefer to report crime to the chairperson who would then provide a letter 
to be taken to the police station. This was considered to be the appropriate procedure, 
as ‘you can’t go from a house like this straight to the police’.341 The MEOs and 
chairpersons were also those who had attended police seminars and were tasked with 
educating the community about ulinzi shirikishi. Police derived much of their 
information about ‘community’ needs from leaders. This account of elements of his job 
given by the ward police officer responsible for B is illustrative:  
 
I visit the mitaa to get information. I talk to the MEO, the 
chairman and ask what news there is. I get information about 
any groups of people smoking marijuana. They might mention 
places where people are going to smoke and we can then visit 
with the car. We get information about certain suspects.342  
 
By authorising local leaders to take measures to secure their areas, police increased the 
powers exercised by typically senior leaders over young people who were deemed to 
threaten order in the mtaa. The assumptions made by the large majority of residents 
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about likely perpetrators of crime were shared by local police.343 Local concerns about 
‘idle’ youth in the area led to police operations to remove young men congregating in 
public space in the three case sites and elsewhere,344 after which ‘there is no more 
kijiwe’ (congregation in a particular place).345 In mtaa C, the sungusungu leadership had 
‘joined hands’ with the police to combat perceived youth criminality in the area,346 and 
leaders were able to threaten those against whom they had no evidence of wrongdoing 
that the police would quickly be able to establish a case by ‘finding’ illicit substances in 
their possession.347 Even in B, where the guards were themselves young men, the 
chairman told his guards that should they fail to report for duty in the future he would 
report them to the police as known troublemakers, emphasising that they could be 
kept at the police station for up to 21 days.348  
 
7.3.6 Police objectives for CP 
 
Whilst limited resources and capacity have affected the extent to which police can 
support and monitor local policing groups, police objectives for and understandings of 
CP have also informed the way in which working relationships between community 
and state police have developed. Reduction of costs and greater efficiency have been 
prioritised over ‘democratising’ policing. Thus in Nelson and Wright’s (1995) terms, 
participation in ulinzi shirikishi has been understood by local police as a means rather 
than an end. CP helps to achieve aims ‘more efficiently, effective or cheaply’, rather 
than enabling communities to establish processes to control their own development 
(ibid.: 1).  
 
The first public address made by Mwanza’s former RPC upon appointment to the post 
is quite revealing regarding how CP has been understood in Mwanza. The RPC stated 
that security in residential areas was primarily the responsibility of mitaa chairpersons, 
urging them to form their own security groups to patrol their neighbourhoods. He also 
encouraged residents to cooperate with the police by reporting criminals living in their 
areas and urged business owners and others to consider donating motorbikes and 
other equipment to the police (Magubira 2010). Thus responsibility for neighbourhood 
security is delegated to local government leaders, whilst citizens are also reminded of 
their responsibilities in crime prevention, including providing information to police 
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and making donations when possible. When explaining the need for CP, police place 
considerable emphasis on the lack of police manpower, which makes participating in 
CP a responsibility of citizens. This is illustrated by an excerpt from a training session 
provided by a police sergeant in Mwanza for members of a CBO: 
 
Sgt: A challenge that emerges in starting polisi jamii is that 
people ask, ‘if we start to guard ourselves, what will the police 
do? What will they be getting paid for?’ But this isn’t just a 
policy that we’ve decided to adopt. It’s the law! Guarding 
yourselves is enshrined in the constitution…. The government 
has made the mtaa government responsible for all development 
in the mtaa, and can you have development if it’s not peaceful?  
 
Female attendee: So you are saying it’s the right of every person 
to protect themselves?  
 
Sgt: It’s not a right! It’s a responsibility!349  
 
The role of the police in neighbourhood security arrangements is not intended to go far 
beyond the provision of ‘expert’ advice when necessary: 
 
Polisi jamii is the property of the people, not us… We advise, we 
explain, but it belongs to them.350 
       
Thus variation between the performance of CP institutions is seen as dependent upon 
the individual chairperson involved, who is responsible for acting upon the 
explanations provided by the police, or upon how well people have understood what 
the police have told them.351 
 
Police acknowledge that CP is a way to tackle crime cheaply. Meeting the demands of 
leaders of neighbourhood security groups for allowances, equipment and joint patrols 
with officers would not be in accordance with this strategy. As one police sergeant 
explained during a television broadcast designed to educate citizens about CP, it is 
envisaged as a way of eradicating crime in Tanzania, ‘without costing anything’.352 
Local policing has been mostly delegated to neighbourhood groups, reducing police 
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workload and easing pressure on limited resources, leading the chairman of B to boast, 
‘now there is no need for any police presence in the mtaa’.353  
 
Improvements in interactions between police and the public were largely understood 
as a means of improving intelligence gathering. The OCS of one Mwanza police 
station, for example, explained that ward police officers had been instructed that they 
should attend and contribute towards local funerals, as this would enable the officer to 
extract information from residents more easily.354 Police may often view consultation 
with the public, institutionalised through CP programmes, as a means of intelligence 
gathering (e.g. Schärf 2001; Baker 2008a; Minnaar 2009). As Hills (2012a: 8) observes of 
the town of Kaduna in Nigeria, ‘community policing is about residents giving 
information to officers, rather than officers providing a service to residents.’  
 
The expectations police have of ulinzi shirikishi should be understood as part of a wider 
context of state expectations of self-help. As Dill (2009: 730) argues with regard to 
CBOs in Dar es Salaam:  
 
…a CBO’s raison d’être was to assist the government. This view 
should not be unexpected given the historical legacy of state-
society relations in Tanzania. The state does not actively direct 
CBOs in this regard, but rather expects CBOs to benefit the state 
as a result of their self-help activities. 
 
The apparent contradiction between ‘community’ and police understandings of how 
CP should be organised is prefigured by the divergent preferences of state and local 
actors over self-help in the 1960s and 70s identified by Jennings (2003: 182): 
 
The state’s perception of self-help was one of state-led and 
state-directed efforts by local communities in the 
implementation of schemes designed to fit in with, and 
promote, the objectives of the state. It was a way to effect 
change and modernisation in a context of minimal resources. 
For the peasantry, self-help implied not state-led development, 
but rather state-supported: the role of government was to 
provide the materials, funds and technical advice required to 
meet the needs and wishes of the individual community. 
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7.4 Conclusion  
 
The previous chapter argued that CP as practised in Mwanza demonstrates the 
‘ambivalence of success’ (Cleaver & Toner 2006: 216), whereby the service provided 
was typically highly valued, but proved difficult to sustain, was not necessarily 
responsive to the community and did not produce equitable outcomes. In this chapter 
these outcomes were explained in terms of the accountability deficits that characterise 
local governance in Tanzania and dominant understandings of participation as either 
an obligation or a means of obtaining club goods. The intensification of party political 
competition in Mwanza constitutes a challenge to these established patterns of the 
governance of local development, however, and it is not yet clear whether this will 
lead to more accountable provision of collective goods or will continue to result in 
obstruction of implementation of policies as is presently the case.  
 
CP strategies have made some contribution towards mitigating the collective action 
problems affecting relationships between police and citizens. In particular the ability of 
residents to contact senior officers or to remain anonymous when reporting a crime by 
mobile telephone appears to reduce the risks associated with reporting crime. 
However, partnership with the police has done little to address collective action 
problems within the mitaa, aside from enabling local leaders to threaten other residents 
with imprisonment for non-participation, or to support community capacity with 
material inputs. Nor has police oversight prevented the use of violence by community 
police or challenged the extent to which CP has restricted the freedom of some mtaa 
residents. From a police perspective, this does not necessarily constitute a weakness of 
the reforms, as CP is envisaged as being a low cost policing strategy and police 
interests are largely aligned with those of existing leaders. CP is a means of making 
citizens understand their responsibility for local crime prevention, rather than 
reorienting policing towards community priorities.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Community policing is lauded by senior police and in police annual reports as one of 
the most successful elements of the ongoing police reform programme to date, albeit it 
is acknowledged that obstacles to implementation remain. From a police perspective, 
success is indicated by higher rates of reporting crime and donations received from 
businesses and other organisations. By delegating responsibility for neighbourhood 
security to groups of organised residents local police reduce their workload and the 
strain placed on limited police resources. Ulinzi shirikishi is a cheap and effective way 
of reducing crime. From the perspective of citizens, however, for whom CP has 
entailed obligations as well as rights, and costs as well as benefits, a more ambiguous 
picture emerges.  
 
CP was valued by residents of low and middle-income areas in Mwanza for having 
reduced neighbourhood crime rates and providing a local service which had not 
previously been available. However, CP was not the responsive, equitable, sustainable 
and ‘democratic’ form of local policing assumed by international advocates. Rather, CP 
was practised in ways more consistent with local governance in Tanzania and often 
entailed coercion, the pursuit of private interests and discrimination against certain 
groups. The ‘community-based’ character of CP has not necessarily made it a more 
responsive or accountable alternative to the state police.  
 
These dilemmas are revisited in this concluding chapter, which suggests that the 
‘policing’ element of CP, whereby a service has been extended into areas in which it 
was not previously available, has been more successful than any attempt to make 
policing more ‘community’ oriented or to give a voice to those previously 
disadvantaged by state policing. Where CP has been sustained this is largely due to the 
extent to which it has assumed practices associated with ‘government’, for example 
utilising legislation to enforce participation. The ‘community’ character of CP can be 
said to refer mainly to the fact that the service must be provided by communities 
themselves with little material support from the state.  
 
8.1 Ulinzi shirikishi and local security 
 
CP is largely credited by residents with having improved their personal security, and 
that of their property, in their neighbourhoods and homes. For many, CP provides a 
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welcome supplement to state policing, and in some places is so effective at preventing 
crime that, ‘there is no need for any police presence in the mtaa’.355 It was largely 
accepted by citizens that they had a role to play in ensuring the security of their 
neighbourhoods, in light of the severe resource constraints facing the police. 
‘Participation’ is ubiquitous in local development in Tanzania and, as discussed 
throughout the thesis, there is a long history of mobilising citizens in the interests of 
local security.  
 
After some initial difficulties in accepting that their professional mandate was to be 
shared with the public, police in Mwanza were typically enthusiastic in their praise for 
CP, recognising that delegating local policing to communities had both greatly reduced 
their workload and reduced crime. Officers also claimed that rates of reporting crime 
had increased and that public fear of the police was reduced. Some strategies adopted 
as part of CP have been particularly successful in addressing collective action problems 
that have limited cooperation between police and the public in the past. For example, 
publicising the mobile phone numbers of senior and local police officers was claimed 
to have reduced the risks associated with reporting crime.  
 
The working relationships between police and their community counterparts are 
mostly valued, particularly when compared to the ‘enmity’ that characterised police 
interactions with sungusungu. Although community police sometimes exacted their 
own punishments on perceived wrongdoers, and participation was sometimes 
reported to be the result of violent coercion, the use of violence is not systematic as it 
was under sungusungu, who ‘did their investigation with a stick’.356 
 
These achievements should not be under-stated: reformers had to contend with a long 
history of police-public relations characterised by mistrust and hostility, partisan and 
often brutal policing and a poorly paid and motivated police force. In contrast to 
Brogden & Nijhar’s (2005: 161) assessment of donor-driven CP reforms in Africa as 
having been ‘planted, watered – and then died’, the idea of CP has proved highly 
resilient in Tanzania. CP is certainly not seen as a foreign import without applicability 
to local conditions. This is partly due to the efforts of highly committed senior police 
leading the reforms, who carried out extensive local consultation and have rendered 
the concept meaningful for a local audience in Kiswahili. In addition, the local leaders 
who participated in the research shared a genuine desire to improve living conditions 
for themselves and their neighbours, and devoted considerable time and energy 
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towards this end. CP is not ‘irrelevant’ (Brogden 2005), and has proved highly 
compatible with existing modes of local governance and understandings about citizen 
participation in governance. However, this has problematic implications for the likely 
durability of local CP arrangements and the equity and responsiveness of the service 
provided.   
 
8.2 Organising local collective action through ulinzi shirikishi  
 
There is considerable variation between neighbouring mitaa with similar crime rates 
and socio-economic and demographic profiles, in terms of the extent to which CP has 
been institutionalised and sustained. Whilst initiating local policing practices might be 
a ‘rational response to growing insecurity’ (Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009: 2) from a 
collective standpoint, this perspective neglects the costs to individuals of participating 
in CP, which frequently disincentivised contribution towards the collective good. 
Although in two of the case sites, these collective action problems were overcome 
reasonably well, the case study illustrated the problem of assuming ‘communities’ to 
have ‘latent and unlimited capacities … [that] will be unleashed in the interests of 
development’ (Cleaver 1999: 604). In practice, it proved quite difficult to 
institutionalise CP, in terms of developing mutually understood and predictably 
enforced rules and/or social norms which incentivised cooperation and shaped 
individuals’ expectations about the likely behaviour of others in a given situation 
(Ostrom 2005). Although rules stipulating the roles of leaders and other residents in CP 
were adopted in all three case sites, compliance was often not monitored and rules 
were not predictably enforced. The thesis emphasised two particular features of local 
governance in Tanzania that frustrated the development of norms of reciprocity and 
trust that might have led individuals to cooperate in CP  (Ostrom 2000).   
 
Firstly, local governance lacks transparency and residents have limited capacity to hold 
leaders to account. Residents had very little information about how public money was 
being used, and memories of abuse of funds in the past, led to suspicions of corruption, 
which reduced popular willingness to contribute to CP. The lack of clarity about how 
much money was being collected and whether other residents were contributing, and 
lax enforcement of agreed rules, both provided opportunities for free-riding and 
hindered the development of norms of reciprocity around making contributions to CP, 
meaning that where CP did endure this was a result of an unpopular ‘top down’ 
sanctions regime. Participation determined by rules that have been imposed with little 
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popular input, and perceptions that some were contributing more than others are not 
likely to be conducive to sustainable collective action (Ostrom 2000: 150). 
 
Secondly, local development is highly politicised in Tanzania. Bringing ‘development’ 
to constituents is an advantage in future electoral competition (Marsland 2006; Lange 
2008). Local politicians, eager to prevent their rivals from taking credit for a successful 
innovation, sometimes frustrated efforts to introduce CP and urged supporters of the 
political opposition to reject demands to perform tasks that were the responsibility of 
the government. The association of CP with ruling party politics was strengthened by 
the legacy of decades of government directed ‘self-help’ during the one party era and 
the co-optation of local voluntary organisations, including sungusungu, by CCM.  
 
In addition, CP tended to place particularly heavy burdens on the relatively poor. 
Patrolling was not an activity for the wealthy, but was reserved for ‘sisi wadogo’ (us 
little people).357 Thus, rather than being a means of enhancing social cohesion as 
envisaged by the official police strategy (TPF 2008b), CP sometimes intensified local 
conflicts, around party political, socio-economic and generational (see 8.4) cleavages.  
 
8.3 Ulinzi shirikishi as a low-cost crime prevention strategy: who bears the costs?  
 
For the police, ulinzi shirikishi offers a low cost means of providing local security, in 
which the onus is placed on community-level organisation and the role of the police is 
to offer advice and expertise. In reality, however, policing requires equipment and 
takes time that could otherwise be spent on income generating activities. The 
partnerships between local policing groups and the police were not predicated upon 
institutionalised transfers of resources and remained highly personalised and 
vulnerable to disruption, leaving local actors dependent upon resources they could 
obtain locally or on securing unpredictable patronage from senior police or politicians. 
It is not easy to raise funds in low-income areas. As one CP kamanda in mtaa A 
lamented: ‘the government says just go to the community around you, and when you 
go to the community they say they don’t have money.’358 CP illustrates what Dill 
(2010b: 622) describes as a ‘paradox of community-based service delivery’:  
 
The strength of local organisations, namely their independence 
from the state and roots in the community, is also their 
shortcoming. The magnitude of many issues requiring 
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community involvement…is much greater than can be solved 
by community initiatives and resources alone. 
 
It is the relatively poor who are obliged to bear the greatest burden as a result of the 
delegation of policing to ‘communities’. CP has different implications depending on 
your wealth: whilst the well off may give police money to purchase fuel or help an 
individual officer to pay school fees, the relatively poor are obliged to participate in 
onerous and potentially dangerous night patrols. This stratification of participation is 
not unprecedented, and very similar outcomes were observed when sungusungu 
patrols were promoted in socio-economically diverse urban areas.  
 
In addition to placing considerable strain on community resources and capacity, 
relying upon volunteers meant that economic incentives could distort the objectives of 
local policing away from providing collective goods. As has been observed in 
neighbouring Mozambique (Kyed 2010: 22), there is a need to consider whether 
voluntarism is a realistic principle upon which to base CP services, particularly as 
policing offers opportunities for economic accumulation. It was widely accepted that 
community police should be compensated for their work, and it is likely that the 
potential for individual or group economic gains was an important factor in whether 
CP was started at all. However, the monetarisation of policing tended to undermine 
some of the assumed benefits of community-based services, for example that they will 
be a cheap option for users (e.g. Baker 2012: 288) and will provide a more equitable 
service (e.g. Dongier et al. 2003).  
 
8.4 For whom did CP improve security, and from whom or what?  
 
Crime prevention patrols provided some collective benefits to mtaa residents, who felt 
safer in their neighbourhoods and homes. However, security is not only an entitlement 
of citizens, but also a ‘process of political and social ordering, maintained through 
authoritative discourses and practices of power’ (Luckham & Kirk 2012: 10). Although 
CP entailed the delegation of power to communities, it did not challenge existing 
inequalities or hierarchies within geographic communities, which privilege seniority. 
Thus for many young people, CP may have been experienced largely as an 
intensification of the ability of older local leaders to impose restrictions on their liberty, 
and sometimes inflict violent punishment. For some residents, the delegation of 
policing powers to local government did not constitute empowerment, but rather a 
means of ‘decentralizing repression’ (Ruteere & Pommerolle 2002).  
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CP is predicated upon the ‘myth of community’ (Gujit & Shah 1998) and the 
assumption that those who live within a particular geographic area have shared 
interests and objectives that can be met through greater participation in service 
delivery. However, in practice, CP illustrated the extent to which ‘much of what is 
considered “participatory” is more a process whereby large numbers of people are 
represented by a relatively small group of participants’ (Hickey & Mohan 2004: 19). In 
Mwanza, police communicated with ‘communities’ almost entirely through local 
leaders who were invariably relatively senior residents. This was the case even when 
youths were the ones who carried out local policing and were in a privileged position 
regarding knowledge of neighbourhood crime. This was not a failure of 
implementation. Police intolerance of ‘idle’ young men in urban areas has been well 
documented historically and in the present (see 3.2.4) and in Mwanza police reportedly 
colluded with their community counterparts in the harassment and false arrest of 
vijana. As has been observed elsewhere, CP enabled police to co-opt local elites, 
reinforcing control over ‘Africa’s “dangerous classes”’ (Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 161). 
 
8.5 The ‘ambivalence of success’.359 
 
The ‘successes’ of CP, from the perspective of police and citizens, relate largely to 
‘policing’ outcomes, rather than the ‘community’ oriented character of the service 
provided. CP facilitated crime prevention and made residents feel safer in their 
neighbourhoods, but was not necessarily more accountable or responsive than state 
policing. In some areas, community police have been accused of the same failings 
frequently attributed to the state police: soliciting bribes, wrongful arrest, use of 
excessive force and lack of sensitivity when dealing with the public. One might query 
what is ‘community’ about CP, aside from the fact that it is the community who must 
provide labour and material inputs. In this sense, CP forms part of a long history of 
‘top down’ forms of self-help in Tanzania, whereby local participation becomes an 
obligation to contribute towards ‘development’, as directed by the government. 
 
Making local policing more accountable, sustainable and equitable will probably be 
contingent upon wider long-term changes to the system of local governance in the 
mitaa and within the police force. At present, however, the operation of CP is deemed a 
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governance in Uchira, in Tanzania’s Kilimanjaro Region. Although community-based water management 
has improved access to water, local level management has not necessarily enhanced ‘community 
ownership’ or improved the equity of outcomes.   
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success in terms of police objectives, and for many the problems associated with CP do 
not negate the benefit of being free from fear of crime.  
 
8.6 Sungusungu to ulinzi shirikishi 
 
Promotion of ulinzi shirikishi was facilitated by the similarity of the concept and the 
organisational model to older forms of local ‘self-policing’ through sungusungu. 
However, the extent to which CP today can be considered a successful reintroduction 
of a ‘traditional’ form of local policing (c.f. Safer Cities 2000; Assiago n.d.) is 
questionable, particularly in urban areas. Although sungusungu in Mwanza did reflect 
some of the more ‘traditional’ elements of sungusungu organisation, such as the oathing 
of leaders, it was also closely linked to ruling party organisations and the 
mobilisational strategies of CCM. It is these ‘traditions’, which appear more relevant to 
CP today (see also Kyed 2010 on Mozambique).   
 
Although the thesis emphasised historical continuities in modes of local governance, 
the increased competitiveness of multi-party politics in Mwanza, suggested by the 
election in 2010 of two opposition party candidates to represent the city in parliament, 
is also apparent at the local level and may undermine existing authoritative 
institutions, and in particular the ten-cell leaders. Residents, and especially the young, 
are questioning the extent to which they can be obliged to comply with government 
policies that require them to provide labour or financial contributions. CP is operating 
under very different circumstances from sungusungu, when ‘the party was the 
government’.360  
 
8.7 Wider significance of the findings  
!
This thesis adopted a non-normative approach to governance, in terms of whether 
state or non-state actors should be responsible for providing collective goods and 
services (see 2.6.1), and the potential for citizen participation in service delivery to 
improve outcomes was acknowledged (see 2.2). Indeed it is recognised that some kind 
of community-based policing solution may at times be the most desirable option for 
citizens in light of the pervasive mistrust that typically characterises relations between 
the public and the police in Africa. However, the conclusions drawn in this chapter 
illustrate four important critiques of participatory or community-based development 
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strategies (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2), which should be given 
consideration by governments and others promoting such forms of local governance, 
including CP. The extent to which the Tanzanian police reforms have been internally 
driven and free of donor influence is relatively unusual in the region and amongst 
other developing countries, however, similar findings emerge from studies of 
participatory or community-based development and CP in a wide range of contexts. 
The four points outlined below illustrate a broader argument regarding the importance 
of avoiding assumptions about the inherent characteristics of ‘state’, ‘informal’, ‘non-
state’ or ‘community’ actors, which should instead, ‘first be understood within a 
specific context, and then evaluated for positive and negative consequences’ (CFS 2010: 
11).  
 
Firstly, naïve assumptions regarding the capacity of ‘communities’ to cooperate in 
order to initiate development projects should be tempered by an appreciation of the 
collective action problems that may frustrate attempts to provide collective goods. The 
Tanzanian case presented here suggests that, despite widespread agreement on the 
benefits of organising community patrols, CP proved very difficult to sustain. The 
limited sustainability of community-led policing is not unique to Tanzania, and 
difficulties in sustaining voluntary participation in policing activities have been 
observed in countries including Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
Uganda (see Baker 2009b: 80-82). Where rules are not enforced consistently and 
transparently, and in the absence of meaningful local accountability mechanisms, 
resulting mistrust is likely to undermine collective action in the interests of local 
security. The analysis presented in this thesis supports a large body of recent empirical 
research from Africa and elsewhere that demonstrates the usefulness of collective 
action analysis in explaining the underproduction of development goods at the local 
level, and the perverse outcomes that can result from imposition of ‘best practice’ 
institutional forms (e.g. Habyarimana et al. 2009; Cammack & Kanyongolo 2010; 
Olivier de Sardan et al. 2010; Bano 2012; Booth 2012). A more realistic approach to what 
‘communities’ can achieve is required, and policy must address how collective action 
problems might be overcome in specific locations, both at the local level and in terms 
of interactions between state agents, such as the police, and citizens.  
 
Secondly, as has been widely argued with regard to both participatory development 
and CP (see 2.3.2), attempts to promote citizen participation in service delivery must 
disavow the ‘myth of community’ (Gujit & Shah 1998), and recognise the existence of 
hierarchies, division and conflict within neighbourhoods. It is essential to appreciate 
the extent to which ‘global development concepts mould and are moulded by existing 
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social and political relationships’ (Mosse 1995: 144), with important implications for 
how the costs and benefits of participation are distributed. The findings presented here 
demonstrated the extent to which, in the absence of meaningful accountability 
mechanisms at the local level, ‘community’ initiatives can come to disproportionately 
benefit local elites, and to entail coercion and exacerbation of existing conflicts. 
 
The extent to which CP in Mwanza enabled existing local leaders to pursue their own 
agenda at the expense of other community members, thus exacerbating rather than 
mitigating social conflict and inequalities, is by no means unique to Tanzania, and has 
been described by Brogden (2004: 635) as common to experiences of CP in Africa and 
India, ‘almost without exception’. Similar outcomes have been observed in Kenya 
(Ruteere & Pommerolle 2002), South Africa (Baker 2002), in post-conflict African 
countries experimenting with CP including Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone and Uganda (Baker 2009b: 82-83), and in various Latin American countries 
(Brogden & Nijhar 2005: 183). 
 
This implies a role for state oversight, to ensure initiatives are not captured by the 
more powerful, and to mitigate the risk of discriminatory and violent policing 
associated with empowering local security providers (Baker 2009b; Mansuri & Rao 
2013). However, the Tanzanian case indicates that the capacity of state agencies to 
ensure equitable outcomes, and their commitment to doing so, should not be taken for 
granted (see 2.5). As Baker (2009b: 82-3) observes regarding the domination of CP 
institutions by local elites and existing leaders in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, the 
police forces that implemented CP reforms had no intention that community 
representatives should be any other than existing elites. As is the case in Tanzania, 
evidence from Nigeria (Hills 2012a), Sierra Leone (Baker 2008a) and South Africa 
(Schärf 2001; Minnaar 2009), suggests that police objectives for CP may be more 
instrumental and pragmatic than the rhetoric of CP suggests. It should also not be 
assumed that co-producing goods and services with groups of organised citizens is a 
cheap or easy option for state actors. Rather, additional resources and personnel may 
be required that are often unaffordable for African police forces (see also Frühling 2009 
on CP in Latin America).  
 
Thirdly, the experience of CP in Tanzania illustrates the extent to which participation 
imposes costs on communities, which may outweigh any benefits attained. Like other 
countries in the region, Tanzania adopted an ‘African model’ of CP (Baker 2009a: 373), 
which entails the delegation of many policing responsibilities to communities, with 
varying degrees of support and oversight from the state. Rather than assuming that 
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community-based service provision offers a low cost alternative to state provision, the 
feasibility of expecting community members to provide services without remuneration 
should be questioned. The recognition that communities are stratified in numerous 
ways also calls for attention to the way in which these costs and benefits are 
distributed across communities. The case presented here suggests that there are clear 
incentives for service delivery to become commercialised to some extent under these 
circumstances, with a corresponding impact on the equity of delivery and access to 
services for the poorest. As Kyed (2010: 22) argues with regard to CP in Mozambique, 
it is necessary to reconsider whether CP, and other forms of participatory service 
delivery predicated upon voluntarism, are reasonable propositions, particularly as 
provision of collective goods and services such as policing entail opportunities for 
financial and political gains. A more realistic approach would recognise that people’s 
participation in ‘community’ initiatives, and even their emergence, may be a result of 
the pursuit of private or group gains, rather than a product of some kind of community 
solidarity (Mercer 2002; Ayee & Crook 2003).  
 
Finally, practices that are framed in terms of current development trends, such as 
participation or community policing, should be understood within their historical 
context. In Tanzania, CP practices at the local level have been influenced by 
understandings of participation and self-help that developed during the one-party era, 
whereby emphasis is placed on coercion and obligation rather than citizen 
empowerment, as well as histories of state-sponsored sungusungu vigilantism. Indeed, 
the implementation of international policy prescriptions for police reform frequently 
has outcomes other than those anticipated due to the impact of political ideologies, the 
history of state-society relations and localised models of policing (Davis et al. 2003; 
Kyed 2010 on Mozambique; Steinberg 2011 on South Africa; Hills 2012b on Nigeria). 
Policymakers should thus be aware of the extent to which older forms of political 
mobilisation might be re-cast in terms of contemporary buzzwords, belying the 
ostensibly democratizing or empowering effects of these reforms.   
 
8.8 Future research directions   
 
This case study was geographically limited to urban Mwanza. At present there is very 
little information available about how CP has been implemented or received in rural 
areas, or how the new language of polisi jamii has shaped, or been shaped by, pre-
existing informal policing institutions, such as sungusungu. Interesting possibilities are 
suggested, however, by Suzette Heald’s (2006) work on the introduction and 
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subsequent re-modelling of sungusungu amongst the Kuria of northern Tanzania, and 
research in neighbouring Kenya and Mozambique that explores how discourses of CP 
have been used, shaped or rejected by existing institutions engaged in providing 
security (Heald 2007; Mkutu 2009; Kyed 2009). The popularity of CP in the region 
means that there is great potential for cross-country comparative research, which 
might provide further illumination of the complex relationships between ‘traditional’ 
and contemporary modes of policing, the impact of political competition on various 
forms of CP and the kinds of partnerships with state police that might facilitate 
effective and equitable collective action for local security. In Kenya, sungusungu has in 
places degenerated into ‘Kenya’s deadliest gang’ (The Standard 2011), which raises 
intriguing questions as to the factors that might make CP look more like organised 
crime than ‘community-based’, ‘democratic’ crime prevention.  
 
Although police officers participated in the research presented here, and their attitudes 
and opinions are crucial to the conclusions reached, there is scope for deeper analysis 
of the extent to which CP has brought about a change in police occupational culture, 
and how sustainable any impact can be in the absence of improved working and living 
conditions and remuneration and in light of the political pressures faced by police. 
Evidence from elsewhere in Africa does not inspire optimism as to the likely impact of 
police reform (Hills 2008, 2009). However, the Tanzanian reform has been more 
internally driven than many other regional examples, and it does appear that at senior 
levels there is strong support for CP and a more service oriented force. However, at the 
same time, the police continue to be accused of political bias and of perpetrating 
brutality with impunity. The next general elections (due in 2015) and a forthcoming 
referendum on a new constitution in 2014 will provide interesting arenas in which to 
consider these questions, as well as the extent to which community police are drawn 
into party political competition.  
 
8.9 Conclusion  
 
This thesis firstly contributes to empirical knowledge regarding the forms of policing 
to which Tanzanian citizens can look for protection from crime and other threats. This 
is important at a time when scholars and policymakers are increasingly recognising the 
diversity of security providers in African states, and considering the potential to look 
to ‘non-state’ actors as a supplement or alternative to state provision of security. This is 
not a new policy concern in Tanzania, and the thesis explores the long history of 
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attempts to co-opt or promote ‘community-based’ forms of policing, and particularly 
sungusungu.  
 
The findings summarised in this chapter are also pertinent to broader debates about 
the roles of states and communities in the provision of collective goods and services. 
These dilemmas are particularly challenging when the good in question is as 
contentious and contingent on power relations as ‘security’. The case study 
demonstrates the importance of interrogating normative assumptions regarding the 
nature of ‘community’ or ‘non-state’ governance. Although CP sometimes proved 
highly effective at reducing threats to security, it was not necessarily more responsive 
or accountable to citizens, being built upon existing local governance institutions 
which tend to lack transparency and meaningful accountability mechanisms. This, in 
addition to the politicised and often coercive nature of the pursuit of local 
development, also limited the extent to which collective participation in CP was 
sustained. CP also reflected, and sometimes exacerbated, existing divisions and 
hierarchies within communities. This affected the way in which the costs and benefits 
of participation in CP were distributed and meant that some parts of the community 
gained additional powers to regulate the behaviour of others.  
 
Co-producing security with the state police did lead to perceived improvements in 
comparison to the systematic use of violence of the sungusungu of the past. However, 
emphasis was placed on community support for the police, rather than police 
providing services to engaged communities. It can be argued that CP has been 
successful in some places in extending ‘policing’ beyond the limited reach of the state 
police, but the ‘community’ character of the service provided is more ambiguous and, 
may be said to refer to the fact that communities must provide resources and labour.  
 
As argued in the final sections of this chapter, however, local security arrangements 
are liable to change as opportunities, incentives and alliances shift. Tanzania’s 
changing political landscape is challenging the way in which public goods have 
historically been produced locally, whilst at the national level the police are frequently 
accused of partisanship in increasingly violent confrontations over political space. 
Whether these trends will lead to greater demand for more responsive local leadership 
or more repressive policing of politically troublesome youth remains to be seen.  
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February 2011 
 
Sgt-Nyamagana, sergeant based at Nyamagana District HQ. Interviewed: 10 
November 2010; 24 January 2011; 10 September 2011; 19 November 2011 
 
Police officers interviewed in Dar es Salaam (national headquarters) 
 
SACP LK. Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police L. Kusima, head of the Tanzania 
Police Reform Programme Change Management Team. Interviewed: 18 October 2011 
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ACP K. Assistant Commissioner of Police E. Kiondo, head of the Kitengo cha Polisi Jamii 
(community policing department). Interviewed: 25 March 2011; 11 October 2011 
 
ASP IM. Assistant Superintendent of Police I. Mahumi, Tanzania Police Reform 
Programme Change Management Team. Interviewed: 18 October 2011 
 
Private security contractors in Mwanza  
 
PSC1, owner of small Mwanza based company. Interviewed: 19 February 2011 
PSC2, manager of large multinational firm. Interviewed: 9 September 2011 
PSC3, owner of small Mwanza based company. Interviewed: 15 July 2011 
 
Other  
 
Anna Mtani, Safer Cities Dar es Salaam. Interviewed: 24 March 2011  
 
Chris Peter Maina (Professor), University of Dar es Salaam. Interviewed: 23 March 
2011 
 
District Militia Advisor, Nyamagana District. Interviewed: 1 March 2011  
 
John Wanga, former municipal solicitor, Mwanza. Interviewed: 8 November 2010 
 
Member of ABG security management team. Interviewed: 13 January 2011 
 
Semboja Haji (Dr), University of Dar es Salaam. Interviewed: 7 October 2011 
 
Ward Executive Officers of 8 Wards in Nyamagana and Ilemela Districts, including 
WEO-BT 16.8.11; 11.2.11. 
 
Survey respondents  
 
108 people residents of mitaa A, B and C were included in a survey (36 residents in 
each case site). Survey respondents were allocated a number and any reference to data 
collected from the open-ended questions included in the survey is indicated as follows: 
survey-n (where n is the number allocated to the survey participant). Respondents 1-36 
were resident in A, 37-72 were resident in B and 73-108 were resident in C.  
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Appendix A: Survey Questionnaire (English translation) 
 
• Male/female 
• Owner/tenant 
• Relationship to head of household if applicable:   
• Age: 
• Length of time living in this location: 
• Sub-ward in which house was located before administrative reorganisation in 
2009: 
• Observations of dwelling (including electricity; construction materials – 
permanent v semi-permanent; general condition; gate?; glass or mesh in 
window frames?):  
 
Before CP  
 
1. How safe was it to walk on your own in the mtaa during the daytime before CP 
started?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
1.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
2. (If respondent is male) How safe was it for a woman to walk on her own in the 
mtaa during the daytime before CP started?   
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
2.b) If answered c or d, why?  
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3. How safe was it for a child to walk on their own in the mtaa during the daytime 
before CP started?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
3.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
4. How safe was it to walk on your own in the mtaa at night before CP started?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
4.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
5. (If respondent is male) How safe was it for a woman to walk on her own in the 
mtaa at night before CP started?   
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
5.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!
3;@!
6. How safe was it for a child to walk on their own in the mtaa at night before CP 
started?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
6.b? If answered c or d, why?  
 
7. How safe was it to be at home on your own at night before CP started?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
7.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
8. (If respondent is male) how safe was it for a woman to be on her own at home at 
night before CP started?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
8.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
9. How safe was it for a child to be on their own at home at night before CP started?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
9.b) If answered c or d, why?  
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10. Was it safe to leave valuable objects at home when you went out before CP 
started?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
10.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
Since CP  
 
11. How safe is it to walk in the mtaa on your own in the daytime? 
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
11.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
12. (If respondent is male) how safe is it for a woman to walk in the mtaa on her 
own in the daytime?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
12.b) If answered c or d, why?  
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13. How safe is it for a child to walk in the mtaa on their own in the daytime?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
13.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
14. How safe is it to walk on your own in the mtaa after dark?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
14.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
15. (If respondent is male) how safe is it for a woman to walk on her own in the 
mtaa at night?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
15.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
16. How safe is it for a child to walk on their own in the mtaa at night?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
16.b) If answered c or d, why?  
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17. How safe is it to be at home on your own at night?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
17.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
18. (If respondent is male) how safe is it for a woman to be at home on her own at 
night?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
18.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
19. How safe is it for a child to be on their own at home at night?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
19.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
20. Is it safe to leave valuable items at home when you go out?  
a. Very safe 
b. Quite safe 
c. Not safe  
d. Very dangerous  
e. Don’t know 
 
20.b) If answered c or d, why?  
 
 
!!
3A"!
21. Have you been a victim of crime since you have lived here?  
 
21.b) If so, when?  
 
21.c) Where did this take place?  
 
21.d) Where did you report the crime?  
 
21.e) What action was taken?  
 
21.f) Were you satisfied with the outcome? Why?  
 
21.g) If you did not report the incident, why not?  
 
(Repeated in case of multiple incidents)  
 
22. What kind of people are responsible for crimes in the area?  
 
23. Are any areas of the mtaa particularly dangerous? Where?  
 
24. Do you think that CP has improved security in the mtaa? 
a. Has helped a lot 
b. Has helped a small amount 
c. Has not made a difference 
d. Has made things worse  
e. Don’t know  
 
25. Rate the ability of the community police to prevent crime in the mtaa: 
a. Extremely good 
b. Good 
c. Sometimes good, sometimes bad 
d. Not good 
e. Very bad 
f. They do not do anything to prevent crime in the mtaa 
g. Don’t know  
 
25.b) Please explain why you think this is the case.  
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26. Rate the ability of the community police to investigate crime in the mtaa:  
a. Extremely good 
b. Good 
c. Sometimes good, sometimes bad 
d. Not good 
e. Very bad 
f. They do not do anything to prevent crime in the mtaa 
g. Don’t know  
 
26.b) Please explain why you think this is the case. 
 
27. Did you participate in selecting the leaders of CP?  
 
27.b) If yes, what criteria were important in choosing? And which was the most 
important?  
 
28. Have you, or somebody within your household:  
a. participated in CP? 
b. contributed financially to CP?  
 
29. Do you think it’s fair to participate in/contribute to CP?  
 
29.b) If no, why not? 
 
 
30. Do you think that the service provided is worth your contribution?  
 
30.b) If no, why not?  
 
 
31. Do you have any complaints about the behaviour of the community police?  
 
31.b) If yes, what?  
 
 
 
31.c) Have you taken any action over this? Were you satisfied with the outcome?  
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32. What would improve community policing?  
 
 
34. Rate the ability of the police to prevent crime in the mtaa:  
a. Extremely good 
b. Good 
c. Sometimes good, sometimes bad 
d. Not good 
e. Very bad 
f. They do not do anything to prevent crime in the mtaa 
g. Don’t know  
 
34.b) Please explain why you think this is the case.  
 
35. Rate the ability of the police to investigate crime in the mtaa:  
a. Extremely good 
b. Good 
c. Sometimes good, sometimes bad 
d. Not good 
e. Very bad 
f. They do not do anything to prevent crime in the mtaa 
g. Don’t know  
 
35.b) Please explain why you think this is the case.  
 
36. Do you think the way in which the police do their work has changed over the 
past 5 years?  
 
 
37. Do you, or any members of your household, have any complaints relating to 
previous experience of the service provided by the police?  
 
37.b) If yes, what?  
 
 
37. c) Have you taken any action over this? Were you satisfied with the outcome?  
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38. Where would you report a crime that occurred in the mtaa?  
 
38.b) Why?  
 
39. What steps do you and your family take to protect your own person and 
property?  
a. Employ guard 
b. Have dog 
c. Have locks on doors 
d. Have whistle 
e. Have telephone number of mtaa chairperson 
f. Have telephone number of police 
g. Have weapon  
h. Have gate/walls around house 
i. Have light outside house  
j. Other 
 
40. What do you do to earn a living?  
 
41. What is the highest level of education you have attained?  
 
42. Do you, or your household, own any of the following items:  
a. A television 
b. A Fridge 
c. A car 
 
43. Over the past year, have you lacked the means to pay for any of the following: 
a. Food  
b. Money for medical treatment  
c. Children’s school fees 
 
44. Are you a member of a political party? Which one?  
 
 
45. Do you participate in any other voluntary activities? 
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Appendix B: Demographic Profile of Survey Respondents 
!
36 people were interviewed in each case site to give a total of 108 respondents. Half of 
the respondents in each site were female (56) and half were male (56). Percentages 
given are rounded to nearest whole number.  
 
Table B- 1: Distribution of respondents by age (%) 
 18-25 
 
26-35 36-45 46-60 Over 60 
A (n=36) 33 33 8 22 3 
B (n=36) 28 50 11 6 6 
C (n=36) 19 25 33 19 3 
Total (n=108) 27 36 18 16 4 
 
 
Table B- 2: Distribution of respondents by quality of dwelling (4=highest) (%)361  
 1  2 3 4  
A (n=36) 11 75 14 0 
B (n=36) 11 44 28 17 
C (n=36) 14 56 25 6 
Total (n=108) 12 58 22 7 
 
 
Table B- 3: Distribution of respondents by level of formal education (%) 
 Did not 
complete 
primary 
school 
Completed 
primary 
school 
Secondary 
education 
up to Form 
4  
Completed 
secondary 
school 
(Form 6) 
Completed 
secondary 
school and 
subsequent 
vocational 
training 
Studying 
for 
university 
degree  
A (n=36) 6 64 25 0 3 3 
B (n=36) 3 36 36 14 8 0 
C (n=36) 11 58 14 3 11 0 
Total 
(n=108) 6 53 25 6 22 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
361 1 = small, metal roof held down with stones, mud bricks, no electricity, mesh in window frames. 2 = 
concrete walls, permanent metal roof, some problems with maintenance, may not have electricity, mesh in 
window frames. 3 = concrete walls, permanent metal roof, mesh in window frames, may have wall around 
compound, electricity connection. 4 = concrete painted walls, permanent metal or tiled roof, glass window 
panes, wall around compound, electricity connection. 
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Table B- 4: Distribution of respondents by occupation (%) 
 Unemployed 
(and seeking 
employment) 
Low 
income 
informal 
sector work 
(e.g. market 
trader, 
minibus 
taxi 
conductor)  
Skilled 
labourer/lower 
level salaried 
employee (e.g. 
nurse, sign 
painter) 
Small 
business 
owner or 
better 
paid 
salaried 
employee 
(e.g. 
owner of 
small 
garage, 
engineer) 
Owner of 
larger 
business 
or highly 
paid 
salaried 
employee 
(e.g. NGO 
staff, 
importer 
of 
vehicles, 
director of 
school) 
Student Retired 
A 
(n=36) 3 22 44 19 3 6 3 
B 
(n=36) 3 14 25 19 17 19 3 
C 
(n=36) 0 61 17 6 6 11 6 
Total 
(n=108) 2 31 29 15 8 36 4 
 
Table B- 5: Distribution of respondents by possession of luxury goods (%) 
 Owns none of 
items 
Self/household 
owns 
television 
Self/household 
owns 
television and 
fridge 
Self-household 
owns 
television, 
fridge and car 
A (n=36) 50 25 19 3 
B (n=36) 28 22 33 17 
C (n=36) 69 14 11 6 
Total (n=108) 49 14 21 8 
 
 
Table B- 6: Distribution of respondents by inability to afford essential goods and services (%) 
 Has been 
forced to go 
without 
food at least 
once during 
the past 
year. 
Is always 
forced to go 
without 
sufficient 
food. 
Has been 
unable to 
afford 
necessary 
medical care 
for self or 
family at least 
once during 
past year. 
Is never able 
to afford 
healthcare 
for self or 
family. 
Has been 
unable to pay 
childrens’ 
school fees at 
least once 
during the 
past year. 
Is never 
able to 
pay 
childrens’ 
school 
fees. 
A (n=36) 28 0 25 6 31 8 
B (n=36) 28 0 6 0 14 0 
C (n=36) 53 0 47 0 47 14 
Total 
(n=108) 36 0 24 2 31 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
